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In  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  historians  in  the  United  States  
described  their  work  as  an  aesthetic  practice.  The  romantic  nationalist  George  Bancroft  
claimed  that  historical  writing  ought  to  provide  readers  with  a  series  of  beautiful  images  
that  would  “secure  the  affections”  of  the  American  people  for  the  U.S.  Constitution.  
William  H.  Prescott,  author  of  volumes  on  the  age  of  conquest,  introduced  his  most  
popular  work  by  claiming  that  he  wanted  to  present  his  readers  with  a  “picture  true  in  
itself”  and,  through  his  vividly  imaginative  descriptions,  “to  surround  them  in  the  spirit  
of  the  times.”  For  this  generation  of  historians,  their  magisterial  texts  were  not  simply  
more  or  less  true  accounts  of  European  experience  in  the  New  World  or  the  story  of  the  
nation’s  revolutionary  origins,  they  were  paintings  in  words—expressionistic  and  
romantic  images  that  would  make  the  passions,  conflicts,  and  virtues  of  previous  
generations  available  to  their  readers  as  an  imaginative  experience.  
Scholars  have  long  understood  the  various  forms  of  historical  consciousness  of  
the  nineteenth  century  as  producing  national,  imperial,  and  racial  orders  in  their  
imagination  of  the  United  States  as  the  locus  of  a  linear  and  progressive  flowering  of  
liberty  in  the  New  World.  My  project  supplements  these  totalizing  accounts  by  
examining  the  central  texts  of  nationalist  history  through  the  lens  of  literary  analysis  to  
    
v  
demonstrate  how  their  aesthetic  dimensions  both  enabled  and  disrupted  such  a  political  
and  temporal  imagination.  Romantic  history  emerged  in  an  era  of  pronounced  temporal  
crisis  for  the  United  States.  On  the  surface,  these  historians  sought  to  provide  readers  
with  experiences  of  an  otherwise  inaccessible  revolutionary  past  that  would  help  bind  a  
nation  confronting  fears  about  dissolution  in  exponential  westward  growth,  
immigration,  and  the  sectional  crisis  over  slavery.  Yet,  when  we  look  closer  at  these  
texts,  we  realize  that  they  contain  covert  recognitions  of  the  vitality  of  struggles  for  
freedom  taking  place  elsewhere—in  Haiti,  Mexico,  or  West  Indian  abolition—that  
exceeded  the  terms  of  U.S.  racial  republicanism  and  claimed  futures  at  odds  with  
nationalism’s  sense  of  historical  preeminence.  Both  compelled  and  horrified  by  the  
assertion  of  black  freedom  throughout  the  Atlantic  world,  the  beautiful  and  haunted  
images  of  romantic  history  registered  the  irruptive  force  of  transatlantic  political  
movements  nominally  inadmissible  within  U.S.  historical  discourse.    
While  romantic  historians  developed  aesthetic  norms  for  confronting  and  
disavowing  alternatives  to  national  orders  of  time  and  political  progress,  abolitionist  
writers  held  fast  to  these  disruptions  to  construct  an  aesthetics  of  slave  revolution.  In  the  
second  half  of  my  dissertation,  I  examine  the  trajectory  of  this  black  radical  tradition  
from  the  abolitionist  historians  of  the  antebellum  period  to  the  twentieth-­‐‑century  
thinkers  who  adapted  and  transformed  these  aesthetics  into  a  comprehensive  anti-­‐‑
imperialism.  Considering  writings  by  William  C.  Nell,  Martin  R.  Delany,  W.E.B.  Du  
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Bois,  and  C.L.R.  James  I  argue  that  this  tradition  did  more  than  reconstruct  histories  of  
black  political  life  that  had  been  suppressed  by  white  supremacist  orders  of  knowledge.  
These  writers  vitalized  history  with  alternate  models  of  freedom  as  immediate,  
proliferating,  and  eruptive—even  when  they  also  sought  for  signs  of  racial  progress  in  a  
linear  model.  In  their  vivid  descriptions  of  an  experience  of  freedom  that  was  irreducible  
to  linear  models  of  progress,  these  texts  produced  what  Walter  Benjamin  once  described  
as  “the  constructive  principle”  in  materialist  history:  “where  thinking  suddenly  halts  in  
a  constellation  overflowing  with  tensions,  there  it  yields  a  shock  to  the  same.”  This  
shock  of  overflowing  tensions  is  the  moment  when  history  becomes  aesthetic—when  
imaginative  excess  overturns  the  narrative  form  of  history.  I  ultimately  argue  that  the  
aesthetics  of  history  can  help  us  reconsider  the  political  stakes  of  historical  scholarship,  
allowing  us  to  think  about  the  writing  of  history  as  an  ongoing  encounter  with  freedom  
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Prologue: Futures Past of Global Democracy 
  
Little  has  been  more  indicative  of  the  United  States’  ambivalent  investments  in  
international  democratic  struggle  than  national  media  and  political  responses  to  the  
resistance  movements  and  social  upheavals  begun  in  2011  generically  known  as  the  
“Arab  Spring.”1  During  an  initial  phase  of  enthusiasm  a  consensus  formed  around  
                                                                                                              
1  Marc  Lynch,  one  of  the  first  commentators  to  label  the  “Arab  Spring,”  borrowed  the  name  from  a  separate  
sequence  of  protests  begun  in  Beirut  in  2005.  Lynch,  writing  for  Foreign  Policy,  introduced  the  term  in  a  
typically  neo-­‐‑imperialist  formulation  that  claims  distant  events  as  the  product  of  U.S.  foreign  policy.  “Are  
we  seeing  the  beginnings  of  the  Obama  administration  equivalent  of  the  2005  ‘Arab  Spring’,  when  the  
protests  in  Beirut  captured  popular  attention  and  driven  in  part  by  newly  powerful  satellite  television  
images  inspired  popular  mobilization  across  the  region  that  some  hoped  might  finally  break  through  the  
    
2  
seeing  in  the  protests  in  Egypt,  Bahrain,  Syria,  Libya,  and  elsewhere  conjoined  potentials  
for  improving  U.S.  relations  in  the  Middle  East  and  a  new  foothold  for  the  global  spread  
of  democracy.  A  frequent  rhetorical  collapse  of  U.S.  interests  into  democratic  values  was  
on  clear  display  in  Barack  Obama’s  May  19th,  2011,  address  on  Middle  Eastern  Policy  
when,  after  detailing  his  administration’s  positions  on  the  events  of  the  previous  few  
months,  he  invoked  a  mythic  comparison:  “[t]here  are  times  in  the  course  of  history  
when  the  actions  of  ordinary  citizens  spark  movements  for  change  because  they  speak  to  
a  longing  for  freedom  that  has  been  building  up  for  years  […]  the  defiance  of  those  
patriots  in  Boston  who  refused  to  pay  taxes  to  a  king,  or  the  dignity  of  Rosa  Parks  as  she  
sat  courageously  in  her  seat”  (qtd.  in  Dwyer).  While  neo-­‐‑imperialist  conflations  of  
freedom  with  the  spread  and  influence  of  U.S.  political  and  economic  capital  have  long  
been  a  feature  of  governmental  proclamations  about  foreign  policy—and  were  heavily  
employed  in  the  adventurist  rhetoric  surrounding  the  previous  administration’s  
invasion  of  Iraq—Obama’s  flair  for  the  mytho-­‐‑historical  reveals  a  lesser  remarked  upon  
temporal  and  affective  layer  to  this  imaginary.  The  contemporary  moment  of  global  
upheaval  is,  for  United  States  power,  an  event  that  effectively  took  place  in  the  past  at  
                                                                                                              
  





some  point  in  a  sequence  that  had  begun  in  1776  and  we  might  infer  ended  with  the  
passage  of  the  Civil  Rights  Act  in  1964.  The  logic  of  neo-­‐‑imperialism  on  display  is  a  
double  articulation  of  spatial  closeness  and  temporal  distance.  The  mythic  past  is  the  
lens  through  which  America  can  inspire  and  interpret  revolutionary  events  that  are  
increasingly  close  to  the  United  States  by  way  of  the  flows  of  global  capital  and  media,  
but  temporally  distant  and  only  now  beginning  to  catch  up  to  an  American  present  from  
which  such  forms  of  political  action  have  been  circumscribed.  While  employed  to  
naturalize  American  power  and  neo-­‐‑liberal  economic  and  political  goals,  this  myth  of  
history  generates  a  whole  series  of  desires  and  anxieties  that  seek  reflections  and  
affirmations  of  national  history  in  the  spectacle  of  democracy  elsewhere.    
Is  it  any  wonder  then,  that  in  the  years  since  the  first  rumblings  of  Middle  
Eastern  revolution,  the  changing  tides,  victories,  frustrations  and  violence  of  revolt  and  
repression  have  instigated  a  series  of  reversals  in  the  existential  theater  of  U.S.  partisan  
politics?  William  Kristol,  a  proponent  of  Bush-­‐‑era  neo-­‐‑conservatism,  voiced  concerns  
early  that  the  administration’s  positions  on  the  Arab  Spring  might  be  naïve,  even  as  he  
alternately  claimed  that  the  movement  “deserves  to  be  greeted  with  enthusiasm  and  
support.”  Even  Kristol’s  tentative,  nominally  realist,  embrace  of  these  political  
movements  came  with  its  own  articulation  of  a  historical  myth  of  domestic  politics:  
“[a]nd  who  knows?  Helping  the  Arab  Spring  through  to  fruition  might  contribute  to  an  
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American  Spring,  one  of  renewed  pride  in  our  country  and  confidence  in  the  cause  of  
liberty.”  Inverting  the  temporality  of  Obama’s  invocation,  Kristol  read  the  Arab  Spring  
as  a  signal  not  just  for  a  mythical  American  past,  but  also  for  a  present  in  which  affective  
attachment  to  that  past  has  withered.  In  this  formulation,  witnessing  (and  perhaps  
guiding)  the  emergence  of  new  Middle-­‐‑Eastern  democracies  should  renew  such  
attachments—taken  here  as  something  of  a  national  birthright—and  the  mediated  
closeness  of  revolution  abroad  should,  in  a  sense,  bring  us  back  to  a  mythic  past  in  
which  we  were  as  passionately  invested  in  our  own  freedoms.    
As  conservative  criticisms  of  Obama’s  rhetorical  support  for  the  ending  of  the  
Mubarak  regime  in  Egypt  and  his  approach  to  military  intervention  in  Libya  became  
more  insistent,  they  tended  to  hinge  on  the  same  fantasy.  On  the  one  hand,  Senator  John  
McCain  supplied  the  talking  point  that  Obama  had  “led  from  behind”  in  Libya.  The  
weight  of  this  charge  was  in  the  suggestion,  often  repeated  throughout  conservative  
media  sources,  that  Obama’s  actions  in  office  did  not  demonstrate  a  sufficient  affective  
attachment  to  forms  of  “freedom”  that  only  could  be  articulated  through  invocations  of  
national  history.  On  the  other  side,  self-­‐‑proclaimed  realists  took  up  Kristol’s  earlier  
skepticism  to  raise  anxieties  about  the  specter  of  instability  in  the  Middle  East  and  the  
growth  of  Islamic  fundamentalism.  This  response  was  memorialized  by  an  infamous  
Newsweek  cover  that  proclaimed  the  widespread  existence  of  “Muslim  rage”  by  way  of  a  
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dubiously  de-­‐‑contextualized  photograph  of  protesters,  faces  frozen  and  distorted  in  a  
forever  incomprehensible  yell.  This  debate  produced  the  Arab  Spring  as  unfathomably  
other  to  U.S  interests  and  democracy  and  thus  incommensurable  to  the  terms  of  national  
history  Obama  had  invoked  in  his  earlier  speech.  For  many,  in  line  with  ongoing  
attempts  at  de-­‐‑legitimization,  the  failure  of  the  Arab  Spring  to  re-­‐‑enact  American  history  
also  marked  Obama  as  potentially  foreign  to  that  past;  he  became  a  symbolic  bearer  of  
the  fraying  of  the  affective  attachments  that  Kristol  had  once  hoped  the  Arab  Spring  
might  revitalize.  
These  two  seemingly  contradictory  strands  of  anxiety  and  desire  came  together  
in  the  debate  and  investigations  into  the  attacks  on  the  U.S.  embassy  in  Benghazi.    
Presidential  candidate  Mitt  Romney  raised  these  concerns  throughout  his  campaign.  He  
suggested  alternately  that  the  attack  proved  that  Obama  had  been  naïve  to  identify  in  
the  Arab  Spring  a  democratic  movement  in  line  with  U.S.  interests  and  that  Obama’s  
immediate  response  to  the  attack  revealed  that  Obama  himself  was  not  acting  in  line  
with  “our”  interests  and  that  his  administration  had  attempted  to  cover-­‐‑up  the  nature  of  
the  attacks  in  the  initial  aftermath,  so  as  to  obscure  this  twin  failure.  Many  of  Obama’s  
defenders  in  the  political  media  have  wondered  about  the  rationality  of  such  arguments,  
seeing  the  accusation  of  naiveté  as  logically  contradicting  the  accusations  of  nefarious,  
counter-­‐‑American  motivations.  Picking  apart  Republican  arguments,  Matt  Steinglass  
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wrote  in  a  widely  circulated  blog  post  for  The  Economist  that  “the  underlying  accusation  
about  Benghazi  is  that  the  Obama  administration  deliberately  mischaracterized  the  
terrorist  attack  there  as  having  grown  out  of  a  spontaneous  demonstration  because  that  
would  be  less  politically  damaging.  Such  a  cover-­‐‑up  would  have  made  no  sense  
because  the  attack  would  not  have  been  less  politically  damaging  had  it  grown  out  of  a  
spontaneous  demonstration”  [emphasis  in  the  original].  Although  Steinglass  expressed  
exasperation  at  partisan  attacks  he  implicitly  accepted  their  underlying  logic;  popular  
opposition  to  American  power  abroad  signifies  a  failure  of  democracy  equivalent  to  
outright  insurgency.  Either  way  such  rhetoric  bespeaks  the  possibility  that  Obama  had  
dangerously  misread  the  situation  in  Libya.  Admittedly,  Steinglass’s  intention  was  to  
protect  the  Obama  administration  from  such  attacks,  but  in  defusing  the  charge  of  
nefarious  motivations  he  inadvertently  raises  the  specter  of  naiveté—and  either  way,  
Obama  had  failed  to  continue  a  democratic  tradition  birthed  in  a  mythic  past.  
Arguments  like  those  of  Steinglass—mostly  expressions  of  partisan  frustration—
remain  on  the  surface  of  political  discourse.  They  fail  to  account  for  the  habits  of  
thought,  fantasies,  and  emotional  investments  that,  nevertheless,  make  such  seemingly  
incredible  arguments  compelling  to  at  least  some.  Those  arguments  are  so  powerfully  
enticing  not  because  they  rest  on  realist  approximations  of  credible  motivations,  but  
because  they  articulate  existential  claims  about  the  nation  in  relation  to  a  more  widely  
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articulated  desire  to  discover  reflections  of  its  own  history  in  foreign  space.  The  central  
hermeneutic  that  enables  such  an  articulation  is  the  one  previously  taken  up  by  Obama  
himself;  events  elsewhere  can  be  recognized  as  democratic  movements  by  way  of  their  
repetition  of  mythic  national  history.  As  those  events  swerve  from  that  limited  legibility  
(as  almost  inevitably  they  would,  occasioned  by  different  circumstances,  constrained  by  
different  structures  of  power  and  capital,  and  conducted  by  agents  who  do  not  always  
fit  a  nationalist  or  liberal  image  of  political  subjectivity)  then  a  misreading  (such  as  
Obama’s)  becomes  both  naïve  and  suspicious.  Since  the  reading  of  the  present  through  
the  lens  of  history  has  been  coded  as  both  a  matter  of  political  knowledge  
(understanding  the  Constitution,  identifying  allies)  and  emotion  (vigorous  feelings  for  
liberty,  stewardship  of  freedom)  a  missed  recognition  becomes  the  occasion  of  national  
existential  crisis  and  the  anxiety  that  we  have  become  alienated  from  our  own  mythical  
past.  This  coming  together  of  the  interpretive  power  of  history  with  political  emotion  
exemplifies  the  ongoing  consequences  of  the  aesthetics  of  history  whose  genealogy  this  
dissertation  intends  to  trace.  
I  begin  with  these  recent  political  debates  not  to  make  a  partisan  critique—both  
major  parties  reproduce  the  mytho-­‐‑historical  hermeneutic  that  generates  the  anxieties  
and  desires  I  have  begun  to  trace.  Rather,  I  want  to  call  attention  to  how  contemporary  
dramas  in  political  discourse  are  underwritten  by  an  aesthetic  vision  of  history  and  
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democracy  concerned  with  the  power  of  political  actors  to  identify  the  continuities  and  
breaks  between  the  past  and  future  as  a  matter  of  vision  and  feeling.  This  “structure  of  
feeling,”  to  use  Raymond  Williams’s  vital  phrase,  is  the  system  of  desires  and  emotions  
produced  by  United  States  neo-­‐‑imperialism,  understood  in  a  double  sense.  First,  neo-­‐‑
imperialism  refers  to  a  global  economic  and  juridical  structure  in  which  a  previous  
model  of  direct  colonial  domination  has  been  supplanted  by  investments  of  capital,  
legislation  of  trade  agreements,  and  international  development  directives  that  takes  the  
“developed”  nation  that  supplies  and  extracts  capital  as  its  teleological  model.2  Second,  
it  is  a  discourse  of  nationalism,  long  incubated,  that  takes  the  imperial  state  as  the  
central  source  of  trans-­‐‑historical,  global  values  (democracy  and  liberty)  and  imagines  a  
global  future  as  already  articulated  in  the  national  present.  Neo-­‐‑imperialism  abstracts  
and  re-­‐‑encodes  global  space  in  a  hierarchical  matrix  of  relative  temporal  distance  and  
closeness  to  alternately  economically  developed  and/or  advanced  democratic  states.    
That  mythical  temporal  re-­‐‑encoding  of  global  space  is  riven  with  violence.  Talal  
Asad  has  argued  that  the  mythical  aspects  of  how  the  modern  liberal  state  justifies  its  
global  power  should  not  be  considered  yet  another  layer  of  ideological  obfuscation  
beyond  which  a  rational  and  just  modernity  can  be  achieved.  Rather,  the  aspiration  
towards  universal  liberal  democracy  is  itself  a  myth.  Asad  powerfully  suggests  that  such  
                                                                                                              
2  The  now-­‐‑canonical  description  of  the  material  aspects  of  this  international  order  can  be  found  in  Hardt  and  
Negri’s  Empire  (2000).  
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a  myth  is  based  in  the  violence  “of  universalizing  reason  itself.  For  to  make  an  
enlightened  space,  the  liberal  must  continually  attack  the  darkness  of  the  outside  world  
that  threatens  to  overwhelm  that  space”  (59).  In  liberal  political  discourse  in  the  United  
States,  the  aspiration  towards  universal  democracy  rewrites  global  space  on  a  
teleological  temporal  axis  in  which  each  nation  is  viewed  as  working  to  catch  up,  as  it  
were,  with  the  paradigmatic  narrative  of  modern  political  and  economic  development:  
U.S.  nationalist  history.  But  in  the  deviance  of  contemporary  events  from  that  
paradigm—from  a  past  that  would  provide  a  stable  model  for  imagining  the  future—the  
same  political  discourse  comes  to  embrace  violence  against  the  agents  of  these  ruptures  
not  only  to  protect  the  future  of  the  liberal  order,  but  also  to  contain  the  existential  crises  
occasioned  by  sudden  shocking  knowledge  that  the  mythical  national  past  may  no  
longer  be  a  guide  to  the  future.  This  dissertation  project  seeks  to  understand  this  
political  imaginary  as  an  aesthetics  of  history:  a  formal  code  for  the  imaginative  
description  of  what  progress  towards  democracy  looks  and  feels  like.  This  aesthetics  
encodes  richly  sensate  descriptions  of  history  with  a  powerfully  affective  sense  of  the  
relationship  between  the  past  and  the  future.  It  was  first  produced  in  the  confrontation  
of  antebellum  nationalist  historians  with  events  in  the  Atlantic  World  that  sought  to  
push  beyond  the  racial  limits  of  U.S.  democracy.  In  what  follows,  I  conduct  a  
genealogical  inquiry  into  how  this  aesthetic’s  tendency  to  produce  deeply  unstable  
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political  affects  first  became  a  habit  of  thought  in  hegemonic  understandings  of  the  
relationships  among  history,  nation,  race,  temporality,  and  the  global  future  of  
democracy.  
  
The Temporality of Historical Nationalism 
 
My  genealogical  examination  of  this  aesthetics  looks  to  the  nationalist  and  
imperial  moment  of  the  decades  between  1830  and  1860  that  saw  the  writing  and  
publication  of  the  first  major  nationalist  histories.  These  histories,  primarily  concerned  
with  European  colonial  encounters  and  conflicts  in  the  Americas  between  the  years  of  
discovery  and  the  American  Revolution,  aimed  to  produce  a  concrete  sense  of  time  as  
culminating  in  the  emergence  and  spread  of  democracy  in  the  New  World  with  the  
United  States  as  the  privileged  agent  of  what  would  have  been  called  historical  
providence.  While  the  general  sense  that  the  United  States  held  some  significance  as  a  
bearer  of  a  democratic  future  was  widespread  in  the  political  rhetoric  and  literary  
cultures  of  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century—John  O’Sullivan’s  1839  invocation  of  
“the  great  nation  of  futurity”  in  The  Democratic  Review  remains  its  most  remarked  upon  
formulation—these  historians  were  some  of  the  first  to  produce  a  thorough  affective  
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mapping  of  history  along  a  teleological  axis  aimed  at  the  emergence  of  the  nation.3  
Scholars  of  the  period  have  tended  to  associate  these  formulations  of  providence  with  
the  expansionist  violence  of  “Manifest  Destiny,”  and  the  direct  domination  and  
subjugation  of  American  Indians,  but  they  have  only  recently  begun  to  interrogate  the  
consequences  of  this  project  as  an  affective  matrix  of  indirect  domination  and  
imperialism.  My  dissertation  proposes  reading  this  discourse  as  generating  an  early  
forms  of  the  emotions  that  would  structure  felt  responses  to  the  neo-­‐‑imperialism  of  the  
late  nineteenth,  twentieth,  and  twenty-­‐‑first  century.  Like  the  travel  writing  analyzed  by  
Mary  Louise  Pratt  in  Imperial  Eyes  (1992)—a  genre  from  which  these  historians  borrowed  
both  knowledge  of  foreign  locales  and  techniques  of  describing  and  coding  space—
antebellum  historical  writing  was  not  merely  an  interpretation  of  a  narrowly  defined  
national  past,  but  a  mode  of  encountering  and  interpreting  contemporary  events  by  
reading  them  through  a  model  of  temporal  progress  that  they  named  Providence.      
The  names  of  many  of  the  historians  engaged  in  this  project  remain  familiar—
George  Bancroft,  Edward  Motley,  William  H.  Prescott  and  Francis  Parkman—but  with  
few  exceptions  their  works  have  long  vanished  from  professional  respectability  and  
                                                                                                              
3  Of  course,  the  use  of  providence  to  describe  the  success  of  the  American  Revolution  (prospective  and  
retrospective)  predates  the  1830s,  but  the  histories  written  by  the  generation  of  the  so-­‐‑called  revolutionary  
historians  like  Mercy  Otis  Warren  were  more  limited  in  scope.  I  am  here  interested  in  how  such  a  large  
variety  of  events  on  the  American  continent  besides  the  American  Revolution  were  unified  not  only  by  an  
overarching  narrative  of  national  progress  but  also  romantic  feelings  of  veneration  for  national  potential  in  
scenes  of  past  struggle.  
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popular  appeal.  They  remain,  to  both  the  guild  of  historians  and  American  Studies  
scholars,  examples  of  the  corrupting  and  destructive  force  of  nationalism  on  historical  
objectivity  and  critical  thought.  In  his  account  of  nineteenth-­‐‑century  historiography,  
David  Noble  went  as  far  as  to  label  the  antebellum  generation  as  “historians  against  
history”:  founders  of  a  tradition  of  historical  writing  in  thrall  of  an  ideology  of  American  
Exceptionalism  that  reproduced  the  Puritans’  prejudices  against  American  Indians  at  the  
expense  of  moral  complication  and  material  specificity.  More  typically,  historians  have  
merely  dismissed  the  writings  of  this  generation  as  constituting  a  pre-­‐‑objective  and  thus  
pre-­‐‑professional  past.4  Even  as  the  centrality  of  objectivity  to  history  has  come  under  
question  by  theorists  inspired  alternatively  by  structuralism,  the  genealogical  inquiries  
of  Michel  Foucault,  feminism,  and  post-­‐‑colonial  studies,  few  have  thought  to  re-­‐‑examine  
the  purported  pre-­‐‑professionalism  of  the  antebellum  generation.  5      
One  exception  to  this  silence  is  Eileen  Ka-­‐‑May  Cheng’s  useful  study  of  early  
national  American  historical  writing,  The  Plain  and  Noble  Garb  of  Truth  (2011).  Through  
painstaking  historical  recovery,  Cheng  reconstructs  the  system  of  epistemic  values  
under  which  these  historians  wrote  and  researched.  Central  to  this  system  was  the  
                                                                                                              
4  For  an  account  of  the  co-­‐‑emergence  of  the  twin  values  of  objectivity  and  professionalism  in  historical  
research  and  writing  see  Peter  Novick’s  That  Noble  Dream  (1988).  
  
5  Notable  challenges  to  historical  objectivity  include  Hayden  White’s  Metahistory  (1973);  Keith  Jenkins’  
Rethinking  History  (1991);  Joan  Scott’s  Gender  and  the  Politics  of  History  (1999);  Michel-­‐‑Rolph  Trouillot’s  
Silencing  the  Past  (1997);  and  Dipesh  Chakrabarty’s  Provincializing  Europe  (2007).  
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concept  of  impartiality,  which  was  seen  as  the  proper  exercise  of  judgment  by  the  
trained  historian.  In  contrast  to  objectivity,  which  sought  to  constrain  the  subjectivity  of  
the  historian  to  allow  for  the  presentation  of  facts  without  personal  prejudice,  
impartiality  asked  historians  to  become  actively  involved  in  the  construction  of  their  
texts  by  isolating  and  highlighting  educative  examples  of  moral  action  and  providing  
commentary  on  how  history  demonstrated  the  providential  emergence  of  American  
democracy.  In  Cheng’s  assessment,  the  nationalism  of  these  historians  was  not  a  
corruption  of  their  professional  standards,  but  an  ideal  measurement  of  moral  truth  that  
allowed  them  to  apply  impartial  judgments  to  the  text  of  the  past.  Moreover,  as  Cheng  
demonstrates,  these  judgments  were  hardly  as  monolithically  prejudiced  against  the  
native  populations  of  the  Americas  as  previous  assessments  of  historical  nationalism  
had  once  supposed.  Since  nationalism  was  a  regulative  ideal,  the  set  of  values  associated  
with  it  was  often  rallied  in  judgments  critical  of  European  settlers.  
While  Cheng’s  work  looks  to  occasion  a  re-­‐‑examination  of  an  epistemic  system  in  
isolation  from  the  prejudices  of  the  one  that  replaced  it,  it  does  little  to  unearth  the  ways  
that  this  regime  of  historical  knowledge  functioned  as  a  structure  of  feeling  for  an  
increasingly  expansionist  and  imperialist  nation.  American  studies  scholarship  and  
literary  criticism  has  been  more  attentive  to  these  concerns  in  a  general  sense,  even  if  
historical  writing  itself  has  often  been  left  under-­‐‑examined.  A  still  dominant  reading  of  
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the  relationship  between  nationalism  and  history  bases  its  claims  on  Benedict  
Anderson’s  materialist  account  of  how  literary  forms  produced  a  sense  of  what  he  calls  
linear  “empty  time.”  In  Imagined  Communities  (1983),  Anderson  argued  that  print  forms  
that  first  emerged  in  the  eighteenth  century—primarily  the  newspaper  and  the  novel—
helped  replace  a  pre-­‐‑modern,  religious  sense  of  time  based  on  cyclical  models  of  
recurrence  and  fulfillment  in  which  the  past  and  future  subsisted  within  the  present  
with  a  modern  temporal  structure  of  succession  and  simultaneity.  Under  this  emergent  
temporality,  the  past  and  the  future  were  firmly  separated  from  the  present  through  the  
production  and  division  of  a  succession  of  calendric  dates.  This  structure  of  time  
allowed  for  national  forms  of  imagined  communities  based  on  a  sense  of  sharing  the  
same,  empty,  moment  of  time  in  a  linear  procession  to  succeed  religious  and  kinship  
groups  rooted  in  local  ‘full’  continuities  across  longer  cycles  of  time.  As  Anderson  wrote,  
an  “American  will  never  meet  or  even  know  the  names  of  more  than  an  handful  of  his  
fellow-­‐‑Americans.  He  has  no  idea  of  what  they  are  up  to  at  any  one  time.  But  he  has  
complete  confidence  in  their  steady,  anonymous,  simultaneous  activity”  (26).    In  this  
reading,  the  writing  of  national  history  in  the  antebellum  period  helped  to  consolidate  
the  sense  of  linear  time  that  already  subsisted  in  the  national  form.  An  historian  like  
George  Bancroft,  whose  magisterial  History  of  the  United  States,  from  the  Discovery  of  the  
Continent  (1834-­‐‑1860)  was  one  of  the  major  works  of  the  period,  wrote  history  as  a  
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progressive,  linear  sequence  of  dates  whose  teleological  direction  was  the  American  
Revolution  and  the  emergence  of  democracy  in  the  New  World.  Thus,  nationalist  history  
contributed  to  the  expansionist  projects  of  the  1830s  and  1840s  by  projecting  forward  a  
providential  sense  that  the  trajectory  of  time  itself  was  towards  the  successive  expansion  
of  a  U.S.  “Empire  of  Liberty”—as  Jefferson  had  put  it—and  democracy.  Moreover,  it  
produced  the  present  as  the  horizon  of  an  emergent  national  future  over  which  the  
community  of  citizen  subjects  could  claim  full  authority.  
Research  in  a  number  of  fields  has  raised  doubts  about  this  totalizing  portrait.    
Even  before  Anderson  was  writing,  scholars  of  early  American  political  and  religious  
formations,  including  J.G.A  Pocock,  Bernard  Bailyn,  and  Sacvan  Bercovitch,  had  
suggested  that  such  forward  looking  nationalism  had  always  operated  in  conjunction  
and  competition  with  classically  Republican  and  Puritan  senses  of  time  as  entropic,  
corrupting  and  in  constant  need  of  revitalization  through  the  performance  of  political  
virtue  or  prophetic  jeremiad.6  However,  this  body  of  work  has  not  stopped  the  frequent  
shorthand  association  of  Andersonian  empty  time  with  nationalist  modernity.  As  Lloyd  
Pratt  has  pointed  out  in  a  complex  intervention,  even  in  the  so-­‐‑called  spatial  turn  in  
                                                                                                              
6  See  J.G.A.  Pocock’s  The  Machiavellian  Moment  (1975);  Bernard  Bailyn’s  The  Ideological  Origins  of  the  American  
Revolution  (1967);  Sacvan  Bercovitch’s  The  Puritan  Origins  of  the  American  Self  (1975)  and  The  American  
Jeremiad  (1978).  For  a  somewhat  more  recent  resuscitation  of  the  implications  of  these  arguments  for  
temporality  that  details  the  political  stakes  of  the  antebellum  historical  novel  see  Philip  Gould’s  Covenant  
and  Republic  (1996).  
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American  Studies—which  has  done  so  much  to  trouble  linear  periodizing  distinctions  in  
scholarship—it  is  often  taken  for  granted  that  the  abstractions  of  linear  time  are  
functional  throughout  a  global  modernity.  In  his  Archives  of  American  Time  (2010)  Pratt  
stages  this  problematic  in  a  compelling  reading  of  Laura  Doyle’s  Freedom’s  Empire  (2008).  
That  book  seeks  to  challenge  dominant  accounts  of  transatlantic  modernity  that  drew  
distinctions  among  nationalist,  imperialist,  and  racial  political  formations.  In  place  of  a  
picture  of  three  discreet  discourses  that  developed  at  separate  times  and  only  sometimes  
operated  in  conjunction,  Doyle  locates  in  the  Anglophone  novel  of  the  eighteenth  
century  a  figure  for  a  form  of  transnational  imperial  and  racial  identity  that  she  argues  
underwrote  a  whole  series  of  historically  particular  articulations.  She  labels  the  novel’s  
dramatization  of  the  process  of  abstraction  that  alienates  and  then  recodes  identity  in  a  
transatlantic  formation  as  the  “Atlantic  swoon”:  “[t]he  self  in  an  Atlantic  swoon  moment  
faces  an  abyss,  losing  an  old  social  identity  as  it  faints—only  to  reawaken,  uprooted  and  
yet  newly  racialized”  (7).  This  new  self  experiences  its  own  freedom  of  activity  across  a  
transnational  economic  sphere  as  predicated  on  its  subjective  position  within  a  national-­‐‑
racial  community  of  Englishness,  and  later,  American-­‐‑ness.  And,  as  Doyle  points  out,  
this  compensatory  sense  of  belonging  to  a  “free  people”  was  always  felt  in  distinction  to  
racially  marked  figures  of  abjection  whose  own  material  and  discursive  abstractions  
from  locality  by  Atlantic  economic  currents  could  not  be  retroactively  imagined  as  a  
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decision  made  in  freedom.  The  “Atlantic  swoon”  was  not  an  actual  event,  either  in  
history  or  in  the  life  of  the  individual;  it  was  a  fantasy  that  grounded  the  modern  liberal  
subject  in  nationalist,  imperialist,  and  racial  terms.    
Pratt’s  point  of  contention  with  Doyle’s  thesis  is  not  with  the  expanded  spatial  
scale  of  its  analysis  of  forms  of  modern  subjectivity.  Indeed,  one  of  her  most  profound  
contributions  to  an  understanding  of  an  Atlantic  modernity  is  her  contention  that  
national  belonging  was  articulated  alongside  forms  of  racial  and  imperial  dominance.  
Rather,  Pratt’s  concern  is  with  her  implicit  reproduction  of  a  totalizing  Andersonian  
model  of  a  modernity  founded  through  the  abstraction  of  selves  into  a  linear,  empty  
time.  He  reads  Doyle’s  work  to  suggest  that  print-­‐‑culture  in  Atlantic  modernity  
produces  a  singular  racialized  form  of  subjectivity  “from  which  there  is  neither  escape  
nor  shelter”  (194).  Pratt  challenges  this  totalizing  analysis  of  modern  subjectivity  and  
time  (taken  as  representative  of  the  “spatial  turn”  as  a  whole)  by  arguing  that,  even  
within  print  culture  and  the  hallowed  form  of  the  novel,  time  was  split  and  fractured,  
never  fully  cohering  into  a  simple,  modern,  forward-­‐‑moving  simultaneity.  Referring  to  
the  early  nationalist  and  antebellum  period  (often  associated  in  American  studies  with  
the  emergence  of  such  modern  temporality),  Pratt  suggests  that,  “this  particular  
temporal  conjecture  was  deeply  inhospitable  to  the  consolidation  of  national  and  racial  
identity”  (3).  In  place  of  singular  articulations  of  race,  nation,  and  imperialism  that  
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supposedly  emerged  with  print  culture,  Pratt  offers  up  the  experience  of  modern  time  as  
traceable  only  on  a  series  of  fractures  between  linear  temporality  and  other  forms  of  
circular  or  cyclical  time.  Relying  on  post-­‐‑colonial  studies  and  the  work  of  Homi  Bhabha  
and  Ian  Baucom  in  particular,  Pratt  argues  that  modernity  was  not  the  progressive  
displacement  of  pre-­‐‑modern  temporalities  with  linear  time,  but  the  co-­‐‑articulation  of  
multiple  temporalities  defined  in  a  hierarchical  relationship  with  each  other.7  Pratt’s  
argument  allows  us  to  further  grasp  how  modern  subjectivity  was  (and  is)  for  everyone  
an  uninhabitable  structure  of  subjectivization  (to  paraphrase  Judith  Butler)  and  the  
experience  of  modern  time  has  always  been  hybrid  and  fractured.8  In  other  words,  the  
laws  of  race  and  nation  that  produce  and  abstract  the  modern  subject  also  produce  a  
frame  for  reading  other  temporalities  as  “pre-­‐‑modern”  forms  of  belonging  that  the  
modern  individual  feels  herself  to  be  alienated  from,  haunted  by,  superior  to,  and/or  
desirous  of.    
For  Pratt,  there  are  vital  political  stakes  in  post-­‐‑colonial  theory’s  concept  of  
hybridity  that  he  wants  to  import  into  American  Studies.  He  argues  that  the  problem  
with  the  spatial  turn’s  inattention  to  temporality  is  that  it  forgets  “one  of  the  central,  (if  
often  forgotten)  points  of  postcolonial  studies”  (196).  The  hybrid  temporalities  of  
                                                                                                              
7  See  Bhabha’s  “DissemiNation”  (1990)  and  Baucom’s  “Globalit,  Inc.”  (2001).  
  
8  Butler’s  arguments  about  the  uninhabitability  of  modern  abstract  structures  of  subjectivity  are  developed  
in  detail  in  The  Psychic  Life  of  Power  (1997).  
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modern  print  forms  (and  especially  the  novel)  constitute  their  readers  as  also  inhabiting  
multiple,  fractured  times.  Thus  the  dominant  subject  position,  “the  white-­‐‑man,  the  
Anglo-­‐‑American  subject,  the  Englishman,  the  American,”  and  its  claim  to  authority  over  
modernity,  other  subject  positions,  and  the  future  “is  hybrid  too”  (196).  Another  way  to  
phrase  Pratt’s  point  would  be  to  suggest  that  critical  genealogies  of  power  need  to  be  
careful  not  to  reproduce  both  power’s  claim  to  ontological  purity  and  its  claim  to  
totalizing  domination  of  all  political  possibility  and  action.  As  Foucault  suggested,  with  
a  slightly  different  but  still  relevant  valence  in  The  History  of  Sexuality  (1976),  life  
escapes.9  The  operation  of  power  to  produce  situations  of  dominance  and  purity—and  
we  might  say,  because  of  the  national  political  subject’s  claims  of  authority  over  it,  
Andersonian  “empty  time”  is  one  such  situation—is  never  complete  because  its  claims  
are  founded  only  on  fictions  of  the  natural  or  necessary  and  the  deviant  or,  in  this  case,  
backwards  and  regressive,  that  it  produces  to  displace  and  manage  its  own  
contradictions.      
Pratt’s  incisive  book  moves  from  this  argument  into  an  exploration  of  the  other  
forms  of  hybrid  temporality  encoded  in  literary  genres  like  the  historical  romance,  
south-­‐‑western  humor,  and  African-­‐‑American  life  writing,  that,  whatever  their  
                                                                                                              
9  I  thank  Fred  Moten  for  calling  attention  to  the  importance  of  this  passage.  Foucault’s  emphasis  is  on  the  
inability  of  biopolitical  regimes  to  fully  integrate  and  dominant  its  object:  “it  is  not  that  life  has  been  totally  




hesitations  and  under  whatever  duress,  operated  within,  but  also  against,  a  nationalist  
discursive  matrix.  But  Pratt’s  argument  has  distinct  unarticulated  implications  for  how  
we  think  about  genres  like  nationalist  history  that  seem  to  be  aimed  at  producing  
modern  linear  models  of  temporality  in  their  visions  of  progressive  time.  What  if  we  
consider  these  texts  as  also  impure  and  struggling  to  produce  an  image  of  and  feeling  
for  singularity  in  time  that  is  riven  by  crisis  and  absence?  The  period  that  saw  the  
production  and  encoding  of  a  progressive  national  authority  over  the  future  also  
witnessed  successive  eruptions  throughout  the  Atlantic  world  that  actively  sought  the  
production  of  futures  alternative  to  those  projected  by  U.S.  nationalism  and  imperialism.  
Central  to  my  analysis  are  the  slave  revolts,  revolutions,  and  political  agitations  
throughout  the  Atlantic  that  resulted  in  what  the  historian  Robin  Blackburn  has  
described  as  the  overthrow  of  colonial  slavery.  As  his  history  of  anti-­‐‑slavery  revolt  in  the  
years  between  1776  and  1848  describes,  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  saw  a  
large  number  of  challenges  to  colonial  slave  regimes,  which  resulted  in  the  “destruction  
either  of  the  colonial  relationship,  or  the  slave  system,  or  of  both”  in  the  large  majority  of  
New  World  colonies  (3).  An  understanding  of  modern  temporality  that  privileged  the  
Haitian  Revolution  at  the  turn  of  the  century,  the  ending  of  the  slave-­‐‑trade  by  Britain,  
West  Indian  Emancipation,  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  majority  of  the  former  Spanish  
colonies  of  Central  and  South  America  upon  achieving  colonial  independence,  and  slave  
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revolts  within  the  domestic  boundaries  of  the  nation  (rather  than  the  institution  of  
republican  governance)  would  have  to  view  the  antebellum  United  States  as  one  of  the  
most  backward  and  regressive  spaces  in  the  New  World.    
This  is  not  to  suggest  re-­‐‑reading  history  along  another  progressive  trajectory  in  
accordance  with  a  different  set  of  values  than  those  held  by  antebellum  nationalism.  Eric  
Williams  and  Marcus  Wood  have  made  the  links  among  abolitionism,  exploitative  
capitalist  domination,  and  the  emergence  of  middle-­‐‑class  values  clear.10  Such  a  narrative  
of  progress  could  just  as  easily  serve  to  justify  current  capitalist  relations  and  global  
power  structures  as  displace  them  (as  in  liberal  and  neoliberal  arguments  that  the  
capitalist  west  helped  end  slavery  and  is  the  primary  agent  of  global  humanitarianism).  
Rather,  I  want  to  insist  on  the  acknowledgement  that  the  dual  overthrow  of  European  
colonialism  and  slavery  in  the  New  World  demonstrated  the  eruptive  capacity  of  
popular  resistance  movements  to  introduce  a  multiplicity  of  political  potentials.  As  
Blackburn  writes:  “[d]espite  the  mixed  results  of  anti-­‐‑slavery  in  this  period  the  sacrifices  
of  slave  rebels,  of  radical  abolitionists  and  of  revolutionary  democrats  were  not  in  vain.  
They  show  how  it  was  possible  to  challenge,  and  sometimes  defeat,  the  oppression  
which  grew  as  the  horrible  obverse  of  the  growth  of  human  social  capacities  and  powers  
in  the  Atlantic  world  of  the  early  modern  period”  (30).    In  the  terms  of  this  study,  such  
                                                                                                              
10  See  Williams’s  Capitalism  and  Slavery  (1944)  and  Wood’s  The  Horrible  Gift  of  Freedom  (2010).  
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an  acknowledgment  entails  the  recognition  that,  just  at  the  moment  in  which  nationalist  
historians  were  articulating  an  aesthetic  vision  of  history  through  which  U.S.  
imperialism  would  come  to  interpret  and  code  global  eruptions  of  democratic  struggle  
as  reflecting  a  national  past,  the  mythical  claim  of  America  to  futurity  was  at  its  most  
tenuous,  shaken  by  the  speed  at  which  the  Atlantic  world  was  moving  beyond  forms  of  
political  freedom  domestically  admissible.    
As  I  will  show,  historians  and  politicians  came  up  with  powerful  ways  to  limit  
and  dominate  these  claims  to  alternate  futurity,  but  they  were  also  haunted  by  these  
feelings  for  other  futures  (and  other  pasts).  It  might  be  argued,  without  placing  undue  
emphasis,  that  the  eruption  of  these  non-­‐‑national  futures  was  a  primary  motivating  
force  in  the  production  of  the  imperial  aesthetic  code.11  There  is  no  need  to  assent  to  this  
claim,  however,  to  identify  that,  at  the  very  least,  nationalist  providential  history  was  
produced  under  conditions  that  challenged  the  foundations  of  its  claims  of  authority  
over  the  future.  Just  because,  in  retrospect,  the  indirect  forms  of  power  produced  in  this  
moment  have  come  to  exercise  a  global  hegemonic  force,  there  is  no  reason  to  
retroactively  impose  a  stability  that  hardly  existed  in  the  moment  of  its  articulation.  As  I  
demonstrated  in  the  prologue,  even  today  after  the  so-­‐‑called  “end  of  history”  when  
                                                                                                              
11  Admittedly,  David  Kanzanjian  makes  a  compelling  case  for  the  emergence  of  neo-­‐‑imperial  racial  
formations  as  early  as  eighteenth-­‐‑century  mercantilism  and  for  the  presence  of  its  governmental  logics  in  the  
African  colonization  movements  of  the  antebellum  period  in  The  Colonizing  Trick  (2003).  
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American  power  can  seem  insurmountable,  the  rhetorical  affects  produced  by  this  
matrix  are  highly  unstable,  fractured,  and  consistent  generators  of  crisis.    
  
Romance and Desire 
  
These  unstable  affects  were  present  throughout  the  texts  and  rhetoric  that  
attempted  to  announce  the  nation  of  futurity  in  the  antebellum  period.  Historians  
sought  to  quell  domestic  fears  that  the  U.S.  indeed  had  no  special  claim  to  the  future—
that  sectional  chaos  or  royalist  retrenchment  were  the  inevitable  outcomes  of  a  
community  that  lacked  shared  traditions  and  social  habits—by  producing  shared  
affective  attachments  to  the  symbols  and  myths  of  the  nation.  George  Bancroft  captured  
this  intention  well  in  his  introduction  to  the  first  volume  of  his  history.  Taking  account  
of  the  potentially  centrifugal  forces  in  the  national  community,  he  counters  each  with  a  
description  of  the  centripetal:  “[n]ew  states  […]  forming  in  the  wilderness”  are  bound  by  
“canals  […]  the  use  of  steam  on  our  rivers  [and]  railroads”  that  “annihilate  the  
distance.”  “Religion,  neither  persecuted  nor  paid  by  the  state,  is  sustained  by  the  regard  
for  public  morals  and  the  convictions  of  an  enlightened  faith.”  And,  although  “[a]n  
immense  concourse  of  emigrants  of  the  most  various  lineage  is  perpetually  crowding  to  
our  shores”  they  are  bound  “by  the  principles  of  liberty,  uniting  all  interests  by  the  
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operation  of  equal  laws,  blend[ing]  the  discordant  elements  into  a  harmonious  union”  
(1:  2;  ed.  1879).  This  complacency  in  synecdoche,  powerfully  expressed  through  a  
totalizing  list  of  the  flows  of  labor  and  technology  in  a  modern  capitalist  democracy  that  
would  not  be  out  of  place  in  a  Whitman  poem,  is  the  rhetorical  structure  of  Bancroft’s  
historical  knowledge.12  As  Bancroft  ends  his  introduction,  “it  is  the  object  of  the  present  
work  to  explain  how  the  change  in  the  condition  of  our  land  has  been  brought  about;  
and,  as  the  fortunes  of  a  nation  are  not  under  the  control  of  blind  destiny,  to  follow  the  
steps  which  a  favoring  Providence,  calling  our  institutions  into  being,  has  conducted  the  
country  to  its  present  happiness  and  glory”  (1:  3;  ed.  1879).    History  helps  bind  the  
national  community  because  it  produces  the  knowledge  that  the  democratic  nation  is  
not  a  contingent,  unstable  formation.  Rather,  it  suggests  that  the  entirety  of  the  past,  
                                                                                                              
12  The  use  of  synecdoche  here  refers  to  Hayden  White’s  tropological  analysis  of  nineteenth-­‐‑century  rhetorics  
of  history.  In  White’s  terms,  we  might  read  Bancroft’s  approach  as  taking  metonymic  figures  that  would  
disaggregate  the  nation  into  discreet  elements  (relations  of  part  to  part)  and  supplementing  them  with  
integrative  synecdoche  (relations  of  part  to  whole),  which  in  turn  enables  them  symbolize  national  totality.  
To  explain,  a  list  that  only  featured  the  first  part  of  his  dyads  would  be  disintegrative  and  metonymic.  In  
such  a  list  “states  in  the  wilderness”  would  refer  to  other  political  units  like  the  juridical  person  or  local  
governance,  even  as  it  raises  the  specter  of  the  ur-­‐‑instance  of  the  Puritan  “errand  in  the  wilderness”;  religion  
uncontrolled  by  the  state  would  reference  other  discrete  private  practices,  familial  or  local  communal  rituals,  
even  personal  hygiene;  and  “the  immense  concourse  of  immigrants”  indirectly  calls  to  mind  the  already  
diverse  populations  of  the  Americas  at  the  moment  of  colonization  well  before  national  integration.  
However,  in  the  list  Bancroft  produced  each  of  these  figures  is  supplemented  by  another  figure  of  binding.  
Canals  and  trains  both  literally  annihilate  distance  through  speed  of  travel,  and  figuratively  bind  the  nation  
as  a  circulatory  network,  symbolizing  a  total  integration  of  an  economic  and  bodily  whole.  Other  models  of  
totality,  the  inner  light  of  faith,  and  the  regulative  juridical  equality,  also  play  roles  in  a  bodily  rhetoric  of  the  
nation,  as  the  heart  and  the  head  of  a  standard  metaphysics  of  the  person.  In  Bancroft,  the  aggregation  of  
these  units  into  national  form  is  both  the  object  of  historical  inquiry—the  past  it  imagines  as  the  truth  of  its  
tropes—and  its  rhetorical  function.  
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despite  apparent  contingencies,  has  been  purposefully  directed  towards  the  present  
form  of  political  organization.  It  eases  the  anxieties  of  the  open  horizon  of  the  present  by  
invoking  a  (mythical)  stable  and  knowable  past.  
However,  there  is  another  function  of  national  history  in  the  antebellum  period  
that  is  best  understood  as  processing  and  mediating  forms  of  political  desire.  
Throughout  the  antebellum  period  the  impossible  contradiction  of  America  was  the  
production  of  the  nation  as  the  vanguard  and  future  of  liberty  and  democracy  during  
the  continuation,  entrenchment,  and  expansion  of  slavery  even  as,  increasingly,  the  
Atlantic  world  was  moving  towards  emancipation.  Scholars  have  long  located  
throughout  this  period  a  sense  of  belatedness  in  its  often  obsessive  and  filiopietistic  
backward  gaze.  But  this  sense  of  a  lack  in  the  antebellum  has  rarely  been  read  against  
the  presence  of  revolutionary  activity  in  various  constructed  elsewheres  (as  of  course,  
some  of  those  elsewheres  were  within  current  and  future  boundaries  of  the  United  
States.).  Although  inquiries  into  antebellum  culture  have  mostly  abandoned  this  line  of  
inquiry  for  being  too  focused  on  elite  cultures  of  domination  at  the  expense  of  the  more  
complicated  and  more  productive  forms  of  resistance,  dominant  accounts  of  the  oedipal  
character  of  the  historical  experience  of  political  elites  have  gone  unchallenged.13  
                                                                                                              
13  Russ  Castronovo’s  Fathering  the  Nation  (1995)  complicates  this  oedipal  narrative  to  a  considerable  degree,  
and  his  insights  are  echoed  in  the  argument  that  follows,  but  his  study  still  takes  that  narrative  (and  the  
scope  of  national  space)  as  a  starting  point.  
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  In  Patricide  in  the  House  Divided  (1979),  the  psycho-­‐‑historian  George  Forgie  
helped  set  the  terms  of  this  reading;  he  described  the  central  crisis  of  the  political  theater  
of  the  antebellum  period  as  lying  in  a  generational  experience  of  the  “problem  of  
ambition  in  the  post-­‐‑heroic  age.”  The  widespread  availability  of  both  formal  history  and  
sentimental  books  that  celebrated  the  heroism  of  the  founding  generation  produced  the  
sense  of  a  “dramatically  sharp”  “contrast  between  the  heroic  past  and  commonplace  
present”  (33).  As  he  wrote,  the  experience  of  this  generation  was  based  in  “the  sense  of  
having  been  born  with  the  Republic  and  of  belonging  to  a  latter  age  than  its  beginnings,”  
and  thus  having  been  “born  too  late  to  experience  the  revolution  but  in  time  to  have  
been  raised  by  the  generation  that  fought  it”  (7).  Forgie  argued  that  this  psychic  conflict  
was  coded  in  the  terms  of  the  Freudian  family  romance.  Because  so  much  of  the  
historical  literature  about  the  founding  generation  relied  on  a  sentimental  rhetoric  of  the  
nation  as  a  family,  it  became  inevitable  that  the  political  dramas  of  the  next  generation  
would  play  out  in  a  rhetorical  dialectic  between  filiopietism  and  patricidal  ambition  that  
sought  to  displace  the  achievements  of  the  fathers  with  that  of  the  sons.  So,  for  instance,  
in  Forgie’s  account  the  “Young  America”  movement  that  helped  produce  the  concepts  of  
linear  national  futurity  was,  at  root,  an  outpouring  of  a  desire  to  both  embody  and  
displace  the  heroism  of  the  founding  generation.  If  we  were  to  ascribe  to  this  overly  
totalizing  narrative  on  its  own  terms  then  we  could  read  the  temporal  project  of  national  
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history  in  the  antebellum  period  as  two-­‐‑fold;  its  first  feature  was  to  open  up  a  space  in  
the  future  for  heroic  activity  in  continuity  and  linear  sequence  from  the  acts  of  the  
founding  generation.  This  would,  in  effect,  ameliorate  the  psychic  conflict  between  
filiopiety  and  fratricide  by  producing  history  as  sequential  and  forward  looking,  
inspired  by  past  actions,  keeping  faith  with  fathers,  without  being  overburdened  by  
their  example.  Second,  we  might  perceive  that  the  reading  of  history  gave  antebellum  
readers  mediated  access  to  the  heroic  actions  and  passions  of  the  previous  generation,  
filling  the  lack  in  modern  life  through  compensatory  aesthetic  experiences.    
Forgie  himself  stages  this  problematic  of  compensation  in  a  relatively  compelling  
reading  of  the  economic  conditions  of  the  post-­‐‑heroic  generation.  He  argues  that  the  
model  of  the  nation  as  a  family  first  emerged  in  a  moment  when,  for  economic  reasons,  
“actual  fathers  ceased  to  provide  more  or  less  automatic  models  of  roles  their  sons  
would  grow  up  to  play”  (28).  The  early  years  of  the  nineteenth  century  in  the  United  
States  was  a  moment  in  which  artisan  systems  of  occupation,  where  sons  would  
apprentice  with  either  their  actual  father  or  another  familiar  figure  in  their  community,  
were  being  disrupted  and  displaced  by  the  expropriation  of  labor  and  goods  occasioned  
by  the  onset  of  the  industrial  revolution,  the  emergence  of  the  factory  system,  and  the  
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economic  binding  of  the  country  through  a  rapid  decrease  in  travel  times  and  costs.14  As  
a  result,  Forgie  argued,  the  internalization  of  the  values  of  the  father  central  to  Freud’s  
description  of  the  family  drama  entered  into  the  public  sphere.  As  he  puts  it,  “[a]t  a  time  
when  expanding  economic  opportunity  meant  that  boys  were  beginning  to  need  a  wider  
range  of  models  than  their  surroundings  were  likely  to  provide,  history  stepped  in  to  
supply  them  in  the  form  of  founding  heroes”  (29).  In  other  words,  the  public  romance  
that  constructed  the  nation  as  a  family  already  functioned  as  compensation  for  a  specific  
experience  of  alienation  through  industrialization.  Claiming  these  other  fathers  followed  
a  loss  of  an  original  father  in  a  nationwide  process  of  economic  expropriation.    
Forgie  reads  the  sentimental  discourse  of  the  national  family  as,  intrinsically,  an  
argument  against  an  abstract  discourse  of  a  liberal  rational  state.  This  sentimentalism  
suggested  that  emotions  were  “not  only  a  legitimate  but  also  an  essential  matter  of  
public  concern,  and  that  it  was  essential  for  Americans  to  extend  natural  affections,  
originally  directed  towards  objects  close  at  hand,  to  the  far  wider  realm  of  the  Republic”  
(5).    The  originally  compensatory  formation  of  a  public  historical  fatherhood  becomes,  in  
sentimentalism,  an  essential  productive  force  in  public  life.  At  this  point,  from  the  
perspective  of  the  developments  in  American  Studies  in  the  more  than  three  decades  
since  Forgie’s  book  emerged,  objections  to  his  argument  begin  to  pile  up  around  his  
                                                                                                              
14  For  a  thorough  analysis  of  the  effect  of  this  process  on  personal  and  political  life  in  a  single  city  (New  
York),  see  Sean  Willentz’s  Chants  Democratic  (1984).  
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clear  reification  of  the  historically  contingent  and  politically  dubious  distinction  between  
the  public  and  the  private.  However,  I  think  there  remains  something  useful  about  his  
account  even  if  it  needs  to  be  read  critically.  Rather  than  acceding  that  the  movement  of  
private  familial  and  psychic  life  into  public  political  discourse  was  occasioned  by  
industrial  expropriation,  we  might  argue  that  industrial  expropriation  created  both  the  
“lost”  psychic  intimacy  of  the  family  romance  and  the  compensatory  reproduction  of  
that  romance  in  the  political  sphere.  There  was  not,  before  industrialization,  a  set  of  
“natural”  affections  that  were  then  expropriated  into  the  discourse  of  the  nation,  but  
rather  the  discourse  of  the  nation  produced  the  model  of  the  family  as  its  authorizing,  
natural,  ground.  That  produced  experience  of  lack  helped  generate  a  political  public  in  
the  terms  of  a  national  family  romance  by  making  the  nation  the  site  of  potential  psychic  
recovery  and  reintegration,  which,  in  turn,  could  only  be  achieved  by  the  fulfillment  of  
the  promise  of  the  founding  fathers.  Romantic  historical  writing  served  to  ground  that  
fantasy  of  reintegration  by  producing  aesthetic  images  of  the  experiential  fullness  of  the  
founding  generation’s  central  claim  to  heroism  against  subsequent  generations’  lack.  
The  founding  generation,  having  been  agents  of  their  own  liberty,  were  viewed  as  
having  founded  themselves  as  abstract  national  subjects  in  ways  that  were  desired  but  
unavailable  to  their  successors.  These  images  allowed  for  a  felt  intimacy  with  the  “lost”  
fathers,  such  as  in  the  famous  biography  of  Washington  by  Parson  Weems,  which  
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concluded  by  allowing  the  reader  to  accompany  the  president  at  his  deathbed  and  then  
gain  a  glimpse  of  his  entrance  into  heaven.    
 
History as an Aesthetic Practice 
 
My  use  of  the  concept  of  aesthetics  to  describe  how  the  romantic  historical  
project  sought  to  provide  readers  with  such  compensatory,  mediated  experiences  of  
revolutionary  fullness  is  derived,  first  of  all,  from  these  historians’  own  engagement  
with  romantic  aesthetic  theory.  Historians  like  Bancroft  and  Prescott  were  deeply  
influenced  by  European  and  American  Romanticism,  both  as  a  school  of  historical  
thought  that  had  important  sources  in  the  works  of  Johann  Gottfried  Herder,  and  as  a  
model  of  literary  production  confronting  the  end  of  state  patronage  and  increased  
marketplace  competition  by  placing  value  on  the  creativity  of  the  individual  author.  As  
George  Callcott  has  argued,  the  influence  of  Herder  was  profound  throughout  the  
romantic  period  and  helped  shape  the  ideas  about  history  and  culture  that  led  to  the  
development  of  nationalist  thought  in  Europe  and  America.  His  central  contribution  to  
history  was  his  rejection  of  Enlightenment  historiography’s  emphasis  on  universal  
abstract  oppositions  like  superstition  and  reason  in  favor  of  a  more  thorough  recognition  
of  the  differences  among  human  cultures  and  their  independent  growth  and  
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development.  Herder  developed  this  argument  in  his  essay,  This  Too  a  Philosophy  of  
History  for  the  Formation  of  Humanity  (1774),  which  in  its  title  and  content  was  a  response  
to  a  paradigmatic  Enlightenment  philosopher,  Voltaire.  Herder’s  emphasis  on  
differentiation  helped  shift  the  focus  of  historical  research  from  the  abstractly  universal  
to  the  national  and  racial.  Herder  also  deployed  a  modern  understanding  of  temporality  
focused  on  linear  concepts  like  growth  that  were  an  immanent  aspect  of  human  culture,  
thus  moving  away  from  religious  or  Enlightenment  abstractions  (as  employed  by  
Voltaire  or  Hume)  and  cyclical  rises  and  falls  rooted  in  eternal,  transcendent  moral  laws  
(a  la  Gibbon).    
Neither  of  these  shifts—from  idealist  to  culturally  produced  value  and  from  
transcendent  to  immanent  time—belied  the  Euro-­‐‑centrism  of  the  historiography  
produced  in  Herder’s  wake.  Rather  they  served  to  ground  an  understanding  of  history  
that  increasingly  searched  in  events  (rather  than  through  abstract  deduction)  for  the  
emergence  of  freedom,  morality  and  Christianity  in  the  development  of  individual  
cultures—which  were  now  understood  as  nations  or  proto-­‐‑nations.  Romantic  theories  of  
history  served  to  make  history  a  central  discipline  for  human  self-­‐‑knowledge.  History  
became  a  form  of  writing  that  sought  to  observe  and  demonstrate  the  reconciliation  
between  ideal  moral  laws  and  human  life  and  tradition.  Reflecting  his  own  romanticism,  
Bancroft  would  claim  in  1854  that  history  is  the  study  of  man’s  growth  in  self-­‐‑
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knowledge  rooted  in  the  discovery  that  God’s  Providence  is  not  a  “boundless  power,”  or  
a  “abstract  and  absolute  cause”  but  an  “infinite  fountain  of  moral  excellence  and  beauty  
[…]  a  creative  spirit,  indwelling,  in  man,  his  fellow  worker  and  guide”  (24-­‐‑25).15  
At  the  same  time,  the  archetype  of  the  romantic  man  of  letters  provided  a  basis  
from  which  many  of  these  historians  understood  their  position  in  society  and  the  
marketplace.  Bancroft  frequently  compared  historians  to  poets;  “it  is  because  God  is  
visible  in  History  that  its  office  is  the  noblest  except  that  of  the  poet”  (“The  Necessity…”  
16).  And  stories  that  surrounded  the  composition  of  Prescott’s  long  works  on  Spanish  
history  and  the  Conquest  focused  on  the  historian’s  blindness  and  his  heroic  struggle  
through  disability  (with  the  aid  of  secretaries)  to  produce  lasting,  extensively  researched  
works  of  history.  Many  of  these  historians  were  at  the  vanguard  of  their  profession,  and  
predate  its  academic  institutionalization.  They  had  to  navigate  the  difficulty  of  making  a  
living  from  history  with  growing  demands  to  professionalization  and  the  commitment  
of  economic  resources  to  a  project  that,  financially,  rarely  could  ever  be  more  than  a  
part-­‐‑time  occupation.  Most  antebellum  historians  were  patrician  Whigs  from  New  
England  who  had  other  sources  of  income  or  pursued  law  or  the  ministry  before  
eventually  committing  to  history.  Bancroft  was  a  major  exception,  and  had  a  lengthy  
political  career  in  the  Democratic  Party,  serving  to  appoint  Hawthorne  to  the  Salem  
                                                                                                              
15  Bancroft  and  other  American  historians’  influence  from  Herder  are  further  explored  in  Callcott’s  History  in  
the  United  States  (1970).  
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custom’s  house  position  commemorated  in  the  preface  to  The  Scarlet  Letter  (1850)  and  to  
be  himself  appointed  as  Polk’s  Secretary  of  the  Navy  during  the  U.S.-­‐‑Mexican  War.  
(Even  so,  this  involvement  in  politics  was  a  subject  of  abiding  criticism  from  other  
historians).  Although  relatively  popular,  the  sales  of  these  historians  could  not  compete  
with  historical  novels  or  the  popular  histories  that  Gregory  Pfitzer  has  explored  in  his  
Popular  History  in  the  Literary  Marketplace  (2009).  Like  Emerson  and  other  romantics  who  
struggled  with  their  relative  marginality  and  the  lack  of  a  support  system  for  literary  
endeavor  in  a  democratic  and  capitalist  culture,  these  historians  saw  themselves  as  
moral  instructors  and  seers  of  the  national  order  whose  work  (as  philosophy  and  as  a  
high  art)  was  more  important  than  the  imperative  to  sell.16  
This  self-­‐‑perception  does  not  mean  that  they  were  not  responsive  to  or  
challenged  by  the  success  of  more  popular  forms  like  the  historical  novel.  Some,  like  
Parkman  and  Motley,  tried  their  hand  at  popular  novel  writing,  while  Prescott  
repeatedly  emphasized  the  importance  that  histories  have  character,  plot,  and  
compelling  central  interests.  They  also  participated  in  literary  culture  more  broadly,  
writing  reviews  of  novels  and  poetry  in  publications  like  the  Everetts’  North  American  
Review,  giving  orations  on  prominent  occasions  and  communicating  extensively  with  
other  literary  authors  to  discuss  both  the  details  of  historical  information  and  descriptive  
                                                                                                              
16  The  canonical  study  on  the  relationship  between  romantic  literature  and  the  marketplace  in  antebellum  
America  is  Michael  T.  Gilmore’s  American  Romanticism  and  the  Marketplace  (1985).  
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techniques  for  best  portraying  character  and  building  dramatic  interest.  To  a  large  
degree,  they  saw  themselves  as  both  the  philosophers  and  poets  of  the  nation—
observing  not  so  much  eternal  rules  for  the  proper  administration  of  state  power  and  
political  will  in  exemplary  incidents  (as  did  their  predecessors  in  the  revolutionary  
generation  of  historians)  as  working  to  make  apparent  the  sources  and  energy  of  a  new  
abstract  entity,  the  American  people,  in  carrying  forward  the  promise  of  historical  and  
democratic  progress.17  
The  blurred  border  between  historical  and  literary  production  came  together  
with  their  philosophical  influences  to  drive  these  historians  to  focus  intently  on  the  ways  
in  which  historical  writing  could  provide  readers  with  the  “experience”  of  distantly  past  
events.  Prescott  introduced  his  Conquest  of  Mexico  (1843)  by  claiming  that  he  desired  to  
“paint  a  portrait  not  only  true  in  itself,  but,  if  I  may  so  express  myself,  make  the  reader  a  
contemporary  of  the  sixteenth  century.”  At  the  outset  of  composition  of  his  history  he  
wrote  in  his  journal:  
In  short  the  true  way  of  conceiving  the  subject  is  not  as  a  philosophical  theme,  
but  as  an  epic  in  prose,  a  romance  of  chivalry  […]  for  surely  there  is  nothing  in  
the  compass  of  Grecian  epic  or  tragic  fable,  in  which  the  resistless  march  of  
destiny  is  more  discernable,  than  in  the  sad  fortunes  of  the  dynasty  of  
                                                                                                              
17  This  focus  on  the  growth  and  development  of  an  abstract  subject,  “the  American  people”  is  most  obvious  
in  Bancroft’s  work.  However  even  histories  not  nominally  about  U.S.  history,  such  as  Prescott’s  works  on  
Spanish  Empire,  work  to  display  the  character  of  a  “people”  who,  for  at  least  a  period  of  time,  could  become  
the  instruments  and  agents  of  historical  progress.  
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Montezuma.  It  is  without  doubt  the  most  poetic  subject  ever  offered  the  pen  of  
the  historian.  (31)  
  
Prescott  conceived  of  writing  history  as  an  art  form  akin  to  the  medieval  romances  that  
he  had  reviewed  in  the  North  American  Review;  it  had  to  convey  through  its  narrative  
ideas  a  profound  emotional  sense  of  the  sweep  of  history.  It  was  not  only  as  narrative  
that  history  could  excel  as  art,  capturing  the  true  tragic  or  romantic  character  of  events,  
but  also  through  rich  descriptions  of  the  emotions,  sights,  and  sounds  of  another  time  
and  place  that  would  make  these  abstract  ideas  discernible  to  the  reader  in  an  aesthetic  
image.  Each  historical  incident  would  be  a  discrete  episode  or  event  that  brought  
together  many  sensate  and  emotional  particulars  under  a  unifying  idea  of  progress.18  
Bancroft  endorsed  this  view  of  history  as  an  exercise  in  narrative  and  description—in  
making  history  present—when  he  suggested  in  an  oration  delivered  to  the  New  York  
Historical  Society  in  1854  that  “as  certainly  as  the  actual  bodies  forth  the  ideal,  so  
certainly  does  history  contain  philosophy”  (16-­‐‑17).  For  Bancroft,  as  for  Prescott,  history  
was  an  art  that  manifests  philosophically  deduced  laws  of  morality  within  the  flux  of  
time  through  the  description  of  actual  events.  Both  Parkman  and  Motley  endorsed  and  
                                                                                                              
18  Rodolphe  Gasché  (along  with  Jacques  Rancière)  has  argued  that  history  and  aesthetics  emerged  at  the  
same  moment  in  the  eighteenth  century  as  two  structurally  isometric  “modes  of  non-­‐‑rationalist  cognition  
that  correspond  to  individualities  constituted  in  analogy  to  reason  through  extensive  determinateness  into  
concrete  and  sensible  unities”  (146).  In  other  words,  they  were  both  discourses  that  imagined  that  
determinate  and  particular  objects  of  perception  could  be  unified  under  a  single  idea  and  logic  without  
recourse  to  an  external  rational  law.  He  goes  onto  to  suggest  that  history  might  indeed  be  a  subset  of  




expanded  on  these  ideas  in  their  own  works,  and  even  Richard  Hildreth,  often  
considered  the  anti-­‐‑Bancroft  in  his  criticism  of  nationalism  in  history,  evinced  at  times  
an  aesthetic  sense  of  what  constitutes  the  real  moral  content  of  history.19      
The  market  pressures  that  led  to  these  historians  insisting  that  their  works  be  
vivid  and  full  of  life  and  interest  were  clearly  numerous.  And  they  were  responding  to  
the  dullness  they  perceived  as  characteristic  of  many  of  the  revolutionary  chronicles  of  
an  earlier  generation,  which  had  sold  poorly  and  were  mainly  read  by  other  historians.  
They  were  also  responding  to  the  imperatives  at  the  center  of  transatlantic  romantic  
culture’s  reaction  against  the  Enlightenment.  Bancroft  was  perhaps  the  most  vehement  
in  taking  up  this  anti-­‐‑Enlightenment  stance,  seeing  in  the  materialist  philosophy  of  
Locke  and  Hume  a  degrading  anti-­‐‑spiritualism  that  could  not  escape  the  “humiliating  
yoke”  of  the  senses  and  whose  main  “characteristic  [w]as  a  refusal  to  recognize  the  
infinite”  (“The  Necessity…”  27).  At  the  same  time,  Bancroft  as  thoroughly  rejected  
academic  and  idealist  philosophy  that  relied  only  on  reason  to  deduce  and  debate  
abstract  values.  As  Mark  Levin  has  pointed  out  in  his  study  of  these  historians,  History  
as  a  Romantic  Art  (1959),  they  rejected  both  the  materialist  conceptions  of  the  
Enlightenment  that  saw  sensation  as  the  only  path  to  knowledge  and  an  abstract  
                                                                                                              
19  I  mean  that  Richard  Hildreth’s  emphasis  on  “living  and  breathing  men,  their  faults  as  well  as  their  
virtues”  (1:  vii),  as  he  put  it  in  the  advertisement  to  his  history,  is  as  much  an  aesthetic  determination  as  an  
epistemological  and  moral  one.  
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idealism  that  removed  truth  and  beauty  from  the  everyday  affections  and  passions  of  
experience.  Instead,  they  saw  their  works  as  paths  to  demonstrating  how  an  ideal  moral  
law  (that  of  progress)  manifested  itself  in  the  actions  and  affections  of  nations  and  
representative  individuals  in  their  experience  with  history,  the  wilderness,  and  the  
forces  of  reaction.  In  order  to  make  such  history  a  vivid  experience  for  their  readers,  they  
relied  on  a  more  or  less  conventional  descriptive  vocabulary  focused  on  moral  
portraiture,  descriptions  of  landscapes  and  battle,  and  the  emergence  and  growth  of  civil  
liberty,  commerce,  and  the  spirit  of  the  people—all  ways  of  visualizing  an  underlying  
order  as  “indwelling”  and  animating  human  time  and  progress.    
The  second  reason  I  have  chosen  to  use  the  concept  of  aesthetics  is  to  distinguish  
it  from  the  way  “the  literary”  has  often  been  employed  in  studies  of  historiography.  The  
concept  of  the  literary  in  historiography  has  tended  to  be  more  limited,  concerned  with  
narrative  at  the  exclusion  of  the  other  two  poles.  This  is  because  in  the  area  of  
historiography,  the  category  of  the  literary  has  been  delimited  by  its  role  as  a  central  
concept  in  debates  over  the  possibility  of  objectivity  and  scientific  history.    While  
generations  of  historians  committed  to  “objectivity”  had,  like  David  Noble,  criticized  the  
romantic  generation  for  their  literariness,  the  more  recent  post-­‐‑modern  challenge  to  
historiography  that  originated  with  Hayden  White’s  work  in  the  1970s  highlighted  the  
unavoidably  discursive  and  literary  aspects  of  all  historical  writing.  Critics  of  Bancroft  
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(and  perhaps  simply  the  myth  of  Bancroft)  could  no  longer  simply  claim  that  contrary  to  
the  objective  histories  of  Leopold  von  Ranke  or  Richard  Hildreth,  Bancroft  had  imposed  
a  literary  and  narrative  form  on  his  history.  White  had  shown  that  even  Ranke’s  work  
emplotted  history  in  comedic  and  socially  integrative  narrative  form  that  had  
conservative  ideological  consequences.  Where  objective  historians  of  the  past  had  
desired  to  reach  objectivity  by  reducing  subjective  and  ideological  components  of  
historical  narration,  White  argued  that  language  itself  was  not  and  could  never  be  a  
neutral  medium  and  that  narrative  form,  standardized  tropes,  and  ideology  suffused  
any  attempt  to  recount  the  story  of  an  event.  As  he  wrote,  historical  narratives  are  
“verbal  fictions,  the  contents  of  which  are  as  much  invented  as  found  and  the  forms  of  
which  have  more  in  common  with  their  counterparts  in  literature  than  they  have  in  the  
sciences”  (82).  In  other  words,  history  has  always  been  literary  and  needed  to  become  
more  self-­‐‑conscious  about  its  linguistic  and  formal  messages,  or  as  White  put  it,  
“emplotment”  in  literary  tropes  and  narratives.  Keith  Jenkins,  a  follower  of  White  and  
the  neo-­‐‑pragmatist  philosopher  Richard  Rorty  took  this  line  of  argument  further  in  the  
1980s  and  1990s,  arguing  that  historians  had  to  view  their  work  as  a  constructive  project  
that  was  not  primarily  about  uncovering  factual  truth  about  the  past  but  was  rather  an  
articulation  of  societal  values  and  political  desires.20  
                                                                                                              
20  See  Jenkins’s  Re-­‐‑Thinking  History  (1991).  
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I  have  chosen  to  move  emphasis  away  from  the  literary  and  narrative  as  concepts  
in  my  analysis  of  romantic  history,  preferring  to  place  it  on  the  category  of  the  aesthetic.  
Part  of  my  concern  with  the  concept  of  the  literary  is  that,  despite  White’s  own  level  of  
detail  concerning  tropes  and  metaphors  in  historical  texts,  his  primary  influence  has  
been  narratological,  providing  a  method  for  reading  history  for  plot  structures  while  not  
attending  to  its  other  uses  of  imaginative  language  and  concepts.  This  has  been  the  case  
with  otherwise  valuable  studies  of  antebellum  historiography  by  Philip  Gould  and  John  
Ernest  that  I  will  engage  at  various  points  in  this  work.21  Perhaps  a  concept  of  poetics—a  
process  of  literary  making—would  be  adequate  to  track  in  detail  the  disruptions  and  
resistances  in  the  text  that  I  want  to  focus  on,  but  I  think  aesthetics  is  the  more  effective  
term  for  how  it  describes  the  way  images  become  coded  with  complex  affects  that  
suggest  the  presence  of  an  underlying  metaphysical  ground  (progress  or  providence)  
while  relying  on  the  text’s  surface  effects  like  emotion,  sensate  description,  and,  yes,  
                                                                                                              
21  Both  Gould  and  Ernest  make  Bancroft  into  a  symbol  of  the  totalizing  progressive  narratives  of  time  that  
critics  of  the  ideologies  of  Manifest  Destiny  and  of  slavery  had  to  contend  with  to  announce  their  differences  
with  the  power  structures  of  antebellum  America.  Gould’s  Covenant  and  Republic  (1996)  focuses  on  
complicating  our  understanding  of  how  Puritanism  got  taken  up  by  antebellum  writers.  He  poses  his  
argument  against  a  view  that  he  claims  extends  from  Bancroft  to  Sacvan  Bercovitch  that  situates  Puritanism  
“consistently  in  the  context  of  a  progressive/millennial  mode  of  historical  progress”  (55).  Similarly,  in  
Liberation  Historiography  (2004)  Ernest  writes  that  “African  American  historical  writing  […]  necessarily  
involved  the  deconstruction  of  various  narratives  and  philosophies  of  history—from  Hegel  to  Bancroft  to  
the  rhetoric  of  Independence  Day  celebrations”  that  had  repressed  the  story  of  “a  scattered”  African-­‐‑
American  community”  (67).  Neither  of  these  accounts  opposes  Bancroft’s  nationalism  with  historiographical  
ideals  like  materialism  or  critical  and  scientific  objectivity,  instead  emphasizing  how  literary  form  
investigates  and  revises  historical  form.  Yet,  they  treat  the  overarching  narratives  and  philosophy  of  history  
projected  by  Bancroft  as  an  accomplished  textual  fact.  They  stage  their  interventions  against  the  ideal  object  
intended  by  thought  and  not  the  actual  texts  that  Bancroft  and  Prescott  produced.  
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narrative  form  to  do  so.  I  also  use  the  word  aesthetics  because  of  the  frequency  of  
aesthetic  metaphors  in  romantic  history.  These  historians  constantly  relied  on  the  
language  of  painting  and  portraiture  to  describe  their  writing,  and  the  effects  they  
intended  are  just  as  frequently  described  as  beautiful.  Finally,  I  think  aesthetics  better  
captures  the  experiential  imperative  that  drove  romantic  historical  writing.22  
The  aesthetics  of  history  were  responsible  for  the  compensatory  experiences  of  
self-­‐‑liberation  central  to  romantic  nationalism.  In  my  first  chapter,  I  will  lay  out  how  this  
aesthetic  produced  a  fantasy  of  continuity  between  past  and  future.  Chronicling  the  
emergence  of  a  romantic  and  progressive  philosophy  of  history  in  the  works  of  Bancroft  
and  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson,  I  argue  first  that  the  ideology  of  progressive  history  was  a  
                                                                                                              
22  Two  other  recent  thinkers  of  aesthetics  and  emotion  have  been  influential  on  my  thinking,  as  well.  Rei  
Terada’s  Feeling  in  Theory  (2003)  provides  a  re-­‐‑reading  of  the  emotional  content  of  texts  that  rejects  a  depth-­‐‑
to-­‐‑surface  model  of  emotion  based  in  a  romantic  concept  of  an  expressive  subject  that  would  prove  its  
existence  through  its  ability  to  express  itself  in  works  of  aesthetic  genius.  In  its  place,  Terada  develops  a  
deconstructive  theory  of  emotion,  focused  on  how  emotion  attests  to  the  absence  of  such  subjective  
intentionality  and,  thus,  emotion’s  presence  as  a  textual  effect  that  subsists  without  regard  for  how  or  why  it  
was  expressed.  This  deconstructive  reading  has  informed  my  sense  that  the  aesthetics  of  history  in  
antebellum  America  does  not  track  the  emotional  life  of  any  actual  or  ideal  national  subject  in  response  to  
history,  but  registers  discursively  a  desire  for  an  “indwelling”  experience  of  history  that  would  displace  
contemporary  sites  of  agency,  revolution,  and  crisis  into  second-­‐‑hand  textual  resolutions.  In  addition,  
Jacques  Rancière’s  recent  rereading  of  aesthetics  in  texts  like  Aesthetics  and  Its  Discontents  (2009),  The  
Aesthetic  Unconscious  (2010),  and  Aisthesis  (2013)  has  provided  a  basis  for  thinking  about  how  these  romantic  
texts  imbued  sensation  and  emotion  with  deeper,  metaphysical  significance.  While  the  extent  of  Rancière’s  
intervention  into  the  critique  of  the  category  of  the  aesthetic  in  modern  critical  theory  cannot  be  recounted  
here,  his  fundamental  insight  that  art  engages  with,  reproduces,  and  intervenes  in  political  regimes  through  
what  he  calls  the  “distribution  of  the  sensible”  is  a  basis  for  much  of  my  analysis.  Just  as  for  Rancière,  the  
modern  political  order  is  based  on  regimes  of  appearance  (who  and  what  actors  are  allowed  to  speak,  how  
those  actors  are  identified  through  appearances,  and  what  deeper  metaphysical  orders  power  projects  as  an  
authorizing  ground  of  those  appearances),  antebellum  historians  imagined  providence  as  dwelling  in  the  
appearances  of  historical  events  and  those  actors  who  gave  order  to  time  and  futurity.  
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reaction  against  the  growing  radicalism  of  anti-­‐‑slavery  politics  that  increasingly  
promoted  a  much  more  thorough  break  with  the  past  than  was  admissible  to  
nationalism.  Second,  I  show  how  Bancroft’s  aesthetics  depended  on  the  very  models  of  
temporality  it  attempted  to  disavow.  These  histories  made  claims  on  a  specifically  
American  futurity  in  the  context  of  an  Atlantic  world  that  was  opening  up  possibilities  
of  other  futures  not  dominated  by  the  U.S.  model  of  progress.  The  emotional  
nationalism  performed  by  the  romantic  history  was  articulated  as  a  disavowal  of  these  
alternate  modernities.23  While  the  reasons  for  this  are  obviously  complex,  it  seems  useful  
to  recall  here  David  Roediger’s  vital  argument  that  central  to  the  compensatory  
formations  of  belonging  produced  in  the  aftermath  of  industrialism  was  a  racially  
oppressive  allegiance  to  “whiteness.”24  We  might  also  recall  that  the  central  political  
drama  of  the  antebellum  years  was  a  series  of  procedural  compromises  that  served  to  
                                                                                                              
23  This  concept  of  disavowal  is  adapted  from  Sibylle  Fischer’s  Modernity  Disavowed  (2004).  In  that  book,  
Fischer  argues  that  the  territorial  consolidation  of  radical  anti-­‐‑slavery  in  the  Haitian  revolution  was  a  
fundamental  fact  of  “the  cultural  and  political  landscape  [of]  the  age  of  revolution,”(1)  although  it  was  often  
only  present  in  the  discourse  of  the  era  “as  unspeakable,  as  trauma,  utopia  and  elusive  dream”  (2).  
However,  in  20th-­‐‑century  arguments  over  the  emancipatory  or  oppressive  potentials  of  a  “modernity”  
thought  to  have  emerged  with  the  twin  forces  of  bourgeois  and  industrial  revolution,  Haiti  has  only  ever  
been  discussed  as  either  a  “more  or  less  pure”  instance  of  an  emancipatory  modernity  or  as  utterly  previous  
and/or  oppositional  to  its  oppressive  structures.  In  place  of  these  models,  Fischer  suggests  the  Haitian  
revolution  induces  us  to  re-­‐‑think  modernity  under  “the  headings  of  colonial  heterogeneity,  displacement,  
and  discontinuity.”  This  is  the  modernity  that  she  claims  has  been  “disavowed”  from  conceptualizations  
based  on  ideal  or  pure  European  models.  Fischer  also  proposes  “disavowal”  as  a  figure  for  the  presences  of  
the  Haitian  revolution  and  its  suggestion  of  heterogeneity  in  the  political  desires  and  nightmares  of  the  
nineteenth-­‐‑century  Atlantic  world—both  as  an  eruptive  dream  or  trauma  and  as  displaced  from  official  
avowal.  
  
24See  Roediger’s  Wages  of  Whiteness  (1991).  
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prolong  the  sectional  crisis  of  slavery.  In  other  words,  the  contemporary  struggles  of  
transatlantic  anti-­‐‑slavery  were  both  vivid  living  examples  of  groups  looking  to  found  
their  own  political  and  personal  independence,  and  conducted  by  agents  and  through  
political  forms  viewed  by  hegemonic  models  of  subjectivity  as  impossible  bearers  of  
liberty.  It  is  my  contention  that  the  forms  of  aesthetic  compensation  produced  by  
nationalist  history  also  contained  disavowed  seeds  of  recognition  and  desire  for  the  
forms  of  democratic  struggle  that  had  been  circumscribed  from  national  space.    
These  texts  evince  the  consistent  eruption  of  racial  figures  of  alternate  futurities  
that  the  historians  of  the  period  struggled,  at  the  cost  of  great  formal  instability,  to  
reintegrate  into  the  aesthetics  and  linear  providence  of  national  temporality  and  
romance.  In  the  second  half  of  my  first  chapter,  I  extend  my  analysis  of  the  racial  
hauntings  of  the  antebellum  historical  imagination  by  examining  Emerson’s  writings  
and  lectures  on  the  philosophy  of  history.  I  contest  that  Emerson  was  a  deeply  engaged  
theorist  of  historical  aesthetics,  more  in  line  with  the  thoughts  of  romantic  nationalist  
historians  than  has  previously  been  acknowledge.  Emerson  adopts  and  critically  revises  
many  of  the  aesthetic  concepts  deployed  by  antebellum  historians,  and  in  doing  so  
discloses  the  conditions  and  limits  that  structured  how  historians  made  the  past  an  
experience  for  their  readers.  Emerson’s  thinking  about  history  results  in  a  figure,  the  
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sound  of  “rats  in  the  wall,”  that  reveals  how  the  racial  hauntings  of  antebellum  history  
disrupted  and  rewrote  the  temporalities  of  the  nation.  
In  my  second  chapter,  I  analyze  one  of  the  major  romantic  historians  of  the  
period,  William  H.  Prescott,  and  his  extremely  popular  History  of  the  Conquest  of  Mexico  
(1843).  At  this  point,  the  proto-­‐‑imperialism  of  the  antebellum  historical  project  re-­‐‑
emerges  as  a  central  concern.  This  text  demonstrates  that,  in  the  place  of  an  open  
recognition  of  Atlantic  anti-­‐‑slavery,  the  desire  for  the  experience  of  liberation  takes  the  
form  of  a  romantic  aesthetization  of  Mexico  as  a  space  in  which  national  subjects  can  re-­‐‑
live  the  self-­‐‑founding  of  previous  generations  through  the  liberation/conquest  of  foreign  
space.  In  my  reading,  the  temporal  aesthetic  of  imperialism  takes  shape  out  of  the  
psychic  trauma  of  a  disavowed  national  desire  and  the  fantasy  of  liberation  plays  a  
compensatory  role  in  the  loss  of  revolutionary  experience  in  the  U.S.  That  loss  is  not  a  
fact  of  belatedness,  but  only  produced  retroactively  as  “post-­‐‑heroic”  by  a  hegemonic  
discursive  structure  that  looks  to  ground  its  loss  in  something  other  than  a  recognition  
of  a  divergent  futurity.  Prescott’s  history,  although  a  narrative  of  the  Spanish  conquest  
of  the  Aztecs,  produces  a  fantasy  of  world  history  as  a  series  of  providential  liberations  
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by  white  European  men  that  brings  about  the  global  future  against  threatening  racial  
others  who  are  ontologically  barred  from  being  bearers  of  futurity.25      
Conducted  by  agents  consciously  excluded  from  progressive  time,  but  able,  as  in  
the  Haitian  Revolution,  to  radically  effect  history,  slave  revolution  featured  in  nationalist  
history  as  an  apocalyptic  break  in  temporal  continuity.  Slave  revolution  in  the  Atlantic  
world  was  perhaps  the  sine  qua  non  of  the  threats  to  national  progress  envisioned  by  
nationalist  historians.  The  second  half  of  this  dissertation  accordingly  turns  away  from  
nationalist  history  to  abolitionist  histories  and  nineteenth  and  twentieth-­‐‑century  writing  
about  slave  revolution.  By  engaging  history  as  a  discourse  and  an  aesthetic  project,  
abolitionist  writers  had  to  confront  its  romantic  form  and  its  deployment  of  race  to  
portray  disruptions  in  national  time.  I  begin  the  third  chapter  by  examining  abolitionists  
and  literary  writers  who  intuited  the  relationship  between  the  language  of  beauty  within  
which  nationalists  had  clothed  their  images  of  progress  and  the  subjection  of  black  
                                                                                                              
25  Frantz  Fanon  was  the  first  and  most  famous  analyst  of  the  racial  ontology  of  modernity  in  Black  Skins,  
White  Masks  (1952),  and  his  work  has  recently  been  revived  by  afro-­‐‑pessimist  scholars,  including  Ronald  
Judy,  Jared  Sexton,  Frank  Wilderson,  and  of  course,  in  Orlando  Patterson’s  now  classic  work  Slavery  and  
Social  Death  (1985).  Wilderson  has  defined  racial  ontology  succinctly:  “[i]n  leftist  metacommentaries  on  
ontology  […]  subjects’  paradigmatic  location,  the  structure  of  their  relationality,  is  organized  around  their  
capacities:  powers  subjects  have  or  lack,  the  constituent  elements  of  subjects  structural  position  with  which  
they  are  imbued  or  lack  prior  to  the  subjects  performance  [but]  in  [leftist/Marxist’s]  putative  embrace  of  
working-­‐‑class  incapacity  there  is  also  from  the  standpoint  of  the  Slave,  a  devastating  embrace  of  human  
capacity-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑that  which  the  Slave  lacks  […]  the  structure  of  the  Slave’s  domination  [is]  something  infinitely  
more  severe  than  exploitation  and  alienation”  (8-­‐‑9).  Temporal  capacity  is  a  matter  of  political  ontology;  it  is  
the  capacity  of  subjects  to  enter  into  and  shape  political  time  and  progressive  futures,  and  at  the  ontological  
level  (before  action)  antebellum  history  denies  its  racial  others  the  capacity  to  enter  into  that  temporal  
relationship  with  other  subjects.  This  is  despite  any  obvious  demonstrated  capacity  in  actual  actions  (of  anti-­‐‑
imperial  and  anti-­‐‑slavery  resistance)  to  make  a  political  future  immanent.  
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bodies  and  political  life  necessitated  by  slavery,  including  the  abolitionist  William  J.  
Watkins,  Harriet  Beecher  Stowe,  and  Herman  Melville.  This  chapter  continues  with  a  
discussion  of  the  black  abolitionist  historians  who  wrote  about  the  slave  revolution  
while  confronting  and  revising  the  aesthetic  norms  of  nationalist  history.  My  
dissertation  ends  with  a  coda  that  considers  writings  from  more  openly  anti-­‐‑imperialist  
moment,  the  early  twentieth  century.  I  argue  that  the  aesthetics  of  history  can  offer  vital  
insights  into  how  W.E.B.  Du  Bois  and  C.L.R.  James  reimagined  the  history  of  political  
modernity  and  the  United  States  in  Black  Reconstruction  and  The  Black  Jacobins.  These  
now  classical  works  of  revisionist  history  reimagine  the  role  the  black  masses  had  in  
shaping  the  history  of  the  modern  Atlantic  world,  but  their  intervention  into  
historiography  extends  beyond  their  production  of  a  new  category  of  materialist  
analysis.  James  and  Du  Bois  revise  a  fundamental  image  of  romantic  history,  and  in  
doing  so  produce  new  temporal  affects  and  a  new  imagination  of  futurity  at  odds  with  
modernity’s  violent  reduction  of  the  past  and  future  to  the  present  political  order.  
With  Derek  Walcott,  I  believe  that  “the  sense  of  history  in  poets  lives  rawly  along  
their  nerves”  (“The  Muse  of  History”  40).  The  rawness  of  the  poet’s  sense  of  history  
described  here  is  the  temporal  hybridity—the  potential  that  the  past  and  future  can  be  
experienced  in  the  present—that  makes  aesthetic  history  possible  at  all.  But  it  is  also  
what  radically  unsettles  romantic  history’s  reduction  of  the  past  and  future  to  a  linear  
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order  projected  from  the  present.  My  dissertation  ultimately  suggests  that  even  
nationalist  historical  writing  has  been  desirous  of  alternative  articulations  of  political  
possibility,  yet,  because  it  is  unable  to  contain  such  displacements  of  linear  national  
time,  it  re-­‐‑codes  such  eruptions  as  temporally  past  and  spatially  other—objects  and  not  
agents  of  imperial  fantasies  of  liberation.  That  aesthetic  project  was  always  subject  to  a  
temporal  hybridity  that  emerged  in  the  vivid  sensate  descriptions  of  texts  whose  goal  
was  to  make  the  past  feel  present  to  the  reader.  As  Prescott  hesitatingly  suggests  in  the  
introduction  to  his  Conquest  of  Mexico,  “I  have  endeavored  […]  to  surround  [the  reader]  
with  the  spirit  of  the  times,  and  in  a  word,  to  make  him,  if  I  may  so  express  myself,  a  
contemporary  of  the  sixteenth-­‐‑century”  (6).  Although  Prescott  here  seems  to  limit  his  
suggestion  of  sensory  time  travel  with  excessive  qualifications,  his  need  to  distance  
himself  from  what  he  clearly  intends  should  point  us  towards  the  complicated  desire  he  
expresses  here.  After  all,  the  sensate  wanderings  of  Prescott’s  history  were  spatial  as  
well  as  temporal  and,  in  bringing  his  reader  into  the  history  of  a  space  in  which  slavery  
had  been  abolished  at  the  moment  of  colonial  independence,  what  he  wanted  to  present  
may  have  seemed  dubious  for  reasons  other  than  its  scientific  implausibility.    
In  Walcott’s  argument  about  New  World  poetry  it  is  just  that  co-­‐‑presence  of  
history,  not  as  an  object  of  discourse,  but,  in  his  formulation,  as  a  sensation—here,  a  
taste—that  occasions  the  possibility  of  the  eruption  of  a  “democratic  vista”:  “The  great  
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poetry  of  the  New  World  [although  Adamic]  does  not  pretend  to  […]  innocence,  its  
vision  is  not  naïve.  Rather,  like  its  fruits,  its  savour  is  a  mixture  of  the  acid  and  the  
sweet,  the  apples  of  its  second  Eden  have  the  tartness  of  experience”  (40-­‐‑41).    For  
Walcott  the  past  is  not  a  constraint,  construed  as  either  a  linear  temporality  of  progress  
or  a  melancholy  repetition  of  oppression,  rather  the  true  history  of  the  New  World  has  
been  “the  amnesia”  of  “the  slave.”  Amnesia  here  is  not  a  forgetting  in  the  sense  of  not  
remembering  past  and  present  domination  and  violence,  but  a  forgetting  of  “history”—a  
discourse  that  tries  to  dominate  the  future  through  its  knowledge  of  the  past.  This  
amnesia  that  feels  history  rawly  in  its  nerves—in  the  tartness  of  all  its  knowledge—
generates  the  possibility  of  a  “politics  of  elation,”  found  in  the  sheer  potential  of  the  
new.  This  dissertation  closes  with  a  consideration  of  how  politically  radical  writers  have  
articulated  a  different  aesthetics  of  history,  and  how  an  understanding  of  history  that  
focuses  on  the  aesthetic,  as  a  site  where  a  vision  of  history  comes  together  with  political  
desire,  can  help  us  imagine  other  temporalities  of  the  future.  In  tracing  an  arc  from  
hegemonic  neo-­‐‑imperial  myths  of  historical  temporality  to  the  hybrid  eruption  of  
democratic  possibility  in  the  multiple  sensations  of  history,  this  project  asserts  that  
central  to  any  consideration  of  how  historical  writing  can  function  as  an  occasion  for  
political  action  and  thought  is  how  the  aesthetics  of  history  makes  us  feel  the  radically  
unsettled  time  of  the  nations  under  our  feet.
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1. Dull Books and Shallow Village Tales 
History  is  distinguished  from  all  other  sciences  in  that  it  is  also  an  art.  History  is  
a  science  in  collecting,  finding,  penetrating;  it  is  an  art  because  it  recreates  and  
portrays  that  which  it  has  found  and  recognized.  Other  sciences  are  satisfied  
simply  with  recording  what  has  been  found;  history  requires  the  ability  to  
recreate.  
—Leopold  von  Ranke,  “On  the  Character  of  
Historical  Science”  (~1830)  
  
Our  age  is  retrospective.  It  builds  the  sepulchers  of  the  fathers.  It  writes  
biographies,  histories,  and  criticism.  The  foregoing  generations  beheld  God  and  
nature  face  to  face;  we,  through  their  eyes.  Why  should  not  we  also  enjoy  an  
original  relation  to  the  universe?  Why  should  not  we  have  a  poetry  and  
philosophy  of  insight  and  not  of  tradition,  and  a  religion  by  revelation  to  us,  and  
not  the  history  of  theirs?  
               —Ralph    Waldo  Emerson,  Nature  (1836)  
  
Even  the  most  skeptical  readers  have  seen  something  iconoclastic  in  Emerson’s  
polemic  against  history.  Whether  they  endorse  his  visionary  proclamation  of  innocence  
or  find  in  it  a  troublesome  evasion  of  historical  and  political  reality,  critics  have  taken  
Emerson  at  his  word  that  he  was  fundamentally  at  odds  with  the  filiopietistic  culture  of  
the  antebellum  United  States.1  Yet,  many  of  the  historians  of  the  antebellum  period  
shared  Emerson’s  sense  that  the  relationship  between  the  past  recorded  in  history  and  
                                                                                                              
1  Older  critics,  particularly  mid-­‐‑century  liberals  formulating  ideals  of  American  Exceptionalism,  promoted  
the  former  view.  See,  R.W.B.  Lewis,  The  American  Adam  (1955)  and  F.O.  Matthiessen,  American  Renaissance  
(1941).  The  anti-­‐‑exceptionalist  critics  of  the  1980s  and  90s  revised  this  view  into  a  critique  of  Emerson  and  
his  followers’  supposedly  de-­‐‑politicizing  transcendental  ideology.  See  Carolyn  Porter,  Seeing  and  Being  
(1985),  Christopher  Newfield,  The  Emerson  Effect  (1996),  and  John  Carlos  Rowe,  At  Emerson  Tomb  (1996).  
These  views  of  Emerson’s  “innocence”  and  supposed  avoidance  of  politics  and  history  has  been  thoroughly  
challenged  by  other  critics:  directly  in  Eduardo  Cadava’s  Emerson  and  the  Climates  of  History  (1997)  implicitly  
by  Len  Gougeon’s  research  into  Emerson’s  engagement  with  abolitionism.  See  his  Virtue’s  Hero  (1990).  
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the  demands  of  the  present  and  the  future  were  troubled  by  the  pace  of  recent  events.  
George  Bancroft,  perhaps  the  most  well  known  nationalist  historian  of  the  nineteenth  
century,  introduced  the  first  volume  of  his  History  of  the  United  States  (published  in  1834,  
two  years  before  Nature)  with  a  preface  emphasizing  that  the  apparent  
incommensurability  of  the  present  with  the  past  was  a  problem  historical  writing  had  to  
overcome.  In  a  brief  introduction,  he  contrasted  the  “new  states  forming  in  the  
wilderness;  canals  intersecting  our  plains  and  crossing  our  highlands  […]  our  wealth  
and  population  [and]  the  immense  concourse  of  immigrants  […]  crowding  our  shores,”  
with  the  “unproductive  waste  […]  destitute  of  commerce  and  political  connection”  that  
had  characterized  the  same  territory  “little  more  than  two  centuries  since”  (1:  2-­‐‑3;  ed.  
1879).2  As  Bancroft  formulated  it,  writing  history  was  an  important  pursuit  because  the  
continuity  between  past  experiences  and  present  challenges  was  no  longer  self-­‐‑evident.  
He  described  historical  writing  as  able  to  “explain  how  the  change  in  the  condition  of  
our  land  has  been  brought  about”  by  “follow[ing]  the  steps  by  which  a  favoring  
                                                                                                              
2  Two  major  editions  of  Bancroft’s  work  were  published  in  the  nineteenth  century.  The  first  was  an  eight-­‐‑
volume  edition  whose  publication  run  stretched  from  1835-­‐‑1860.  The  first  three  volumes  were  published  
well  before  the  final  five,  as  Bancroft’s  work  was  delayed  by  his  participation  in  Democratic  politics  and  the  
Polk  administration  in  the  1840s.  Those  three  volumes  were  republished  in  the  middle  of  the  1850s  as  the  
remaining  volumes  were  being  released.  After  the  Civil  War  Bancroft  revised  and  abridged  his  initial  eight  
volumes  down  to  six,  published  in  a  Centenary  Edition  in  1879.  He  later  expanded  this  edition  to  ten  
volumes,  with  additional  volumes  written  at  the  end  of  his  life  on  the  framing  of  the  Constitution  and  early  
national  history.  I  have  in  all  cases  attempted  to  use  the  first  eight-­‐‑volume  edition,  as  my  historicist  concerns  
are  primarily  with  the  decades  between  1830  and  1860.  But  due  to  missing  volumes  in  the  university  library,  
their  age,  and  lack  of  significant  republication  since  the  nineteenth  century,  I  have  had  to  rely  on  the  
Centenary  Edition  in  a  few  instances.  The  changes  between  the  editions  are  primarily  abridgements  and  
corrections  of  mistakes  in  historical  scholarship.  Citations  from  the  Centenary  Edition  will  be  noted  with  the  
date  of  publication  (1879),  those  from  the  original  will  not.  
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Providence,  calling  our  institutions  into  being,  has  conducted  the  country  to  its  present  
happiness  and  glory”  (I:  3;  ed.  1879).  While  Bancroft  and  Emerson  approached  the  
problem  of  historical  change  differently,  both  identified  a  fundamental  distance  between  
past  and  present  experience  that  either  had  to  be  explained,  at  risk  of  the  past  becoming  
useless  to  the  present,  or  was  a  reason  for  challenging  the  accepted  authority  of  the  past  
over  present  and  future  generations.  
I  begin  this  chapter  by  highlighting  the  shifting  temporalities  that  underwrote  
some  of  the  most  important  writing  about  history  in  the  antebellum  period  in  order  to  
question  dominant  accounts  of  the  political  distance  between  history  and  literature.  
Literary  critics  are  accustomed  to  thinking  about  nationalistic  historical  writing  in  the  
nineteenth  century  as  a  monolithic  ideological  discourse:  a  large-­‐‑scale  meta-­‐‑narrative  
that  glorified  the  founding  fathers,  naturalized  emergent  U.S.  imperialism,  and  
entrenched  forms  of  racial  and  gendered  domination  and  political  exclusion  without  
registering  any  sense  of  the  material  opposition  to  such  an  abstract  ideology.  In  contrast,  
scholars  have  treated  novelists,  poets,  and  other  literary  writers  with  more  nuance,  
seeing  in  their  works  more  productively  imaginative  responses  to  the  political  conflicts  
of  the  nineteenth  century.  Some  scholars  have  sought  out  writing  that  challenged  the  
dominant  narrative,  introduced  counter-­‐‑myths,  and/or  resisted  the  forms  of  oppression  
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encoded  into  its  narrative  structures.3  Others  have  simply  treated  the  literary  as  
profoundly  haunted  by  the  racial  and  sexual  contradictions  of  the  nation—
unconsciously  responsive  to  politics  if  not  actively  critical.  Where  history  has  been  
treated  as  a  static  discourse  of  power,  the  literary  has  often  been  vindicated  as  more  
active,  opening  up  the  possibility  of  thinking,  like  Emerson,  through  alternate  
relationships  with  the  past,  present,  and  future  that  subvert  history’s  authority.  This  
chapter  begins  with  a  challenge  to  that  opposition  between  history  and  literature  in  
order  to  suggest  that  historians  like  Bancroft  shared  with  literary  writers  a  sense  of  the  
temporal  shifts  that  marked  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  and  wrote  romantic  
and  aesthetic  responses  that  are  capable  of  being  read  as  closely  and  with  as  much  
subtlety  as  what  we  normally  have  considered  imaginative  literature.  
In  order  to  overcome  the  growing  distance  of  the  past,  history  became  an  
aesthetic  project  that  sought  to  provide  readers  with  imaginative  descriptions  of  what  
temporal  progress  looked  and  felt  like.  Historians  wrote  aesthetically  for  two  reasons.  
First,  it  was  a  way  to  imagine  the  writing  of  history  as  a  recuperation  of  a  past  whose  
meaning  had  become  obscured  by  historical  change  as  an  experience  for  readers  in  the  
present,  mediated  by  texts  conceived  as  works  of  romantic  art.  Second,  historians  sought  
                                                                                                              
3  For  example  we  might  look  to  Carolyn  Karcher’s  important  introduction  to  Lydia  Maria  Child’s  Hobomok.  
Although  a  powerful  recovery  of  a  vital  text,  Karcher  draws  an  overly  broad  distinction  between  official  
myths  and  ideology  about  race  and  history  (as  found  in  the  work  of  historians  and  Cooper)  and  a  structural  
affinity  between  white  women  and  American  Indians  that  produced  Child’s  critical  revisions  of  New  
England  history.  Doing  so  collapses  the  complexity  of  the  nominally  hegemonic  discourses  (history  and  
Cooper)  while  overstating  the  radicalism  of  Child’s  criticisms  of  discourses  on  race  and  imperialism.    
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to  provide  an  experience  of  the  past  precisely  because  it  was  in  the  past  (and  not  in  the  
conflicted  present)  that  they  most  clearly  could  identify  what  progress  looked  and  felt  
like,  thus  providing  a  seemingly  stable  experience  of  the  (metaphysical  or  otherwise)  
conditions  that  grounded  the  national  community  and  its  future.  This  imagination  of  
progress  was  central  to  forms  of  national  and  racial  identity  because  the  stability  of  the  
nation  was  being  challenged  in  the  antebellum  period  by  convulsive  changes  and  new  
forms  of  political  resistance  and  radicalism  that  proposed  absolute  breaks  with  the  past.  
These  alternative  relationships  with  time  included  Emerson’s  radical  rejection  of  
historical  authority  and  the  political  temporalities  demanded  by  abolitionist  
immediatism  and  Atlantic  slave  revolt.  
A  period  of  unprecedented  social  and  political  change,  the  nineteenth  century  
occasioned  major  contradictions  in  temporal  experience.  The  nation  was  expanding  
rapidly,  growing  westward  in  leaps  and  bounds  that,  despite  the  rhetoric  of  Manifest  
Destiny,  profoundly  unsettled  the  sense  many  had  of  the  form  of  the  nation  and  the  
subjects  that  composed  the  community  represented  by  the  U.S.  government.  This  period  
of  expansion  was  marked  by  massive  technological  advancements  in  communication  
and  transportation.  The  building  of  canals  and  railroads  and  the  invention  of  the  
telegraph  bound  together  and  brought  into  intimate  contact  an  unstable  and  rapidly  
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changing  nation.4  As  Anne  Baker  has  argued,  these  developments  led  many  writers  and  
observers  to  an  anxious  search  for  national  form  in  a  quest  to  define  a  stable  shape  of  the  
nation  in  geographical,  political,  idealist,  and  aesthetic  terms.5    
While  the  nation  grew  geographically,  the  political  community  was  also  
expanding  and  constricting  at  a  rapid  pace.  As  mass  white  male  suffrage  was  introduced  
and  the  character  of  American  politics  was  irretrievably  altered  by  the  growth  of  the  
democracy  movement  and  the  second  party  system,  citizenship  became  increasingly  
restricted.  Where  women  and  even  some  free  blacks  (who  owned  property)  had  been  
able  to  vote  in  some  northern  states  during  the  early  national  period,  after  the  
introduction  of  universal  suffrage,  citizenship  and  voting  rights  were  delimited  in  
stricter  racial  and  gendered  terms.  Just  at  the  moment  in  which  Democratic  politics  was  
redefining  political  time  as  a  progressive  struggle  of  the  people  against  entrenched  
privilege,  more  and  more  people  in  the  United  States  were  being  denied  participation  in  
national  political  life.  As  a  result  (but  also  perhaps  as  an  instigating  force)  women,  
American  Indians,  abolitionists  and  slaves  sought  out  alternate  forms  of  belonging  that  
crossed  and  upended  national  citizenship  and  sought  out  alternate  futures,  pasts,  and  
presents,  including  a  history  of  slave  revolution  in  the  Atlantic  world  that  peaked  in  the  
                                                                                                              
4  The  territorial,  geographic  and  political  convulsions  of  the  period  are  expertly  detailed  in  Daniel  Walker  
Howe’s  What  God  Hath  Wrought  (2009).  
  
5  See  Baker’s  Heartless  Immensity  (2006)  as  well  as  Paul  Giles’s  The  Global  Remapping  of  America  Literature  
(2011)  for  thoughtful  discussions  of  how  geographic  form  interacts  with  literary  form.  
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Haitian  Revolution  but  continued  in  the  revolts  and  antislavery  movements  of  the  
nineteenth  century.  
As  the  nation  moved  rapidly  into  a  future,  many  were  haunted,  on  the  one  hand,  
by  the  rapidity  with  which  it  might  be  losing  itself  and  its  identity  in  new  political  
geographies,  and  on  the  other  by  being  deprived  from  participation  in  and  dominated  
by  political  and  material  progress.  It  is  in  this  moment  that  the  magisterial  works  of  
romantic  nationalist  history  were  conceived  and  produced,  just  as  Emerson  and  others  
wrote  their  rebellious  subversions  of  historical  authority.  Both  discourses  were  
responses  to  the  shifting  conditions  of  temporal  experience  in  the  antebellum  United  
States,  or  what  Reinhart  Koselleck  (in  a  discussion  of  the  emergence  of  philosophies  of  
progress  in  a  European  context)  has  called  the  “temporalization”  of  history.  
Temporality,  in  Koselleck’s  usage,  defines  the  ways  the  relationships  among  the  past,  
present,  and  future  have  been  understood  throughout  history.  As  he  argues  in  his  
Futures  Past  (1985),  a  process  that  began  in  Europe  in  the  eighteenth  century  and  
accelerated  in  the  nineteenth  displaced  the  past  from  the  present  and  generated  the  
possibility  of  imagining  the  future  as  open-­‐‑ended  and  not  conditioned  by  what  had  
come  before.  While  it  is  evident  from  a  work  like  Irving’s  “Rip  Van  Winkle”  (1819)  that  
from  quite  an  early  date  in  the  nineteenth  century  authors  in  the  United  States  
understood  the  limits  of  known  history  for  understanding  their  future,  it  was  also  
possible  for  them  to  imagine  enough  continuity  between  the  heroic  actions  of  the  past  
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and  the  political  problems  confronted  in  their  present  to  avoid  inducing  Van  Winkle’s  
feeling  of  uncanny  repetition.  They  could  see  history,  under  an  older  Enlightenment  
conception,  as  space  of  moral  philosophy  where  a  stable  set  of  values  governed  both  
past  and  future.  As  Philip  Gould  has  argued,  it  was  clear  to  writers  as  late  as  the  1820s  
and  30s  (like  James  Fennimore  Cooper  and  Catharine  Maria  Sedgwick)  that  history  was  
a  form  of  writing  where  contemporary  ideas  about  political  virtue  could  be  contested  in  
works  concerned  with  the  past.    
The  quotation  from  Emerson  in  the  epigraph  demonstrates  the  degree  to  which  
such  a  sense  of  continuity  became  increasingly  strained.  As  Koselleck  put  it,  the  growth  
of  philosophies  of  historical  progress  meant  the  “destruction  of  the  exemplary  nature  of  
past  events  and,  in  its  place,  the  discovery  of  the  uniqueness  of  historical  processes”  (32).  
Just  as  the  sense  that  the  contemporary  moment  took  part  in  long-­‐‑term  historical  
processes  was  growing—that  life  indeed  had  a  historical  character—so  could  history  
itself,  in  Emerson’s  other  famous  phrase,  become  a  “dull  book.”  The  shifting  temporal  
horizons  of  the  early  nineteenth  century  are  key  to  understanding  the  massive  amount  
of  historical  writing  produced  in  the  same  period  and  the  huge  increase  in  its  popularity  
in  the  marketplace.  This  historical  writing  sought  to  overcome  the  experience  of  a  
profound  gap  between  present  and  future,  and  it  was  central  to  how  a  national  past  was  
consolidated  as  the  groundwork  of  the  emerging  discourses  on  race  
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identity  that  increasingly  relied  on  ideas  of  progress  as  a  basis  for  social  and  political  
hierarchy.    
Lloyd  Pratt  has  argued  that  progress  was  not  a  natural  form  of  temporal  
experience  and  that  it  was  not  the  only  temporality  available  to  antebellum  Americans  
for  understanding  the  relationship  between  time  and  the  nation.  But,  in  the  work  of  
these  historians  it  was  asserted  as  a  dominant  structure  of  feeling  because  its  
presentation  was  so  aesthetically  powerful.  It  relieved  senses  of  conflict  and  crisis  in  the  
national  temporal  order  in  powerful  romantic  images  that  internalized  racial  and  
temporal  hierarchies  as  a  matter  of  feeling,  vision,  and  imagination.  As  Anthony  Bogues  
has  argued  in  Empire  of  Liberty  (2010),  the  emergence  of  American  imperial  power  was  
more  than  a  matter  of  political  domination:  it  was  the  encoding  of  a  particular,  
historically  contingent,  way  of  life  as  an  expression  of  natural  human  capacities,  felt  to  
be  universally  true  in  the  mind’s  interaction  with  the  external  world.  Historians  like  
Bancroft  were  central  to  a  process  by  which,  in  becoming  aesthetic,  historical  writing  
helped  produce  a  way  of  sensing  and  feeling  time  that  disavowed  other  political  and  
temporal  possibilities  in  the  antebellum  period.  As  such,  history  was  a  central  
imaginative  genre  in  producing  the  structure  of  feeling  that  has  shaped  responses  to  U.S.  
imperial  power  for  nearly  two  centuries.      
This  chapter  takes  up  Emerson  and  George  Bancroft  as  two  of  the  dominant  
voices  in  the  cultural  process  that,  for  a  brief  period  of  time,  brought  to  the  fore  a  mode  
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of  historical  writing  defined  by  its  aesthetic  power.  Aesthetics  was  not  the  only  way  
historians  conceptualized  history  in  this  period,  and  some  writers  of  history  reacted  
against  what  they  called  Bancroft’s  “lack  of  taste”—a  product  of  his  romantic  and  
nationalist  enthusiasm  and  seeming  lack  of  awareness  of  complexity  and  contrasting  
voices.6  History  was  also  conceived  judiciously  as  an  impartial  narrative  that  carefully  
weighed  the  rights  and  wrongs  of  various  actors  and  in  proto-­‐‑professional  terms  as  a  
discipline  that  researched  carefully  into  the  past  in  order  to  reveal  the  truth  of  events.7  
Yet,  in  all  the  major  works  of  the  period,  from  Bancroft’s  histories,  to  those  of  William  H.  
Prescott,  Francis  Parkman,  and  John  Lothrop  Motley,  we  find  what  Donald  Ringe  in  his  
study  of  romantic  literature  once  called  “the  pictorial  mode”:  an  effort  to  descriptively  
visualize  past  events  as  paintings  that  demonstrated  the  forward  movement  of  progress  
across  a  natural  landscape  and  against  forces  of  resistance—variously  pre-­‐‑Columbian  
Empires,  Native  Americans,  and  the  European  despotic  past.  This  aesthetics  of  history  
                                                                                                              
6  Francis  Bowen,  a  prominent  reviewer  of  history,  attacked  Bancroft  for  his  “lack  of  taste”  and  obvious  
political  investments,  and  hence  lack  of  impartiality  in  a  letter  to  Lorenzo  Sabin  in  1845.  This  attack  captures  
a  common  refrain  in  criticism  of  Bancroft:  that  he  was  too  obviously  a  political  Democratic  and  that  his  
partisanship  impinged  on  what  should  a  professional  calling  as  a  historian.  Other  prominent  historians  like  
Richard  Hildreth  and  John  Lothrop  Motley  wrote  history  implicitly  as  a  reaction  against  Bancroft’s  overt  
patriotism  and  lack  of  complexity.  Motley  introduced  his  Rise  of  the  Dutch  Republic  by  emphasizing  his  
patient  work  in  archives,  the  need  for  temperance  in  history  and  by  claiming  that  “neither  that  liberty  [of  the  
Dutch  Republic]  nor  ours  was  born  of  the  cloud-­‐‑embraces  of  a  false  Divinity  with,  a  Humanity  of  impossible  
beauty.”—all  of  which  are  clearly  comments  on  Bancroft’s  enthusiasm  and  aesthetic  excesses.  Nonetheless,  
these  historians  still  relied  on  an  aesthetic  discourse  that  conjoined  beauty  to  heroism  to  describe  the  
progress  of  liberty  in  the  past.  
  
7    For  an  excellent  account  of  the  variety  of  intersecting  epistemological  and  aesthetic  imperatives  that  
shaped  historical  writing  in  the  antebellum  period  see  Cheng’s  aforementioned  The  Plain  and  Noble  Garb  of  
Truth  (2008).  
  58  
was  a  visualization  of  time  that  described  portraits  of  the  movement  and  spread  of  
liberty  through  the  New  World  (and  sometimes  the  Old)  and  the  organization  of  space  
and  subjugated  populations  in  the  providential  violence  of  civilization.  In  this  rewriting  
of  history  as  an  aesthetic  project  Emerson’s  literary  voice  is  critical  but  not  divergent.  He  
wanted  history  to  provide  readers  with  profound  experiences  of  human  possibility  so  as  
to  supplement  and  overcome  the  limits  of  the  present  to  experience.  But  lacking  an  
ideological  commitment  to  the  nation  or  to  progress,  his  writings  touch  on  the  limits  of  
history  for  figuring  temporal  experience  and  its  boundaries  in  racial  and  temporal  
alterity.  In  what  follows,  I  provide  a  reading  of  the  emergence  of  the  aesthetics  of  
progress  in  antebellum  history  in  the  context  of  antebellum  domestic  politics  over  race  
and  slavery.  In  following  chapters  I  will  expand  that  scope  to  show  the  role  that  
aesthetics  played  in  the  cultural  imaginary  of  U.S.  imperialism.  
  
Progress and Abolition 
  
By  1854,  when  Bancroft  delivered  his  oration  “The  Necessity,  the  Reality,  and  the  
Promise  of  the  Progress  of  the  Human  Race”  at  the  fiftieth  anniversary  of  the  New  York  
Historical  Society,  his  reputation  was  that  of  a  prophet  of  the  future  of  the  Union  who  
saw  beyond  the  tumultuous  order  of  events  to  the  underlying  causes  of  history  with  a  
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placid  faith  that  the  “universal  mind”  of  the  people  would  overcome  all  obstacles.8  In  
this  count,  the  lecture  of  1854  did  not  disappoint.  Employing  transcendentalist  rhetoric  
to  nationalist  ends,  it  celebrates  the  fifty  years  of  progress  since  the  founding  of  the  New  
York  Historical  Society  as  a  time  in  which  Bancroft  “dare[d  to]  assert  that,  in  some  
branches  of  human  activity,  the  period  we  commemorate  has  done  more  for  his  
instruction  and  improvement  than  all  that  went  before”  (19).  Despite  the  placid  surface  
of  Bancroft’s  declaration  of  faith  in  historical  progress,  this  lecture  registers  the  crises  
slavery  and  anti-­‐‑slavery  presented  to  such  a  model  of  temporal  continuity.  In  it,  Bancroft  
is  profoundly  troubled  by  the  challenges  presented  to  his  philosophy  of  progress  by  the  
call  of  radical  abolitionists  for  a  complete  break  with  the  national  past  and  the  present  of  
slavery.  In  order  to  disavow  the  ethical  crisis  generated  by  this  alternate  political  
temporality,  Bancroft  worked  to  curtail  its  promise  of  immanent  justice  into  an  
expectation  of  a  future  whose  coming  would  be  permanently  deferred  in  order  to  
maintain  the  continuity  of  time  itself.    
The  New  York  Historical  Society  was  one  of  the  first  major  societies  of  its  kind  in  
the  U.S.  (predated  only  by  the  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  Historical  Societies,  
founded  in  1791  and  1799,  respectively).  The  primary  collectors  of  archival  material  
                                                                                                              
8  As  his  most  recent  biographer  has  written,  the  first  volume  of  Bancroft’s  history  “earned  immediate  
welcome  for  its  historical  arguments  against  the  gloomy  forecasts  [of  his  contemporaries].  The  nation  
received  a  scholarly,  if  not  soberly  written,  reminder  that  the  past  had  also  been  out  of  joint,  that  it  had  not  
been  a  smooth  harmonious  development”  but  that  the  nation  had  overcome  all  those  obstacles  in  its  
progress  into  the  future  (Handlin  129).  
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about  colonial  and  national  history,  the  historical  societies  outpaced  even  the  largest  
university  libraries  in  the  size  of  their  collections  (Callcott  41).  For  historians  like  
Bancroft  they  were  central  sites  for  conducting  research,  as  well  as  important  engines  for  
funding  historical  research,  publishing  monographs,  and  disseminating  the  norms  of  
scholarship  for  a  discipline  that  would  not  find  a  home  in  the  American  academy  until  
after  the  Civil  War.  Because  the  societies  were  in  large  part  funded  by  the  membership  
of  prominent  figures  in  the  local  community,  including  politicians,  ministers,  and  
attorneys,  a  commemorative  lecture  like  Bancroft’s  was  not  a  small  affair  addressed  to  a  
only  a  small  coterie  of  intellectuals.  It  was  reported  on  by  local  newspapers,  published  
by  the  society,  and  distributed  to  all  of  its  members,  including  the  soon  to  be  president,  
James  Buchanan  (Kelly  96).  As  such,  it  is  perhaps  one  of  the  definitive  public  statements  
of  the  role  the  institution  of  history  was  imagined  to  play  in  the  development  of  the  
nation  before  the  Civil  War.  
The  surface  ideological  implications  of  Bancroft’s  philosophy  of  progress  in  the  
context  of  antebellum  politics  were  various  and  give  a  clue  to  how  this  temporal  
conservatism  could  take  the  form  of  a  progressive  philosophy,  but  we  need  to  go  
beyond  them  to  get  to  a  sense  of  Bancroft’s  affective  disavowal  of  other,  more  
disruptive,  models  of  temporality.  In  the  1830s,  he  announced  his  political  affiliation  
with  the  Democratic  Party,  and  his  dialectical  model  of  an  ongoing  political  conflict  
between  a  “party  of  progress”  and  a  “party  of  the  past”  that  would  result  in  mediated  
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reform—adapted  from  Sir  Walter  Scott,  among  others—justified  the  party  politics  model  
that  the  Democrats  endorsed  and  the  Whigs  claimed  to  oppose.9  Progress,  as  Bancroft  
envisioned  it,  underwrote  westward  expansion  and  imperialist  wars  as  both  a  tool  in  
spreading  the  institutions  of  liberty  across  the  continent  and  (in  the  growth  of  new  
settlements  in  the  west)  a  source  of  renewal  in  the  political  system.  Progress  also  served,  
in  Bancroft’s  history,  to  justify  past  practices  of  slavery  even  while  promising  its  natural  
dissolution.  As  Bancroft  wrote  in  the  first  volume,  slavery  was  an  “unjust,  wasteful  and  
unhappy  system  […]  fastened  upon  the  rising  institutions  of  America  […]  by  the  
mercantile  avarice  of  a  foreign  nation”  (1:  126;  ed.  1879).  He  went  on  to  suggest  that,  
given  its  impossible  contradiction  with  institutions  of  freedom,  it  would  necessarily  
come  to  an  end  through  the  inevitable  agency  of  progress.  And  yet,  in  the  third  volume,  
published  in  1850  as  abolitionist  agitation  was  increasing,  Bancroft  relied  on  progress  to  
partially  justify  the  past  of  slavery,  arguing  that  “in  the  midst  of  the  horrors  of  slavery  
and  the  slave  trade,  the  masters  had,  in  part  at  least,  performed  the  office  of  advancing  
and  civilizing  the  Negro”  (3:  408).  In  each  instance,  progress  served  to  overcome  and  
mediate  apparently  insoluble  conflicts  about  the  nation  and  its  future.10  
                                                                                                              
9  George  Dekker  has  described  how  the  conflict  between  a  “party  of  progress”  and  “a  party  of  the  past”  
structured  the  fictions  of  Scott  and  Cooper,  helping  to  shape  the  historical  consciousness  of  U.S.  culture  in  
his  study,  The  American  Historical  Romance  (1990).  
  
10  David  Brion  Davis  highlights  Bancroft’s  position  on  slavery  as  one  of  his  key  examples  of  how  
intellectuals  resolved  the  “philosophical  problem”  slavery  presented  in  cultures  committed  to  the  freedom  
and  enlightenment  in  the  introduction  to  The  Problem  of  Slavery  in  Western  Culture  (1966).  He  writes:  “While  
Bancroft  saw  a  basic  contradiction  between  slavery  and  America’s  mission,  he  resolved  the  dilemma  in  a  
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However,  beyond  these  evident  political  implications,  it  is  also  clear  that,  to  
Bancroft  and  his  listeners,  progress  was  more  than  a  narrative  about  the  nature  of  
history,  it  was  an  indwelling  feeling  evidenced  and  made  possible  by  each  individual’s  
love  for  liberty  that  could  be  activated  and  renewed  through  the  writing  and  relating  of  
history.  A  recent  biographer  notes  that  the  1854  lecture  at  times  reads  as  “less  a  
statement  of  democratic  dogma  than  a  hymn  to  God”  (Handlin  254).  Coming  as  it  does  
in  the  midst  of  the  fervor  of  the  1850s,  Bancroft’s  faith  in  progress  and  the  will  of  the  
people,  perceived  by  the  New  England  Whig  culture  in  which  he  was  raised  as  radical  in  
the  1830s,  became  increasingly  conservative  and  seemingly  oblivious  to  the  facts  of  
history  that  surrounded  him.  According  to  Handlin,  Bancroft  had,  in  fact,  grown  
disillusioned  with  the  Democratic  Party,  and  was  beginning  to  see  his  history  as  the  
most  effective  platform  for  addressing  the  public  and  pushing  for  a  resolution  to  the  
political  crises  of  the  present.  More  than  a  political  ideology,  progress  summoned  a  
national  community  to  its  indwelling  feeling  for  a  future  beyond  the  tumult  of  the  
present.  
Slavery  weighed  heavily  on  Bancroft’s  articulation  of  this  feeling  for  progress,  
however,  as  was  evidenced  by  his  frequent  rhetorical  elisions  of  the  consequences  of  its  
                                                                                                              
  
manner  that  was  apparently  satisfactory  to  most  of  his  countrymen.  The  institution  was  alien  to  the  nature  
of  the  New  World;  it  had  been  imposed  on  the  people  against  their  will,  and  the  guilt  thus  fell  upon  an  
already  guilt-­‐‑sickened  Europe.  Yet  in  a  larger  view,  even  slavery  appeared  as  part  of  the  providential  plan  
for  the  redemption  of  the  human  race”  (24).  
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persistence  in  the  United  States.  In  attempting  to  account  for  the  progress  that  had  been  
experienced  in  the  previous  fifty  years  since  the  founding  of  the  New  York  Historical  
Society,  Bancroft  claimed  that  he  was  “not  here  refer[ing]  to  our  own  country,  because  it  
is  all  together  new  […]  I  speak  rather  of  results  in  which  the  old  world  takes  it  share”  
(19).  Bancroft’s  nationalism  had  always  been  at  once  a  form  of  universalism.  Throughout  
this  lecture  (as  in  his  history)  he  makes  claims  on  behalf  of  the  equal  potential  of  all  men  
in  all  times:    
Every  man  is  in  substance  equal  to  his  fellow  man.  His  nature  is  changed  neither  
by  time  nor  by  country.  He  bears  no  marks  of  having  risen  to  his  present  degree  
of  perfection  by  successive  transmutations  from  inferior  forms;  but  by  the  
peculiarity  and  superiority  of  his  powers  he  shows  himself  to  have  been  created  
separate  and  distinct  from  all  animal  life.  He  is  neither  degenerating  into  such  
differences  as  could  in  the  end  no  longer  be  classified  together,  nor  rising  into  a  
higher  species.  Each  member  of  the  race  is  in  will,  affection  and  intellect  
consubstantial  with  every  other.  (9)  
  
While  much  of  this  language  is  inflected  by  his  friend  Emerson’s  approach  to  history  
and  universality,  the  particular  emphasis  against  theories  of  degeneration,  climate,  and  
species  differentiation  within  the  human  race  is  a  refutation  of  the  racial  theories  then  
circulating  in  southern  and  Democratic  Party  circles.11  The  language  of  consubstantiality  
is  an  implicit  partial  endorsement  of  abolitionism,  which  had  repeatedly  focused  on  that  
theme  throughout  the  period.  For  Bancroft,  progress  was  not  found  in  the  growth  of  
particular  groups,  civilizations,  or  even  of  individuals;  it  was  a  shared  condition  of  the  
                                                                                                              
11  For  the  development  and  spread  of  these  and  other  racial  theories  in  the  antebellum  period  see  George  
Fredrickson’s  The  Black  Image  in  the  White  Mind  (1971).  
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entirety  of  the  human  race.  It  was  an  indwelling  capacity  to  push  human  institutions  
towards  a  more  just  and  free  moral  order.  But  in  stepping  away  from  the  specificity  of  
the  United  States  here  Bancroft  discloses  the  pressure  of  slavery  on  his  vision.    
Bancroft  endorsed  the  view  that  the  United  States  had  a  special  (i.e.  
exceptionalist)  purpose  in  bringing  about  that  progress.  As  he  proclaimed,  “[o]ur  
country  is  bound  to  allure  the  world  to  freedom  by  the  beauty  of  its  example”  (36).  Thus,  
it  is  significant  that,  in  this  commemorative  essay  looking  to  celebrate  the  achievements  
of  the  community  he  was  addressing,  he  turned  his  focus  away  from  the  United  States  
and  back  towards  Europe.  We  can  attribute  Bancroft’s  inability  to  directly  assess  
progress  in  the  United  States  in  the  nineteenth  century  to  a  strategy  for  processing  the  
sense  of  national  crisis  felt  throughout  the  1850s.  He  never  says  this  directly,  but  his  
logic  can  be  summarized  by  the  following;  although  domestically  progress  might  be  
hard  to  discern  in  the  tumult  of  expansion  and  sectional  crisis,  the  example  of  the  U.S.  
had  already  inspired  renewal  abroad,  evidencing  the  work  of  Providence  at  home.  What  
Bancroft  did  say  when  he  descended  from  abstract  categories  is  found  in  a  series  of  
attempts  to  anticipate  possible  objections  to  his  overall  vision  of  progress.  In  discussing  
the  status  of  women,  Bancroft  argued  that  “[i]t  may  seem  at  variance  with  our  theme,  
that  as  republican  institutions  gain  ground,  WOMAN  appears  less  on  the  theater  of  
events  […]  yet  the  progress  of  liberty,  while  it  has  made  her  less  conspicuous,  has  
redeemed  her  into  the  full  dignity  of  her  nature”  and  then  celebrates  woman’s  role  as  
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man’s  “companion,  his  counselor,  and  fellow-­‐‑martyr”  (22).  For  all  his  progressive  
rhetoric  concerning  material  progress,  scientific  knowledge,  individual  freedom,  and  the  
dignity  of  laboring  classes,  Bancroft  evinced  a  reactionary  politics  when  it  suited  his  
purpose.  He  consistently  refuted  counter-­‐‑evidence  to  progress  by  circumscribing  the  
equality  of  those  groups  whose  positions  had  become  more  marginalized  in  the  national  
order  over  time.    
In  confronting  slavery,  he  deflected  from  the  questions  of  national  institutions  
and  race  into  a  discussion  of  the  abolition  of  serfdom  in  Prussia:  
The  fifty  years  which  we  celebrate,  have  taken  mighty  strides  toward  the  
abolition  of  servitude.  Prussia,  in  the  hour  of  its  suffering  and  its  greatest  
calamities,  renovated  its  existence  partly  by  the  establishment  of  schools,  and  
partly  by  changing  its  serfs  into  a  proprietary  peasantry.  (23)  
  
In  the  United  States,  the  most  recent  significant  change  regarding  the  future  of  slavery  
was  the  Compromise  of  1850  and  the  expansion  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law.  The  
legislation  signed  in  the  compromise  had  endorsed  the  doctrine  of  Popular  Sovereignty  
(by  which  newly  incorporated  states  were  granted  the  ability  to  decide  for  themselves  
the  legality  of  slavery),  overturning  the  previous  balance  achieved  between  the  slave  
and  free  states  by  the  Missouri  Compromise  and  opening  the  door  to  slavery  in  
territories  acquired  in  the  U.S.-­‐‑Mexican  War,  including  California.  The  compromise  also  
extended  the  reach  of  Fugitive  Slave  Law,  allowing  southern  slave  owners  to  make  
claims  of  ownership  against  any  black  person  in  the  northern  states  without  the  need  to  
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bring  them  to  trial.  As  the  historian  David  Potter  has  written,  the  purpose  of  the  
compromise:  
[W}as  to  put  a  stop  to  agitation  over  the  slavery  question.  But  to  accomplish  this  
the  compromisers  adopted  a  law  to  activate  the  recapture  of  fugitive  slaves  […]  
Any  measure  that  required  the  sending  of  men  from  freedom  into  slavery  would  
have  caused  strong  revulsion  at  best,  but  the  fugitive  slave  law,  as  enacted  
contained  a  number  of  gratuitously  obnoxious  provisions  […]  In  the  eyes  of  
many  northerners  [the  law]  meant  that  the  federal  government  had  not-­‐‑only  
gone  into  the  business  of  man-­‐‑hunting  itself  but  also  required  every  freeborn  
American  to  become  manhunter  on  occasion.  (130-­‐‑131)12    
  
In  the  United  States,  the  legislative  power  of  the  slave  states,  the  potential  future  
expansion  of  slavery,  and  the  juridical  association  of  race  with  slavery  had  all  recently  
been  vastly  expanded,  while  Bancroft  attempted  to  claim  great  progress  in  the  cause  of  
abolition  by  deflecting  attention  to  the  status  of  Prussian  serfs.    
Bancroft’s  earlier  willingness  to  embrace  a  more  universal  view  and  move  away  
from  the  United  States  in  his  celebration  of  progress  comes  back  here  as  an  inability  to  
attend  to  the  worsening  prospects  of  abolition.  If  philosophies  of  progress  emerged  in  
the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  century  to  make  sense  of  the  changing  relationship  
between  past  and  future  evinced  by  the  age  of  revolution  (as  diverse  commentators  
including  Reinhart  Koselleck  and  Georg  Luckács  have  argued),  then  the  perception  of  
                                                                                                              
12  The  specific  provisions  that  conscripted  the  federal  government  and  average  citizens  into  the  recapture  of  
fugitive  slaves  were  “the  denial  of  the  alleged  fugitive  any  right  to  jury  trial.”  It  allowed  the  cases  of  slaves  
to  be  tried  by  court-­‐‑appointed  commissioners  in  which  the  commissioner  would  be  paid  “a  $10  fee  in  cases  
in  which  the  alleged  fugitive  was  delivered  to  the  claimant,  but  only  a  $5  fee  in  cases  when  he  was  set  free.”  
And,  perhaps  most  outrageously  to  citizens  of  states  whose  public  sentiment  was  increasingly  against  
slavery,  the  law  “empowered  federal  Marshalls  to  summon  all  citizens  to  aid  in  enforcement  of  the  Act.”  
(Potter  131)  
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regression  becomes  a  serious  problem  for  exponents  of  progress.  The  more  conservative  
Whig  historians  had  formulated  a  theory  of  so-­‐‑called  “backwards”  progress  to  help  
explain  phenomena  that  did  not  seem  to  augur  progressive  futures.  As  a  historian  of  the  
Whig  Party,  Daniel  Walker  Howe,  puts  it,  “[f]or  them,  real  progress  was  not  something  
likely  to  happen  automatically;  it  required  careful,  purposeful  planning.  Social  progress  
took  place  much  as  the  education  of  the  individual  did,  through  careful  cultivation  of  
what  was  valued  and  rigorous  suppression  of  that  which  was  not”  (21).  As  such,  society  
could  easily  revert  to  earlier  states  if  the  worst  qualities  (for  many  Whigs,  slavery,  
expansionism,  political  corruption,  partisanship,  and  class  conflict)  were  allowed  to  
fester.  Compare  their  view  with  Bancroft  democratic  faith  in  progress’s  inevitability:  
Every  thing  is  in  movement,  and  for  the  better,  except  only  the  fixed  eternal  law  
by  which  the  necessity  of  change  is  established;  or  rather  except  only  God,  who  
includes  in  himself  all  being,  all  truth  and  all  love.  The  subject  of  man’s  thoughts  
remains  the  same,  but  the  sum  of  his  acquisitions  ever  grows  with  time,  so  that  
his  last  system  of  philosophy  is  the  best,  for  it  includes  every  one  that  went  
before.  (36)  
  
For  Bancroft,  progress  was  its  own  necessity:  an  indwelling  principle  that  could  do  
nothing  but  advance  because  all  actions  led  towards  a  more  advanced  future  of  greater  
material  knowledge,  freedom,  and  self-­‐‑consciousness.  Slavery  was  an  aberration  for  
Bancroft,  but  one  marked  as  belonging  to  an  earlier  era  that  would  necessarily  wither  
away.  How  then  could  he  confront  the  truth  that  slavery  was  rapidly  expanding  in  the  
1850s?  
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Part  of  the  problem  was  that  such  expansion  had  seemed  to  Bancroft  and  others  
to  call  into  being  far  more  radical  rejections  of  U.S.  nationalism  by  abolitionists  than  had  
previously  been  encountered.  Ultimately,  abolitionists  were  formulating  quite  different  
temporal  models  from  the  progressive  politics  of  the  Democrats  that  harkened  back  to  
prophetic  religious  traditions  and  eighteenth-­‐‑century  philosophies  of  natural  rights.  This  
temporal  model  has  been  termed  immediatist  abolition  by  David  Brion  Davis  and  others  
looking  to  acknowledge  its  difference  from  progressivism.13  Immediatism  was  a  
philosophy  that  emerged  out  of  eighteenth  century  abolitionism  and  natural  rights  
philosophy.  As  the  British  abolitionist  Granville  Sharp  argued,  slavery  was  a  violation  of  
“common  law,  the  law  of  reason,  and  the  law  of  God,”  and  called  for  “immediate  
redress,  because  to  be  in  power,  and  to  neglect  even  a  day  in  endeavoring  to  put  a  stop  
to  such  a  monstrous  injustice  and  abandoned  wickedness,  must  necessarily  endanger  a  
man’s  eternal  welfare”  (qtd.  in  Davis  1962:  211).    
The  temporal  dimension  of  such  immediatism  was  of  a  piece  with  radical  
Enlightenment  philosophy;  political  rights  were  to  be  enacted  regardless  of  the  currently  
existing  state  of  affairs,  because  to  operate  in  violation  of  natural  or  moral  law  was  a  
graver  danger  than  the  rejection  of  social  or  political  traditions.  The  value  of  the  past  
over  the  present  was  reduced  to  a  zero  degree  in  immediatism.  As  Davis  argued,  
                                                                                                              
13  Jeffrey  Insko  has  further  discussed  the  temporal  character  of  immediatism  in  “Immediatist  Abolitionism  
and  Romantic  Presentism”  [unpublished  conference  presentation]  (2014).  
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although  immediatism  had  roots  in  the  eighteenth  century,  when  it  returned  and  gained  
in  strength  in  the  1830s  in  the  United  States  it  was  perceived  as  a  far  more  radical  
philosophy  than  it  had  been  in  the  earlier  period.  In  the  interceding  years,  the  idea  that  
natural  right  could  be  imposed  on  a  social  situation  without  destructive  upheavals  
confronted  conservative  and  nationalistic  reactions  to  the  French  Revolution  that  
insisted  such  idealism  was  disastrous  for  the  social  order.  In  the  United  States,  this  
conservatism  was  reflected  in  the  increased  emphasis  of  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  
and  the  early  historians  of  the  American  Revolution  on  the  continuity  between  the  new  
legal  order  and  traditions  of  English  civil  liberty.14  As  a  result  of  this  conservative  turn,  
abolitionism  in  the  United  States  was  dominated  in  the  early  nineteenth  century  by  
gradualist  and  colonizing  currents  that  sought  the  end  of  slavery  in  careful  reform  and  
tried  to  alleviate  fears  about  the  effect  of  emancipation  through  the  colonization  of  ex-­‐‑
slaves  outside  the  United  States  in  Liberia  and  elsewhere.  In  Davis’s  words,  “[t]here  was  
a  wide-­‐‑gap  [in  the  nineteenth  century]  between  the  abstract  proposition  that  slavery  was  
wrong,  or  even  criminal,  and  the  cautious  formulation  of  anti-­‐‑slavery  policy”  (“The  
Emergence  of  Immediatism…”  214).  
As  both  legal  abolitionism  and  slave-­‐‑revolution  advanced  across  the  Atlantic  
world,  immediatism  became  the  dominant  strand  in  many  branches  of  U.S.  abolitionism.  
                                                                                                              
14  As  Michael  Kammen  once  argued,  in  the  early  national  period  in  the  United  States,  the  revolution  became  
non-­‐‑revolutionary.    See  his  A  Season  of  Youth  (1978).  
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Although  many  white  abolitionists,  including  Garrisonians  and  the  so-­‐‑called  “conscious  
Whigs,”  came  to  embrace  variations  on  the  immediatist  position,  black  abolitionists  
drove  the  rejection  of  the  temporal  delays  of  Bancroft’s  philosophy  of  progress  and  
began  to  theorize  new  relationships  between  time  and  freedom  from  the  1830s  on.  As  I  
will  suggest  in  my  third  chapter,  immediatism’s  call  for  black  entry  into  national  
political  time  is  only  part  of  the  story  of  the  temporalities  produced  by  these  texts.  But  it  
was  that  call  that  progressives  like  Bancroft  found  most  disruptive  in  their  visions  of  the  
political  future  and  to  which  they  responded  most  vehemently.  For  David  Walker,  any  
continuation  of  slavery  was  a  continuation  of  a  history  of  murderous  cruelty,  
fundamentally  at  odds  with  both  his  evangelical  Christianity  and  the  rights  white  
Americans  had  claimed  for  themselves  at  the  American  Revolution.  Other  writers  like  
Martin  R.  Delany,  Frederick  Douglass,  and  James  Theodore  Holly  saw  in  real  and  
imagined  scenes  of  slave  revolt  the  demand  for  an  immediate  end  to  slavery  and  the  
arrival  of  a  future  that  had  been  too  long  prolonged.  The  essence  of  this  renewal  of  
immediatism  was  a  messianism,  in  which  a  higher  moral  law  entered  into  human  affairs  
in  visions  of  slaves  striking  out  for  their  own  freedom,  rejecting  a  past  and  present  of  
enslavement.15  This  radicalism  was  in  contrast  to  the  progressive  visions  of  Bancroft,  
who  could  only  imagine  an  end  to  slavery  in  the  eventual  growth  and  spread  of  
                                                                                                              
15  Lloyd  Pratt  has  explored  the  messianic  temporalities  of  anti-­‐‑slavery  thought  in  the  antebellum  U.S.  in  his  
essay,  “Progress,  Labor,  Revolution”  (2000).  
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institutions  of  liberty  radiating  outward  from  those  groups  (white  men)  who  had  
already  claimed  it  for  themselves.  Immediatist  abolition  was,  in  striking  ways,  a  
fundamental  rejection  of  progressive  ideology.    
Throughout  the  1854  lecture  Bancroft  seemed  to  acknowledge  the  moral  
credibility  of  such  immediatist  politics  while  insisting  that  it  would  fundamentally  
uproot  society  and  break  with  the  culmination  of  human  knowledge  and  self-­‐‑
consciousness  in  institutions  through  the  destructive  imposition  of  abstract  moral  laws.  
His  response  to  radicalism  was  not  dissimilar  to  conservative  political  philosophy  going  
back  to  Burke,  but  rather  than  rejecting  it  wholesale,  he  adapted  it  into  a  normatively  
progressive  political  vision  that  transformed  the  moral  order  desired  by  radicals  into  a  
inevitable  but  endlessly  deferred  telos.  Here  is  how  Bancroft  described  the  interaction  of  
different  political  groups  as  inevitably  serving  progress:  
The  course  of  human  destiny  is  ever  a  rope  of  three  strands.  One  party  may  
found  itself  on  things  as  they  are,  and  strive  for  their  unaltered  perpetuity:  this  is  
conservatism,  always  appearing  wherever  established  interests  exists,  and  never  
capable  of  unmitigated  success,  because  finite  things  are  ceaselessly  in  motion.  
Another  may  be  based  on  theoretic  principles,  and  struggles  unrelentingly  to  
conform  society  to  the  absolute  law  of  Truth  and  Justice;  and  this,  though  it  
kindle  the  purest  enthusiasm,  can  likewise  never  perfectly  succeed,  because  the  
materials  of  which  society  is  composed  partake  of  imperfection,  and  to  extirpate  all  
that  is  imperfect  would  lead  to  the  destruction  of  society  itself.  And  there  may  be  a  
third,  which  seeks  to  reconcile  the  two,  but  which  yet  can  never  thrive  by  itself,  
since  it  depends  for  its  activity  on  the  clashing  between  the  fact  and  higher  law.  
[emphasis  added]  (11-­‐‑12)  
  
While  not  exactly  dialectical—Bancroft  portrayed  progress  as  not  so  much  a  synthesis  of  
the  real  and  ideal  as  the  former  catching  up  with  the  later—he  deployed  a  synthetic  
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model  that  sought  to  bring  conservatism  and  radicalism  under  the  umbrella  of  his  own  
progressive  ideology.  The  theory,  at  an  abstract  level,  mediated  conflicts  in  society  over  
the  political  function  of  time  without  acceding  either  contradictory  model  validity.  For  
Bancroft,  as  much  as  the  retrenchment  of  slavery  was  a  problem,  radicalism  was  a  more  
fundamental  threat  because,  unmediated,  it  would  in  his  own  words,  “lead  to  the  
destruction  of  society  itself.”  By  deflecting  from  the  expansion  of  slavery  in  the  United  
States  Bancroft  diffused  the  moral  immediacy  of  abolitionist  radicalism  in  order  to  assert  
the  ultimate  capacity  of  progress  to  maintain  a  continuity  between  the  past  and  a  more  
advanced  future—a  continuity  that  radicalism  would  reject.    
Bancroft’s  attempt  to  generate  the  nation  itself  as  a  mediating  agent  that  would  
maintain  continuity  while  pushing  towards  a  utopic  future  relied  on  disavowing  its  role  
in  furthering  nominally  “unprogressive”  orders  like  slavery  and  the  forces  (often  
ambivalent  or  hostile  to  American  nationalism)  that  would  call  attention  to  and  oppose  
that  history.  He  also  incorporated  a  moral  claim  against  slavery  into  the  deferred  
temporal  scales  of  justice  proposed  by  the  philosophy  of  progress.  Deeply  embedded  in  
the  way  Bancroft  developed  his  progressive  philosophy,  both  in  this  lecture  and  in  his  
histories,  is  a  feeling  for  a  future  of  moral  advancement  and  justice  that  is  made  palpable  
in  his  rhetoric  and  descriptions  of  the  past.  Thus,  he  both  incorporated  and  disavowed  
such  radicalism  into  his  writing  of  history.  His  writing  worked  to  embed  the  promise  of  
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immediatism  (as  a  universal  and  near  religious  capacity  to  desire  freedom)  into  the  
prolonged  rhythm  of  progress.  
In  the  lecture,  he  repeatedly  emphasized  how  progress  was  found  in  a  feeling  for  
the  rhythm  of  lived  experience  coming  together  with  knowledge  of  higher  laws.  As  he  
claimed:    
It  is  the  glory  of  man  that  he  is  conscious  of  this  law  of  his  existence.  He  alone  is  
gifted  with  reason  which  looks  upward  as  well  as  before  and  after,  and  connects  
him  with  the  world  that  is  not  discerned  by  the  senses.  He  alone  has  the  faculty  
to  combine  thought  with  affection,  that  he  can  lift  up  his  heart  and  feel  not  for  
himself  only,  but  for  his  brethren  and  his  kind.  [emphasis  added]  (8-­‐‑9)    
  
For  Bancroft,  universalism  and  a  feeling  for  universal  equality  were  the  engines  of  
progress,  but  only  as  they  came  to  be  expressed  within  forms  of  human  self-­‐‑knowledge  
that  are  cumulative  rather  than  radical.  Philosophically,  Bancroft’s  progress  was  
dependent  on  incorporating  an  acknowledgement  of  the  higher  law  of  immediatist  
abolition,  which  it  then  sublimated  into  a  feeling  for  a  future  that  would  slowly  express  
itself  over  time—but  would  be  deferred  indefinitely.  If  the  new  temporalities  of  the  
eighteenth  and  nineteenth  century  disrupted  the  sense  of  continuity  between  the  past  
and  future,  Bancroft  imagined  the  nation  as  an  agent  that  mediated  the  tempo  of  change  
so  as  to  make  continuity  and  progress  commensurable,  at  the  expense  of  a  more  radical  
claim  to  justice.  He  imagined  the  writing  of  history  as  a  way  to  recover  a  sense  of  
continuity  in  the  past  in  how  it  could  produce  feelings  for  a  promised,  but  ultimately  
deferred,  future.  And,  as  I  will  show  in  the  reading  of  his  histories  that  follows,  he  
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accomplished  this  vision  of  continuity  though  a  racial  aesthetic  that  leveled  all  forms  of  
opposition  to  “progress”  into  violent  apocalyptic  visions  of  the  destruction  of  “society  
itself.”  
  
Seeing and Feeling Progress 
  
The  original  publication  of  Bancroft’s  history  was  divided  into  three  major  parts.  
The  first  three  volumes  deal  with  the  colonization  of  the  land  that  would  go  on  to  
compose  the  United  States,  the  middle  three  concern  the  causes  of  the  American  
Revolution,  and  the  final  two  (the  final  volume  not  published  until  1860)  recount  the  
story  of  the  Revolution  itself.  While  the  first  volume  (1834)  begins  by  speaking  of  the  
vast  differences  in  the  American  landscape  between  the  onset  of  colonization  and  the  
Jacksonian  era,  the  emphasis  throughout  is  on  establishing  the  causes  of  that  change  as  
an  effect  of  a  deeper  continuity  and  the  growth  of  institutions  and  values  in  the  nation’s  
formation.  After  three  chapters  discussing  the  early  voyages  of  discovery,  Bancroft  
embarks  on  a  long  discussion  of  the  first  years  of  the  Virginia  settlement  and  the  
administrations  of  the  early  colonial  assemblies.  By  the  end  of  the  fourth  chapter,  which  
concludes  in  1661  with  the  administration  of  Sir  Francis  Wyatt,  Bancroft  has  claimed  that  
“[t]he  system  of  representative  government  and  trial  by  jury  thus  became  in  the  new  
hemisphere  an  acknowledged  right.  On  this  ordinance  Virginia  erected  the  
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superstructure  of  her  liberties.  Its  influences  were  already  wide  and  enduring,  and  can  
be  traced  through  all  her  history”  (1:  125;  ed.  1879).  From  the  very  outset  of  his  history,  
Bancroft  establishes  that  his  model  of  national  progress  is  concerned  with  continuities  
that  cut  through  and  bind  together  historical  changes  into  unified  patterns  of  
development  and  growth.  Liberty  is  not  so  much  formed  by  diverse  historical  currents  
in  the  foundation  of  the  United  States  as  found  ready-­‐‑to-­‐‑hand  in  its  history,  sustaining  
itself  through  time  in  the  affections  of  colonists  until,  due  to  England’s  betrayal  of  
liberty,  the  nation  must  assert  its  independence.  
Throughout  the  history,  Bancroft  describes  liberty  as  found  not  just  as  a  
metaphysical  presence  in  the  details  of  various  colonial  administrations,  legal  structures,  
and  governing  institutions,  but  also  as  a  feeling  that  suffuses  the  actions  of  national  and  
proto-­‐‑national  heroes.  A  large  part  of  Bancroft’s  prose  is  aimed  against  an  
understanding  of  liberty  that  would  remain  at  the  level  of  verbal  abstraction,  as  in  
volume  seven,  when  he  celebrates  Washington  as:    
[A]  man  of  action,  and  not  of  theory  or  words;  his  creed  appears  in  his  life,  not  in  
his  professions,  which  issue  from  him  very  rarely,  and  only  at  those  great  
moments  of  crisis  in  the  fortunes  of  his  country,  when  earth  and  heaven  seemed  
actually  to  meet,  and  his  emotions  became  too  intense  for  suppression.  (7:  398)    
  
A  proper  feeling  for  liberty  as  exemplified  by  Washington,  then,  is  not  a  matter  of  
testimony;  as  Bancroft  reiterates  throughout,  a  feeling  for  liberty  suffuses  his  “whole  
being”  and  “the  law  of  his  nature”  (7:  398).  What,  we  might  then  ask,  is  the  proof  of  that  
“alignment”  with  liberty  that  would  establish  a  given  actor  as  an  agent  of  progress?    
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Bancroft,  himself  a  writer  and  a  politician,  confronted  the  limitations  of  language  
as  testimony  for  emotion.16  Although  it  is  feeling  and  not  “professions”  that  proves  “no  
philosopher  of  the  eighteenth  century  was  more  firm  in  support  of  religious  opinion:  
none  more  tolerant  or  more  remote  from  bigotry,”  than  Washington  himself,  Bancroft  
can  only  describe  Washington’s  own  feeling,  “the  essence  of  his  character,”  in  such  
professions  of  his  virtue.  In  order  to  supplement  such  empty  phrases,  Bancroft  employs  
vivid  descriptions  of  action  that,  beyond  just  relating  factual  details,  are  meant  to  encode  
such  feelings  for  liberty  and  communicate  them  to  a  reading  audience  as  expressions  of  
a  deeper  continuity  in  feeling  between  the  past  and  present  beyond  the  language  that  
conveys  them.  
Bancroft’s  model  of  feeling  as  a  driving  force  in  history  abides  in  actors  and  
institutions  until  it  emerges  in  dynamic  displays  of  action  in  important  historical  events.  
The  proof  of  progress  is  its  ability  to  weather  and  overcome  crisis.  Without  a  situation  
that  calls  for  action,  the  ideals  of  progress  remain,  in  Bancroft’s  estimation,  the  empty  
“professions”  of  abstract  philosophers  that  lack  feeling  and  belief.  Thus,  at  the  center  of  
the  aesthetic  norms  that  emerge  in  Bancroft’s  history  in  his  descriptions  of  what  
                                                                                                              
16  Rei  Terada’s  Feeling  in  Theory  (2003)  has  recently  described  this  problem  at  length.  Many  theories  of  
emotion  are  based  on  a  “depth  to  surface”  model,  in  which  a  subject’s  expression  of  powerful  emotion  is  
take  as  proof  as  a  rich  and  substantial  inner  life.  In  place  of  this  model,  Terada  proposes  a  deconstructive  
reading  of  emotion  that  sees  it  as  a  trace  in  the  language  that  communicates  it;  a  surface  effect  that  cannot  
ever  be  ascribed  to  individual  actors,  but  proliferates  across  texts  without  requiring  any  ground  in  
individual  feeling  or  self-­‐‑hood.  This  theory  is  fundamental  to  my  reading  of  how  Bancroft’s  nationalist  
emotion  discloses  the  insubstantiality  of  the  communal  agent  of  progress,  the  American  people,  whose  
existence  he  wants  confirm  and  reproduce  by  demonstrating  and  communicating  its  constituents’  emotional  
capacity  for  desiring  a  future  of  freedom.  
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progress  looks  and  feels  like  are  confrontations  with  other  temporal  possibilities  that  are  
coded  as  regressive  and  even  apocalyptic.  In  the  early  chapters  on  colonization,  Bancroft  
sets  up  an  opposition  between  the  materialist  and  economic  motives  of  many  of  the  
voyages  to  the  New  World  and  a  more  sublimated  and  divine  feeling  for  discovery.  The  
presence  of  the  latter  feeling  in  history  is  frequently  established  through  descriptions  of  
nature  reminiscent  of  those  in  Cooper’s  romances.  Describing  the  English  discovery  of  
the  Carolina  coast,  Bancroft  writes:    
The  English  commanders  were  in  raptures  with  the  beauty  of  the  ocean,  seen  in  
the  magnificence  of  repose,  gemmed  with  islands,  and  expanding  the  clearest  
transparency  from  cape  to  cape.  The  vegetation  of  that  southern  latitude  struck  
the  beholders  with  admiration;  the  trees  had  not  their  paragons;  luxuriant  
climbers  gracefully  festooned  the  loftiest  cedars;  wild  grapes  abounded;  and  
natural  arbors  formed  impervious  shade,  that  not  a  ray  of  the  suns  of  July  could  
penetrate.  The  forests  were  filled  with  birds;  and,  at  the  discharge  of  the  
arquebuse,  whole  flocks  would  arise,  uttering  a  cry,  as  if  an  army  of  men  had  
shouted  together.  (1:  76;  ed.  1879)  
  
Bancroft  is  working  off  a  conventional  association  of  the  New  World  with  Eden.  The  
shore  witnessed  by  the  English  upon  arrival  is  a  land  of  plenty,  empty  of  civilization,  but  
full  of  natural  wonder.  It  is  a  scene  at  the  end  of  time,  with  the  emotional  and  religious  
meanings  of  “rapture”  active  throughout  the  passage.  Yet,  this  scene  of  joy  (the  bird’s  
cry  like  the  shouts  of  the  men)  pauses  the  narrative,  holding  a  future  promised  by  the  
scene  in  deferral  as  Bancroft  diverts  from  an  otherwise  dry  account  of  the  details  of  the  
English  command  and  the  ship’s  provisions.  He  describes  an  experience  of  profound  
expectation  to  the  reader.  More  than  wealth  is  discovered  in  a  utopian  promise  of  the  
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New  World.  The  excess  promised  by  the  future  is  made  present  as  a  feeling  shared  with  
readers  at  the  very  outset  of  the  narrative,  spiritualizing  imperialism  and  conquest  with  
other,  more  profound  desires  in  a  text  written  during  a  period  of  unprecedented  
westward  expansion.  
Despite  his  romantic  aesthetics  of  discovery,  Bancroft  does  not  mask  the  violence  
of  the  period  of  conquest.  However,  he  ascribes  violence  and  dispossession  to  base,  
material,  and  unprogressive  motivations  that  he  separates  from  the  high  ideals  of  
discovery  and  the  nobility  of  progress.  He  establishes  some  of  the  norms  for  how  he  will  
present  these  and  other  deviations  from  progress  in  a  long  section  on  De  Soto’s  quest  for  
gold  in  Florida  and  the  Mississippi  basin  and  the  subsequent  Spanish  wars  against  the  
Chickasaws.  Bancroft  associates  De  Soto’s  useless  journey  for  material  gain  with  images  
of  slaughter,  chaos,  and  flame.  While  (ever  the  universalist)  Bancroft  describes  the  
Chickasaws  as  “poor  and  independent;  they  were  hardy  and  loved  freedom,”  De  Soto’s  
demands  for  gold  and  his  enslavement  of  members  of  the  Chickasaw  tribe  to  aid  in  his  
quest  results  in  a  desperate  attack  by  the  Chickasaws  on  the  Spanish  and  their  tragic  
defeat.  Unable  to  gain  access  to  the  future  promised  by  progressive  time,  and  thus,  
unable  to  have  “faith”  in  achieving  victory  over  what  they  perceived  to  be  a  more  
substantial  force,  the  Chickasaws  merely  destroyed  the  Spanish  provisions  without  
defeating  them  or  expelling  them  from  the  land,  and  this  failure  to  assert  their  total  
independence  from  materialist  oppression  results  in  their  destruction.  At  the  height  of  
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the  battle,  Bancroft  describes  this  apocalyptic  scene  of  panic:  “[m]any  of  the  horses  had  
broken  loose;  these,  terrified  and  without  riders,  roamed  through  the  forest,  of  which  the  
burning  village  illuminated  the  shades,  and  seemed  to  the  natives  the  gathering  of  
hostile  squadrons”  (1:  46;  ed.  1879).  Here  a  freedom  loving  people  is  destroyed  by  
avarice,  prompting  a  scene  that  mirrors  a  very  different  end  of  time  from  the  salvific  
desires  awakened  in  the  moment  of  discovery.  The  forces  of  a  spiritless  age  (the  
avaricious  Spanish)  burn  down  Eden.  If  Bancroft  encoded  the  aesthetics  of  progress  with  
the  expectation  of  an  ideal  future,  here  is  an  image  that  exemplifies  how  he  represents  
threats  to  progress  throughout  his  history.  Every  crisis  in  the  progressive  order  of  time  is  
filled  with  vengeful  shades  that  augur  the  chaotic  end  of  freedom.  
So  far  as  Bancroft  stays  in  the  realm  of  a  traditional  opposition  between  the  
liberty  of  the  English  and  what  is  clearly  an  evocation  of  the  so-­‐‑called  “black  legend”  of  
Spanish  avarice  and  cruelty,  his  aesthetics  of  history  remain  relatively  static.17  The  text  
becomes  more  emotionally  powerful  and  dynamic  as  Bancroft  develops  the  
confrontation  between  the  United  States  and  England.  Here  aesthetically  rich  and  
contradictory  temporal  images  are  layered  into  the  description  of  events  torn  between  
progress  and  regression.  In  these  scenes,  apocalyptic  violence  confronts  the  forces  of  
progress,  but,  serene  in  the  expectation  of  the  future,  the  freedom-­‐‑loving  people  of  
                                                                                                              
17  For  more  on  the  prominence  of  “the  black  legend”  in  nineteenth  century  culture  and  formations  of  U.S.  
imperialism  see  María  DeGuzmán’s  Spain’s  Long  Shadow  (2005).  
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America  weather  each  and  every  crisis.  While  Bancroft  discusses  these  developments  
abstractly  and  in  specific  narrations  of  events,  he  powerfully  evokes  a  feeling  for  the  
achievements  of  progress  in  such  tense  agonistic  descriptions,  like  his  famous  staging  of  
the  Battle  of  Bunker  Hill  that  closes  the  seventh  volume.    
At  the  outset  of  the  battle  (whose  description  arrives  shortly  after  a  chapter  
entitled  “The  Revolution  Emanates  from  the  People”)  Bancroft  describes  the  sight  
witnessed  at  Bunker  Hill  as  both  a  contest  between  opposing  forces  and  a  spectacle  
staged  by  providence.  The  battle  begins  with  the  shelling  of  Charlestown  by  British  
forces:  “[t]he  inflammable  buildings  caught  in  an  instant,  and  a  party  of  men  landed  and  
spread  the  fire”  (7:  422).  With  that  opening  volley,  “the  time  for  the  holocaust  was  now  
come.”  Here,  Bancroft  draws  on  the  biblical  language  of  fire  and  apocalypse  that  has  
been  a  pattern  throughout  his  history.  Facing  this  threat  to  the  revolutionary  cause,  
providence  seems  to  become  manifest  in  the  historical  event  and  frames  the  battle  as  a  
discrete  spectacle  in  the  conflict  between  universal  progress  and  narrow  possessive  
influence:  
As  [the  British]  began  to  march  [on  the  American  positions],  the  dazzling  luster  
of  a  summer’s  sun  was  reflected  from  their  burnished  armor  […]  the  town  of  
Charlestown,  consisting  of  five  hundred  edifices  of  wood,  burst  into  blaze;  the  
steeple  of  its  only  church  became  a  pyramid  of  fire;  and  the  masts  of  the  shipping  
and  the  heights  the  British  camp,  the  church  towers,  the  housetops  of  a  populous  
town,  and  the  acclivities  of  the  surrounding  country  were  crowded  with  
spectators  to  watch  the  battle  which  was  to  take  place,  in  full  sight  on  a  
conspicuous  eminence,  and  which,  as  the  English  thought,  was  to  assure  the  
integrity  of  the  British  empire,  as  the  Americans  believed  was  to  influence  the  
freedom  and  happiness  of  mankind.  (7:  422-­‐‑423)  
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This  passage  demonstrates  what  time  looks  and  feels  like  in  Bancroft’s  history;  an  almost  
Manichean,  biblical  struggle  that  is  both  timeless  and  specifically  historical,  contributing  
to  concrete  advances  and  witnessed  in  the  past  and  (by  proxy)  in  the  present  of  the  
writing  and  reading  of  history  by  those  who  share  in  the  historical  actors’  love  of  
freedom.  The  paragraph  encodes  abstract  ideas  about  time  into  the  specific  description  
of  an  event  in  such  a  way  that  makes  a  metaphysics  of  progress  an  element  of  historical  
description,  attested  to  by  the  emotions  reported  to  have  been  felt  by  the  represented  
actors  and  that  the  image  produces  as  an  affect  for  readers.  The  spread  of  that  emotion—
Bancroft’s  anticipation  that,  like  the  witnesses  in  Charlestown,  readers  will  feel  a  passion  
for  liberty  in  reading  the  description  of  the  Battle  of  Bunker  Hill—becomes  proof  of  the  
continuous  driving  force  of  a  love  for  freedom  in  human  progress  across  time  and  
through  historical  change.  Bancroft  relies  on  conventional  biblical  resonances  to  develop  
this  emotional  impact,  while  interpolating  those  resonances  into  a  feeling  for  the  future  
made  vivid  in  the  facts  of  historical  experience.  
In  Bancroft,  the  future  remains  a  feeling,  made  present  in  the  spectacle  of  
conflicts  between  progress  and  reaction,  but  never  achievable  as  a  settled  state.  The  
eighth  volume  ends  not  with  the  accomplishment  of  a  new  era  of  human  well-­‐‑being  
after  the  Revolution,  but  with  the  signing  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence—a  
moment  Bancroft  writes  as  one  of  possibility  and  expectation,  not  of  final  
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accomplishment.18  Bancroft  concludes  his  history  first  by  arguing,  “[h]ere,  and  in  that  
century,  here  only,  was  a  people,  which  by  its  education  and  large  and  long  experience,  
was  prepared  to  act  as  the  depository  and  carrier  of  all  political  power.  America  
developed  her  choice  from  within  itself.”  Then  he  leaves  off  with  the  statement  that  “the  
nation,  when  it  made  the  choice  of  a  day  for  its  great  anniversary,  selected  not  the  day  of  
the  resolution  of  independence,  when  it  closed  the  past,  but  that  of  the  declaration  of  the  
principles  on  which  it  opened  its  new  career”  (7:  474-­‐‑475).  Bancroft’s  rhetoric  
substantializes  the  collective  agent  of  “the  people”  (developed  throughout  his  history)  as  
synonymous  with  the  nation,  both  self-­‐‑created  and  mutually  generative  on  the  basis  of  
shared  expectation  of  a  deferred  future.  The  emotional  force  of  his  text  on  contemporary  
audiences  would  help  to  attest  to  the  continuous  existence  of  this  abstract  communal  
agency.  He  uses  the  aesthetics  of  history  to  produce  a  continuity  of  feeling  between  past  
and  present,  manifesting  the  underlying  force  of  progress  in  shaping  historical  time  
even  as  his  writing  discloses  progress’s  insubstantial  existence  as  an  affective  trace  in  the  
text  of  history.  The  text  aims  at  producing  an  imagined  community  of  readers  by  
aesthetically  encoding  its  images  of  time  with  this  emotional  charge.  But  that  national  
and  universal  public  committed  to  liberty  can  only  be  found  in  the  text’s  capacity  to  
generate  the  feeling  of  inhabiting  a  continuous  temporal  order.  
                                                                                                              
18  After  the  war,  Bancroft  revised  his  history  into  six,  slightly  longer  volumes,  and  then  spent  the  rest  of  his  
life  extending  that  edition  to  ten  volumes,  covering  the  end  of  the  Revolutionary  War,  the  framing  of  the  
Constitution,  and  some  of  the  history  of  the  nation  before  the  Civil  War.  But  the  original  plan  of  eight  
volumes  completed  in  1860  only  reached  to  1776.  
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That  (in)substantive  and  self-­‐‑generative  agent  (the  people/nation  of  futurity)  
recognizes  itself  primarily  through  a  feeling,  communicated  through  its  own  historical  
experience—understood  as  both  first  hand  experience  and  as  an  experience  mediated  by  
the  aesthetics  of  history.  As  Bancroft  would  claim  in  his  lecture  of  1854,  “[t]he  progress  
of  man  consists  in  this,  that  he  himself  arrives  at  the  perception  of  truth.  The  divine  
mind,  which  is  its  source,  left  it  to  be  discovered,  appropriated  and  developed  by  finite  
creatures”  (9).    History  opens  up  that  self-­‐‑knowledge  first  by  generating  the  subject  and  
object  of  that  knowledge  as  a  continuous  agent  through  historical  change,  and  then  by  
recuperating  past  experience  to  the  emotions  of  the  present.  Bancroft  suggests  as  much  
in  how  he  concluded  his  lecture  by  directly  addressing  his  fellow  historians  with  the  
following  invocation:  
You,  brothers,  who  are  joined  together  for  the  study  of  history,  receive  the  
lighted  torch  of  civilization  from  the  departing  half-­‐‑century,  and  hand  it  along  to  
the  next.  In  fulfilling  this  glorious  office,  remember  that  the  principles  of  justice  
and  sound  philosophy  are  but  the  inspirations  of  the  common  sense,  and  belong  
of  right  to  all  mankind.  Carry  them  forth,  therefore,  to  the  whole  people;  for  only  
can  society  build  itself  up  on  the  imperishable  groundwork  of  universal  freedom.  
(37)  
  
Bancroft  positions  history  as  mediating  between  the  original  agency  of  “all  mankind”  
and  “the  people”  of  a  nation,  inspired  by  a  natural  feeling  for  liberty,  and  the  same  
people’s  knowledge  of  itself  and  its  strivings  for  freedom.  But  as  I  suggested  above,  such  
a  substantialization  of  an  abstract  ahistorical  community  takes  place  in  his  history  
through  the  description  of  the  movement  for  a  promised  future  coming  into  crisis  in  
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conflicts  with  backward  looking  forces.  Progress  is  always  supplemented  by  its  opposite  
in  the  aesthetics  of  the  text.  Thus  far  I  have  focused  on  progress’s  struggles  against  Old  
World,  but  just  as  prominent  in  Bancroft’s  history  are  encounters  and  confrontations  
with  racial  difference.  In  these  scenes,  Bancroft  produces  a  racial  aesthetic  that  envisions  
racial  difference  as  a  fundamental  disruption  and  threat  that  the  agents  of  progress  have  
to  overcome  and  suppress  to  ensure  the  future  political  order.  This  aesthetic  reflects  
Bancroft’s  ideological  disavowal  of  the  disruptions  immediatist  abolition  generated  in  
progressive  philosophies  of  history,  and  it  would  help  make  race  a  primary  element  in  
the  palette  of  romantic  historians.  
Bancroft’s  aesthetics  of  history  produced  racial  difference  on  the  grounds  of  his  
perception  of  the  ability  of  different  racial  groups  to  enter  into  modern  time  and  carry  
forward  futurity.  While,  throughout  the  antebellum  period,  the  structure  of  racism  
(scientific  and  political)  produced  blackness  and  redness  as  distinct  structural  positions  
with  what  Frank  Wilderson  would  call  different  ontological  incapacities,  I  follow  Ezra  
Tawil’s  study,  The  Making  of  Racial  Sentiment  (2006),  in  suggesting  that  it  is  important  to  
recognize  the  structural  continuities  in  how  race  was  produced  as  a  matter  of  
incompatible  natural—or  in  this  case  temporal—capacities  for  inclusion  in  the  modern  
community  in  order  to  understand  how  the  aesthetics  of  progress  produced  an  affective  
community  around  the  threat  of  racial  difference.  Most  fundamental  to  understanding  
this  affective  structure  is  Tawil’s  incisive  recognition  that  the  portrayal  of  Indian  
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resistance  to  Westward  expansion  in  frontier  romances  was  layered  with  fears  and  
anxieties  about  slave  revolt.19  Bancroft’s  history  reflects  this  racial  over-­‐‑determination.  
When  he  turns  towards  the  formation  of  the  American  community  in  confrontation  with  
native  tribes,  he  adapts  the  apocalyptic  descriptive  vocabulary  he  previously  utilized  to  
condemn  Old  World  materialism  to  racialize  the  backwardness  of  American  Indians  and  
encode  the  affective  formation  of  the  progressive  American  community  in  the  
confrontation  with  that  difference.      
The  first  instance  of  native  resistance  sets  the  tone  for  the  remainder  of  the  
history.  In  describing  the  Pequod  War,  he  first  takes  up  an  impartial  voice  weighing  the  
legitimate  threats  felt  by  the  Pequods  in  the  face  of  the  English  settlement  in  Connecticut  
against  the  “injuries”  that  “roused  Connecticut  to  action”  (1:  314;  ed.  1879).  While  
Bancroft  indulged  in  a  romantic  racialist  idealism  about  the  native  tribes  and  their  
independence,  they  remained,  in  his  account,  groups  that  either  need  to  be  incorporated  
within  the  overall  progress  of  the  nation  or  violently  resisted  and  subjugated  if  they  
refused.  Bancroft  justifies  the  settlers’  pre-­‐‑emptive  attack  and  massacre  of  the  Pequods  
by  claiming  that  “the  colonists  were  fighting  for  the  security  of  their  homes;  if  defeated,  
the  war-­‐‑whoop  would  resound  near  their  cottages,  and  their  wives  and  children  
abandoned  to  the  scalping-­‐‑knife  and  the  tomahawk”  (1:  315;  ed.  1879).  Although  
                                                                                                              
19  Tawil  points  out  that  to  recognize  the  role  slavery  played  in  shaping  portrayals  of  Native  Americans  in  
literature  is  not  in  the  interest  of  “displacing  the  frontier  and  installing  slavery  as  the  new  master  narrative  
for  this  period  of  political  history.  [It  is]  simply  to  call  attention  to  their  interaction  in  the  formation  of  
American  racial  categories.”  (5).  
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Bancroft’s  depiction  of  the  massacre  is  not  without  sympathy  for  “Indian  helplessness”  
in  confronting  the  flames  and  bullets  of  the  English,  he  portrays  the  confrontation  as  
essential  to  growth  of  the  colonies.  He  concludes  his  discussion  of  the  Pequod  War  with  
the  following  reflection  on  the  formation  of  the  nascent  nationalist  community:  
The  vigor  and  courage  displayed  by  the  settlers  on  the  Connecticut,  in  this  first  
Indian  War  in  New  England,  struck  terror  into  the  savages,  and  secured  a  long  
period  of  peace.  The  infant  was  safe  in  its  cradle,  the  laborer  in  the  fields,  the  
solitary  traveller  during  the  night-­‐‑watches  in  the  forest;  the  houses  needed  no  
bolts,  the  settlements  no  palisades.  The  constitution,  which  on  the  fourteenth  of  
January  1639,  was  adopted  by  them,  was  of  unexampled  liberty.  (1:  316;  ed.  1879)  
  
The  singularity  (and  universality)  of  progress  transforms  the  groups  that  oppose  it  in  
moments  of  crisis  into  accessories  to  its  ultimate  victory.  Bancroft’s  portrayals  of  the  
Indian  Wars  suggest  that  the  community  of  progress  comes  to  witness  and  know  itself  in  
struggles  against  such  racial  difference,  which  are  also  drawn  as  threats  to  progressive  
time.  This  is  a  structure  that,  as  I  will  show  in  the  next  chapter,  enabled  the  aesthetics  of  
history  to  imagine  affective  resolutions  to  the  sense  of  temporal  crisis  produced  by  
emerging  forms  of  U.S.  racial  imperialism  and  fears  of  slave  revolt.  In  the  work  of  other  
antebellum  historians,  the  crisis  occasioned  by  racial  difference  in  history  mirrors  other  
crises  over  slavery  and  imperialism  in  the  decades  between  1830  and  the  Civil  War.  For  
now,  it  is  enough  to  recognize  that,  in  Bancroft’s  vision  of  the  past,  not  only  are  native  
groups  deprived  of  any  feeling  for  the  future,  unless  they  accept  subordination  to  
English  civilization  and  temporality  their  resistance  and  violent  suppression  become  
constitutive  parts  of  the  formation  and  growth  of  the  national  community.  Race  is  an  
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essential  part  of  the  historical  and  emotional  experience  of  community  and  continuity  
Bancroft  wanted  his  readers  to  access  in  his  history,  and  it  is  not  an  accident  that  he  
celebrates  the  “liberty”  of  the  Connecticut  constitution  as  an  outcome  of  the  Pequod  
War.    
In  response  to  the  possibility  that  the  present  or  the  future  would  irretrievably  
break  with  the  past,  Bancroft  formulated  a  theory  of  progress  that  established  the  
growth  and  continuity  of  a  national  community  through  rapid  historical  change  and  
periods  of  dire  crisis.  He  worked  to  substantialize  this  abstraction  through  the  
aestheticization  of  past  events,  turning  history  into  an  emotionally  potent  genre  that  
would  communicate  a  feeling  for  liberty  across  generations  and  attest  to  a  deeper  shared  
experience.  But  the  communal  agent  he  produced  was  aimed  at  the  disavowal  of  more  
radical  approaches  to  temporality  that  demanded  immediate  justice  regardless  of  any  
claims  to  national  cohesion  or  stability.  Bancroft  sublimated  that  demand  into  a  feeling  
for  the  future  that  deferred  its  arrival.  At  the  same  time,  by  producing  that  feeling  
through  the  description  of  scenes  of  crisis,  he  structured  it  as  the  experience  of  a  
racialized  national  community,  violently  suppressing  the  desires  for  the  future  of  those  
who  resisted  the  will  of  progress  as  apocalyptic  threats  on  par  with  those  presented  by  
the  materialist  Old  World  empires.  Racial  difference  became  an  unavoidable  element  in  
antebellum  history’s  palette,  central  to  its  many  images  of  temporal  crisis.  Race  was  
unaccountable  excess  in  the  feeling  of  progressive  time.  And,  as  I  will  show  in  what  
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follows,  in  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson’s  writings  on  the  philosophy  of  history  that  excess  
returns  in  an  eruption  of  difference  that  exposes  the  hollowness  of  romantic  history’s  
claims  to  universality.  
  
Emerson and History’s Present 
  
Emerson  was  most  focused  on  history  at  the  outset  of  his  career,  but  his  
formulations  were  an  important  influence  on  his  friend  Bancroft’s  more  abstract  ideas  
about  history.  Emerson’s  most  famous  two  sentences  about  history,  “[t]here  is  one  mind  
common  to  all  individual  men  […]  Of  the  works  of  this  mind  history  is  the  record,”  were  
echoed  in  Bancroft’s  1854  lecture’s  constant  repetitions  of  the  theme  of  the  “divine  
mind”  and  “the  great  collective  mind  of  man”  that  shapes  all  of  history  (“History”  237).  
However,  the  implications  each  drew  from  their  shared  assertion  of  universality  and  
commonality  diverged  widely.  Emerson  claimed  repeatedly  that  the  whole  of  history  
should  be  “explained  from  individual  experience,”  while  Bancroft,  likely  in  direct  
refutation  of  this  idea,  argued  that  “the  life  of  the  individual  is  but  a  breath;  it  comes  
forth  like  a  flower,  and  flees  like  a  shadow.  Were  no  other  progress,  therefore  possible  
than  that  of  the  individual,  one  period  would  have  little  advantage  over  another”  (10).  
Where,  for  Emerson,  all  history  can  be  related  to  the  life  of  an  individual,  for  Bancroft,  
progress  ensures  that  the  culmination  of  the  diverse  experiences  of  individuals  over  time  
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amounts  to  far  more  than  individual  consciousness.  Emerson  entirely  rejects  the  idea  
that  progress  could  be  traced  over  historical  timescales:  “[t]herefore  is  there  no  progress  
to  the  race.  Progress  belongs  to  individuals  and  consists  in  becoming  universal”  (EL  13-­‐‑
14).  Nevertheless,  Bancroft  and  Emerson  were  friends,  and  it  is  likely  that  their  debate  
over  race  versus  individual  progress  helped  shape  the  substance  of  both  of  their  ideas  
about  history.  As  such,  Emerson’s  early  lectures  and  writing  on  history  can  be  read  as  a  
particularly  intuitive  critical  reading  of  Bancroft’s  nationalist  history.  
Emerson’s  overriding  concern  in  the  lecture  that  introduced  his  series  “The  
Philosophy  of  History”  and  the  first  essay  of  the  First  Series,  “History,”  is  that  historical  
texts  as  they  have  been  written  were  not  providing  readers  with  substantial  enough  
access  to  the  truth  of  the  past  and  were  instead  forming  one  vast  “dull  book.”  He  begins  
his  lecture  with  the  following  observation:    
It  is  remarkable  that  most  men  read  little  History.  Even  scholars,  whose  business  
is  to  read,  complain  of  its  dullness.  This  fact  may  suggest  that  it  is  not  rightly  
written  for  it  should,  should  it  not?  correspond  to  the  whole  of  the  mind,  to  
whatever  is  lovely  and  powerful.  No  man  can  think  that  this  all  containing  
picture  if  seen  in  good  light  could  be  void  of  interest.  (EL  7)  
  
Emerson’s  metaphor  is  typically  optative,  and  like  historians  of  the  period,  emphasized  
the  analogy  between  historical  writing  and  painting.  Antebellum  historians  utilized  the  
painting  metaphor  to  address  the  formal  totalities  of  narrative  they  strived  for  and  the  
way  they  used  visual  description  to  make  past  moments  of  time  present  to  their  readers.  
Emerson’s  use  of  this  metaphor  (as  is  common  in  Emerson’s  work)  shifts  and  adapts  
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these  meanings,  developing  correspondences  among  art,  history,  vision,  and  the  activity  
of  thought.  History  is  an  interesting  pursuit  for  Emerson  not  because  it  records  or  
displays  the  individual  facts  of  the  past  or  even  makes  them  present  to  a  reader  as  
experience  or  feeling,  but  because  it  unlocks  hidden  potentials  within  individuals  that  
help  them  grow  towards  universality.    
The  difference  between  Emerson’s  thinking  on  history  and  that  of  historians  was  
in  their  understanding  of  the  temporal  depth  of  historical  writing.  Bancroft  thought  of  
history  as  representing  and  making  accessible  the  events,  ideas,  and  passions  of  a  past  
era  to  the  present  to  aid  in  the  cumulative  self-­‐‑knowledge  of  the  human  race  in  its  
struggle  for  democracy  and  liberty.  For  Emerson,  it  is  the  very  past-­‐‑ness  of  the  past  that  
is  insubstantial.  History  is  rather  an  attempt  to  de-­‐‑sediment  the  accumulation  of  
experience  in  the  present,  making  specific,  once  obscured,  layers  visible  to  readers.  As  
Emerson  writes,  “[i]f  the  whole  of  history  is  in  one  man,  it  is  all  to  be  explained  from  
individual  experience”  (15).  The  present  is  a  zero  degree  annihilation  of  the  past,  
transforming  it  into  a  textual  record  (history)  that  either  is  or  is  not  useful  to  
contemporary  experience.  Despite  the  loss  of  the  past  occasioned  by  the  present,  each  
existent  thing  in  nature  is  an  accretion  of  all  its  past  associations  and  intertwining  with  
other  things:    
Nothing  but  God  is  self-­‐‑dependent.  Every  being  in  nature  has  its  existence  so  
connected  with  other  beings  that  if  set  apart  from  them  would  instantly  perish.  
An  ear  of  corn  is  very  far  from  being  a  simple  nature;  it  is  a  very  composite  one;  
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it  is  a  cord  of  many  strands  which  light,  heat,  water,  air,  carbon,  azote  compose.  
Is  man  less  complex?  On  the  contrary.  (EL  17)  
  
Such  accretions  of  associations  in  nature  are  what  can  be  laid  out  in  a  good  history,  one  
that  would  properly  “correspond  to  the  whole  of  the  mind.”  As  Emerson  goes  on  to  
suggest,  “[m]an  is  powerful  only  by  the  multitude  of  his  affinities,  or,  because  his  life  is  
intertwined  with  the  whole  chain  of  organic  and  inorganic  being”  (EL  17).    These  
intertwined  affinities  are  the  substance  of  each  and  every  consciousness,  but  because  any  
given  individual’s  experience  is  limited,  knowledge  of  those  affinities  remains  limited.  
History  fills  in  the  role  of  second  hand  experience,  calling  out  to  dormant  affinities  in  
readers  to  reveal  every  person’s  full  human  potential  to  themselves:  “[u]nder  the  light  of  
these  two  facts,  that  the  mind  is  one  and  that  nature  is  its  correlative,  history  is  to  be  
read  and  written  […]  There  is  nothing  but  is  related  to  me,  no  mode  of  life  so  alien  and  
grotesque  but  by  careful  comparison  I  can  soon  find  my  place  in  it;  find  strict  analogy  
between  my  experiences  and  whatever  is  real  in  those  of  any  man”  (EL  19).  
Emerson  reads  and  adapts  Bancroft’s  and  others’  history  for  their  aesthetic  
elements,  emphasizing  history  as  a  vehicle  for  experience.  The  moments  in  Bancroft’s  
history  in  which  his  aesthetic  descriptions  make  it  possible  for  contemporary  readers  to  
feel  themselves  as  experiencing  the  flow  of  history  and  progress  first  hand,  become,  in  
Emerson’s  re-­‐‑reading  of  history,  the  lived  (rather  than  mediated)  experiences  of  each  
individual  that  remained  buried  in  the  “the  knot  of  roots”  known  as  consciousness,  
“whose  flowers  and  fruitage  is  the  world,”  before  they  are  brought  into  the  light  by  the  
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second  hand  experiences  related  in  history  (EL  17).20  As  a  reading  of  Bancroft,  however,  
Emerson’s  thinking  about  history  comes  up  against  the  racial  visions  of  his  aesthetics.  
Although  Emerson  rejects  the  idea  of  national  progress  for  a  more  pluralistic  liberalism,  
more  narrow  and  nationalistic  narratives  shaped  the  histories  that  Emerson  read.  In  
particular,  the  aesthetic  experiences  that  called  out  to  present  consciousness  were  
shaped  by  anxieties  over  race,  slavery,  and  imperial  expansion.  These  histories  
generated  a  feeling  for  the  future  based  on  racial  division  to  produce  their  aesthetic  
effects.  Because  Emerson’s  texts  rely  on  and  displace  conventional  ideas  and  meanings,  
they  tend  to  be,  in  the  words  of  Eduardo  Cadava,  both  “symptomatic  and  critical”  of  the  
dominant  cultural  and  political  logics  of  his  historical  moment.  The  dual  symptomatic  
and  critical  aspect  of  Emerson’s  thought  is  never  more  the  case  than  in  his  writings  on  
history,  where  the  racialized  aesthetics  of  his  contemporaries  return  as  an  eruption  of  
race  into  his  universalizing  theory  that  leads  him  to  question  his  overall  model  of  history  
and  his  ideas  about  sedimentation  and  correspondences.  Reading  this  part  of  Emerson’s  
thought  as  a  symptom  and  critique  of  history’s  racialized  aesthetics  opens  up  a  fuller  
understanding  of  the  problems  of  race  and  revolution  in  those  texts.  
                                                                                                              
20  Although  Emerson  uses  organic  metaphors  often  that  point  towards  an  affiliation  with  romantic  
nationalism’s  tropes  of  growth  and  development,  my  reading  draws  on  recent  scholarship  on  Emerson  has  
called  attention  to  his  knowledge  of  natural  processes  and  his  more  ecological  deployment  of  these  
metaphors.  See,  Lee  Rust  Brown’s  The  Emerson  Museum  (1997)  and  Joan  Richardson’s  A  Natural  History  of  
Pragmatism  (2007).  
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After  a  series  of  claims  for  the  correspondence  between  history  and  individual  
experience  that  had  been  developed  in  his  lecture  and  stated  in  even  stronger  terms  in  
the  essay  “History,”  Emerson  concludes  the  latter  by  claiming,  “[t]hus  in  all  ways  does  
the  soul  concentrate  and  reproduce  its  treasures  for  each  pupil.  He,  too  shall  pass  
through  the  whole  cycle  of  experience.  He  shall  collect  into  focus  the  rays  of  nature.  
History  no  longer  shall  be  a  dull  book.  It  shall  walk  incarnate  in  every  wise  and  just  
man”  (255).  The  visual  art  metaphor  with  which  he  began  his  thinking  on  history  has  
expanded  into  a  fuller  optative  spectrum,  encompassing  a  correspondence  between  
optics  and  mental  function,  and  tracing  a  fullness  of  meaning  in  the  way  light  brings  
vision  to  an  eye.  Then,  pausing  he  shifts  registers  to  ask,  “[i]s  there  something  
overweening  in  this  claim?  Then  I  reject  all  I  have  written,  for  what  is  the  use  pretending  
to  know  what  we  know  not?”  (255).  Emerson  raises  these  doubts  to  recognize  the  
“neighboring  orders  of  being”  that  have  not  yet  been  painted  as  visually  correspondent  
to  experience  by  history—i  .e.  the  lives  of  animals  and  racial  others  that  have  been  
objectified  as  the  natural  background  to  historical  progress  or  painted  as  forces  of  
resistance.  He  writes:    
I  hold  our  actual  knowledge  very  cheap.  Hear  the  rats  in  the  wall,  see  the  lizard  
on  the  fence,  the  fungus  under  foot,  the  lichen  on  the  log.  What  do  I  know  
sympathetically,  morally,  of  either  of  these  worlds  of  life?  As  old  as  the  
Caucasian  man,—perhaps  older,—these  creatures  have  kept  their  counsel  beside  
him,  and  there  is  no  record  of  any  word  or  sign  that  has  past  from  one  to  the  
other.  […]  Yet  every  history  should  be  written  in  a  wisdom  which  divined  the  
range  of  our  affinities  and  looked  at  facts  as  symbols.  I  am  ashamed  to  see  what  a  
shallow  village  tale  our  History  is.  How  many  times  must  we  say  Rome,  and  
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Paris,  and  Constantinople!  What  does  Rome  know  of  the  rat  or  the  Lizard?  What  
are  Olympiads  and  Consulates  to  these  neighboring  systems  of  being?  Nay  what  
food  or  experience  or  succour  have  they  for  the  Esquimaux  seal-­‐‑hunter,  for  the  
Kanaka  in  his  canoe,  for  the  fisherman,  the  stevedore,  the  porter?  (256)  
  
As  always,  Emerson’s  language  is  slippery,  tracing  mental  associations  rather  than  
producing  an  analytical  argument.  The  differences  he  identifies  as  challenging  history  
(as  it  has  been  written)  slips  from  animality  to  metaphysics  to  cultural,  race,  and  finally  
class  alterity.  We  are  left  to  ask  if  all  these  differences  are  so  extreme  that  Emerson  can  
imagine  them  as  equally  incommensurable  with  the  project  of  history,  or  if  any  of  them  
are  more  fundamental  to  the  disruption  in  Emerson’s  train  of  thought.  
In  my  reading,  it  is  an  eruption  of  racial  difference  that  shapes  his  exclamation  of  
doubt.  While  it  is  only  at  the  end  of  the  paragraph  that  groups  of  humans  seem  to  enter  
into  his  thought,  the  initial  figure—the  sound  of  rats  in  the  wall—is  a  racial  haunting.  
Not  only  does  the  intimacy  of  the  figure  suggest  the  experience  of  difference  within  
domestic  space,  the  shift  to  an  aural  metaphor  carries  with  it  the  implication  of  the  type  
of  blocked  vision  that  was  characteristic  of  the  racial  experience  of  antebellum  whites  
who  were  haunted  by  the  indeterminate  presence  of  those  who  had  been  marked  as  
absent  from  political  and  historical  space  and  time.  The  ambiguity  in  the  prose  between  
an  animal  object  experienced  in  history  and  a  human  subject  experiencing  history  
further  suggests  the  indeterminacy  of  personhood  that  was  a  feature  of  antebellum  
racial  theories  and,  as  we  have  seen,  the  very  aesthetics  of  history  Emerson  was  
exploring.  As  in  Bancroft’s  history,  the  futures  desired  by  racial  and  political  difference  
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are  produced  here  as  unknowable  and  as  potentially  destructive  to  the  meaning  of  all  
the  history  that  has  come  before.  Those  divergent  futures  are  present  in  the  traditional  
association  of  rats  with  death  and  with  the  plural:  a  destructive  multiplicity  that  would  
bring  an  end  to  linear  time.  The  rats  in  the  wall  are  none  other  than  the  unaccountable  
resistance  to  slavery  and  imperialism  that  agents  of  progress  experienced  throughout  
the  New  World,  made  intimate  by  the  institution  of  slavery.21  Figured  as  a  tumultuous  
and  chaotic  sound  in  histories  of  progress,  the  rats  in  the  wall  haunt  the  aesthetics  of  
history  as  an  alternative  future  that  would  denaturalize  progressive  temporality.    
Emerson  here  is  symptomatic  and  critical:  symptomatic  of  the  racial  aesthetics  that  could  
associate  native  resistance  and  black  revolution  with  darkness,  death,  rats,  and  
meaningless  sounds,  and  critical  in  his  recognition  that  any  attempt  to  de-­‐‑sediment  the  
experiences  that  compose  history  runs  up  against  these  incommensurable  eruptions—
which  must  but  can  never  be  recuperated  to  any  singular  model  of  history,  progressive  
or  otherwise.  
Many  of  the  most  important  works  of  antebellum  history  would  be  aimed  at  
resolving  the  crises  to  temporality  occasioned  by  the  eruption  of  disavowed  racial  
difference  into  the  aesthetics  of  history.  Prescott  confronted  this  problem  by  
aestheticizing  imperial  violence  and  contributing  to  the  “romance”  of  conquest  felt  by  
proponents  of  the  U.S.-­‐‑Mexican  War.  Abolitionist  historians  had  a  different  problem.  
                                                                                                              
21  The  theory  of  racial  haunting  deployed  here  is  influenced  by  Toni  Morrison’s  Playing  in  the  Dark  (1993).  
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Because  the  slave  revolutions  they  wanted  to  recover  were  the  very  thing  that  romantic  
history  marked  as  threats  in  the  progressive  order  of  time,  they  wound  up  radically  
revising  the  aesthetics  of  history.  In  these  texts,  we  can  observe  both  the  immediatism  
officially  desired  by  abolitionism  and  stranger  moments  that  figure  freedom  as  the  
proliferation  of  transitory  flights  from  the  violence  of  progress.  Throughout  antebellum  
historical  writing,  aesthetic  moments  that  attempted  to  describe  how  history  looks,  
sounds,  and  feels  are  haunted  by  the  experience  of  discontinuity  with  the  past,  the  
unstable  production  of  racial  difference,  and  the  crisis  over  slavery.  It  was  in  the  attempt  
to  grasp  the  experience  of  the  past  that  historians  confronted  their  own  times  and  the  
divergent  futures  that  escaped  their  desires  for  stability  and  progress.
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2. The Second Conquest and William H. Prescott’s Imperial 
Aesthetic 
  
In  1847,  as  the  U.S.  army  marched  from  coastal  Vera  Cruz  to  Mexico  City,  
soldiers  began  to  see  themselves  in  the  image  of  the  Spanish  conquistadores  who  had  
followed  Cortés  along  the  same  route  three  centuries  earlier.  One  volunteer,  John  Blount  
Robertson,  remembering  the  war  years  later  claimed  he  had  enlisted  because  of  a  “long  
cherished  desire  to  visit  Mexico,  the  scene  of  Cortés’s  conquests,”  and  because  “life  as  a  
soldier  had  always  been  linked  with  peculiar  associations,  and  war  had  been  clothed  in  
a  kind  of  romance”  (66)..  It  is  likely  that  William  H.  Prescott’s  History  of  the  Conquest  of  
Mexico  (1843)  had  helped  provide  these  romantic  garments.  A  best-­‐‑seller  by  the  
standards  of  the  nineteenth  century  (selling  175,000  copies  in  the  1840s),  it  was  read  at  
night  in  camp  during  the  war  by  the  more  educated  among  the  ranks,  and  when  the  
army  occupied  Mexico  City,  those  attempting  to  learn  Spanish  relied  on  a  version  
translated  by  the  Mexican  historian  Lucas  Alamán.1  Observing  the  many  “points  of  
analogy  […],  which  strike  the  observer  on  the  spot,”  Col.  Caleb  Cushing  wrote  Prescott  
during  the  invasion  to  commend  him  on  the  accuracy  of  his  descriptions,  referring  to  the  
war  effort  then  underway  as  “the  second  conquest”  (qtd.  in  Johannsen  246).  More  than  
just  a  compelling  read,  full  of  useful  knowledge  of  a  foreign  landscape  garnered  from  
                                                                                                              
1 Information drawn from Robert W. Johannsen, To the Halls of the Montezumas (1985), 245-248. 
Circulation data from Eileen Ka-May Cheng, The Plain and Noble Garb of Truth, 44.	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travellers’  accounts  (although  it  certainly  was  that),  The  Conquest  of  Mexico  provided  an  
imaginative  framework  for  the  conduct  of  the  war.  It  brought  soldiers  out  of  themselves,  
their  homes,  and  their  local  allegiances  and  transformed  them  into  an  army  serving  in  
the  nation’s  first  invasion  and  occupation  of  a  foreign  state  with  previously  
acknowledged  sovereignty.2  
   William  H.  Prescott,  a  fastidious  conservative  Whig,  shared  with  the  more  
visionary  Bancroft  aesthetic  ambitions  that  aimed  at  providing  his  readers  with  an  
experience  of  the  past.  He  introduced  his  Conquest  of  Mexico  by  hesitatingly  stating  his  
desire  to  “make  [the  reader],  if  I  may  so  express  myself,  a  contemporary  of  the  sixteenth  
century”(6).  However,  in  contrast  to  Bancroft’s  focus  on  the  continual  movement  of  
                                                                                                              
2 This statement should be taken as flagging a significant development in U.S. imperialism and not as 
marking an origin. As Amy Kaplan has argued, an exceptionalist narrative of the anti-colonial foundation 
and mission of the United States has long obscured an accounting of the many formations of American 
Imperialism, see her “Left Alone With America,” (1993). In the aftermath of the Vietnam war, a generation 
of scholars produced a critique of westward expansion, violence against indigenous peoples and the 
ideology of Manifest Destiny in what was known as the internal-colonization thesis, see, for instance, 
Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence (1973); and Michael Paul Rogin, Fathers and Sons 
(1988). More recently, (particularly after 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq) a rich archive has emerged 
uncovering a more broadly imagined past of U.S. imperialism. Economic theorists have viewed the 
Spanish-American war as a key moment in which a transfer of hegemonic authority from Britain to the 
United States was initiated through the dramatic entrance of the latter onto the imperial scene; see Giovanni 
Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century (1994); and David Harvey, The New Imperialism (2005). In contrast, 
American Studies scholars have looked to the 1840s and earlier for nascent imperial formations. Amy 
Kaplan and Shelley Streeby have focused attention on the pressure of imperial power on cultural and 
identity formations in, respectively, domestic and urban space; see Kaplan, The Anarchy of Empire in the 
Making of U.S. Culture (2005); and Streeby, American Sensations (2002). David Kazanjian and Andy 
Doolen have called attention to the ways an imperialist imaginary informed the racial and political fears of 
the early Republic and the strategies that developed for ameliorating those tensions through domination in 
the Naturalization Act of 1780, the Alien and Sedition laws, and plans for the expropriation of free blacks 
in the colonization project initially proposed by Thomas Jefferson, see Kazanjian, The Colonizing Trick 
(2003); and Doolen, Fugitive Empire (2005). In contrast to European models, this scholarship has come to 
view imperialism less as a stable ideology or state structure, and rather, in the words of Doolen, “identifies 
a more ambiguous and terrifying process of power consolidated across borders rather than derived from a 
single place” (xv).	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progress  and  the  shared  love  of  freedom  among  people  of  vastly  different  epochs,  
Prescott  was  concerned  with  the  differences  of  character  among  discrete  eras  and  
civilizations  and  the  lessons  to  be  drawn  from  historical  change.  Although  he  was  
interested  in  how  each  civilization  contributed  to  the  overall  trajectory  of  human  
progress,  Prescott  was  committed  to  adjudicating  the  differences  among  civilizations,  
their  relative  political,  moral,  and  religious  evolution,  and  the  reasons  for  their  rise  
and/or  fall.  For  Prescott,  history  was  a  ladder  whose  top  rung  was,  at  the  moment,  the  
United  States,  but  that  was  a  precarious  position  that  had  been  held  by  many  different  
civilizations  over  the  course  of  history.  No  civilization  was  above  the  possibility  of  
eventual  corruption  and  decline  and  each  had  a  definitive  internal  potential  to  ascend  
the  scale  of  progress.    
Nevertheless,  Prescott’s  parsimonious  interpretations  of  civilizational  difference  
were  balanced  by  a  countervailing  desire  to  conscript  his  readers  into  feeling  resonances  
between  the  past  and  present  and  across  cultural  (but  not  racial)  differences,  all  while  
invoking  the  sensation  of  witnessing  events  distant  from  everyday  experience.  In  the  
Conquest  of  Mexico,  Prescott  frequently  asserts  the  relative  barbarity  of  both  the  Aztecs  
and  the  Spanish,  but  positions  the  reader  to  feel  themselves  to  be  among  the  Spanish,  
facing  a  barbaric  and  backwards  civilization  and  attempting  to  elevate  it  through  
conquest  into  the  flow  of  modern  progressive  time.  Scholarship  on  the  relationship  
between  antebellum  historiography  and  U.S.  racial  imperialism  has  often  focused  on  
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history’s  ideological  hierarchies  of  time  and  space  without  paying  attention  to  how  those  
hierarchies  are  encoded  as  a  matter  of  feeling  and  vision  in  the  aesthetics  of  history.3  
Scholars  have  observed  that  historians  like  Prescott  endorsed  a  providential  theory  of  
history  that  shored  up  projections  of  U.S.  hemispheric  pre-­‐‑eminence.4  Such  progressive  
history  served  imperial  and  racial  power  by  abstracting  time  and  space  into  a  
developmental  schema  that  granted  sovereignty  and  modernity  to  a  society  upon  the  
establishment  of  republican  forms  of  government,  while  justifying  racial  violence  by  
placing  Native  American  and  African  culture  at  the  lowest  rungs  of  civilized  time  or  
outside  of  history  altogether.5  However,  while  it  is  banal  to  observe  that  history  has  
often  been  written  from  the  perspective  of  European  victors,  there  is  more  to  the  
                                                                                                              
3 Donald Ringe and David Levin have both written useful studies of the aesthetic preconceptions of 
romantic historians. However, working before the turn to a more political historicism, they maintained a 
separation between aesthetics and its politics. Ringe’s comment that “Prescott, reflecting a typically 
nineteenth-century attitude, saw the struggle between Spaniard and Aztec as a conflict between Christian 
and pagan” reflects the extent of their interest in the latter. See Ringe, “The Artistry of Prescott’s ‘Conquest 
of Mexico” (1953), and Levin, History as Romantic Art (1959). 
	  
4 Scholars often utilize romantic history as a symbol of the hegemonic formations against which they pose 
the cultural work of more critical or resistant texts. However, a number of essays have explored the 
structural complications of Prescott in particular, including John Ernest’s, “Reading the Romantic Past” 
(1993), and Eric Wertheimer’s, “Noctography” (1995). A few recent insightful essays have taken up The 
Conquest of Mexico’s artistic and literary dimensions as well, albeit while only dealing with aesthetics as a 
matter of genre, see Robert D. Aguirre’s, “Annihilating the Distance” (2002), and Jesse Alemán, “The 
Other Country” (2006).   
 
5 This draws an imprecise parallel with the developmental theories of progress long examined by post-
colonial theory, see, for instance, Chakrabarty’s, Provincializing Europe (2000). However, because the 
United States officially disavowed its own imperial authority throughout the nineteenth century, it is 
important not to be too doctrinaire in adapting a critique of power structures rooted in the centralized 
bureaucratic administration of the British and French Empires to a context where that authority was 
distributed through processes and agents often working at a great distance from centralized power and 
even, in the case of the “filibuster” campaigns in Mexico and Cuba, outside of legal authority. For 
examinations of the complicated and often contradictory instantiation of U.S. imperial power across the 
antebellum hemispheric landscape see Gretchen Murphy, Hemispheric Imaginings (2005), and Walter 
Johnson, River of Dark Dreams (2013).  
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visionary  descriptive  vocabulary  of  Prescott’s  writing  than  simple  one-­‐‑sidedness.  
Prescott’s  vision  of  how  time  functioned  in  the  past  helped  construct  a  comprehensive  
imperialist  aesthetic  that  contributed  to  how  many  Americans  thought,  felt,  and  
experienced  U.S.  imperial  confrontations  with  their  neighbors.  This  aesthetic  was  a  
descriptive  visualization  of  time  that  offered  up  images  of  the  growth  and  movement  of  
liberty  through  the  New  World.  It  was  a  manner  of  making  providence  manifest  to  
readers  whose  futures  were  feared  to  be  deviating  from  the  nation’s  presumptive  
destiny.  A  text  like  Prescott’s  History  was  not  just  an  imposition  of  U.S.  ideologies  about  
race  and  progress  on  the  Mexican  past,  it  was  discourse  on  sensation  and  time  that  
sought  make  available  to  readers  an  experience  of  the  sights  and  sounds  of  progress  
through  the  description  of  past  events.  
As  the  founding  generation  receded  into  idealized  memory  and  the  nation  
confronted  the  sectional  crisis  over  slavery  and  expansion,  optimism  over  the  American  
future  was  profoundly  shaken.  As  suggested  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  construction  of  
national  time  and  space  was  met  with  conflicting  anxieties  and  desires  about  the  
convulsively  expanding  form  of  the  nation,  and  was  challenged  by  signs  of  resistance  to  
what  Andy  Doolen  has  called  “the  historical  trinity  of  U.S.  imperialism—war,  slavery  
and  territorial  expansion”  (xv).  As  the  U.S.  Government  attempted  to  secure  territorial  
boundaries  between  an  organized  and  progressively  sovereign  space  and  a  disordered  
sphere  of  international  capital  and  racial  rebellion  beyond  its  frontiers,  many  were  
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haunted  by  images  of  racial  contamination,  resistance,  deformation,  and  temporal  
retrogression.6  In  real  and  imagined  slave  revolts  throughout  the  south,  such  as  those  
attributed  to  Denmark  Vesey  and  Nat  Tuner,  observers—including  slave-­‐‑owners  like  
Thomas  Jefferson  and  even  some  white  abolitionists  during  the  Civil  War—saw  over-­‐‑
determined  reflections  of  their  own  fantasies  of  the  Haitian  Revolution’s  apocalyptic  
violence  and  South  American  political  disorder.7  New  England  Whigs  had  grown  
concerned  that  expansionist  policy  and  democratic  upheaval  would  deform  national  
character  and  upend  the  proper  order  through  the  incorporation  of  cultural  and  racial  
strangers  into  the  body  politic.  And  western  Democrats  feared  that  land  and  slave  
holding  elites  would  bring  an  abrupt  halt  to  the  growth  and  spread  of  liberty  through  
the  New  World.  These  visions  of  hemispheric  revolt  and  national  dissolution  turned  the  
projected  order  of  space  and  time  inside  out,  challenging  the  very  models  of  temporal  
progress  and  civilizational  order  antebellum  historians  were  using  to  interpret  the  
hemispheric  past.  
In  this  context,  Prescott’s  Conquest  of  Mexico  can  be  read  as  a  reactionary  attempt  
to  envision  not  only  the  abstract  historical  order  that  would  ground  U.S.  sovereignty,  
                                                                                                              
6  For instance, Bruce A. Harvey has written about the role representations of racial hybridity in South 
American played in constructions of U.S. national identity in the antebellum period. See Harvey’s 
American Geographics (2001) 
 
7 Matthew Clavin and Alfred N. Hunt have detailed the role the Haitian Revolution played in antebellum 
constructions of identity and debates about emancipation before and during the Civil War. See Clavin’s 
Toussaint Louverture and the American Civil War (2009), and Hunt’s Haiti’s Influence on Antebellum 
America (1988).	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but  also  ways  of  describing  and  identifying  the  emergence  of  that  order  in  its  sensate  
particulars.  By  linking  that  future  to  images  of  an  organized  and  progressively  
unfolding  past,  The  Conquest  of  Mexico  invited  readers  to  witness,  relive  and  be  
transformed  by  the  vivid  description  of  the  various  historical  scenes  of  the  emergence  
and  progress  of  such  national  values  as  liberty,  Christianity,  and  property.  In  order  to  
accomplish  this  vision,  Prescott  produced  an  aesthetics  that  relied  on  long  established  
norms  for  figuring  darkness  and  light  in  racialized  backwardness  and  the  “inevitable”  
transcendence  of  civilization  to  produce  powerful  images  of  the  agents  of  progress  
overcoming  crisis  and  resistance.  But  this  aesthetic  encoding  of  time—of  imagining  what  
progress  looked  and  felt  like—was  haunted  by  the  sense  of  disorder  it  attempted  to  
overcome  and  disavow.  Prescott  displaced  anxieties  over  slavery  and  imperialism  onto  
other  places  and  times,  endowing  heroic  actors  like  Cortés  with  the  power  to  overcome  
temporal  confusion  in  violent  conquest.  In  focusing  attention  on  this  imperial  aesthetic  
my  hope  is  not  merely  to  help  dispel  its  often  still-­‐‑overwhelming  romantic  power.  I  
propose  that  by  reading  this  eruption  of  the  continental  past  into  the  crises  of  Prescott’s  
present  we  can  uncover  the  fears,  anxieties,  and  desires  about  the  future  that  drove  
Prescott  and  others  to  produce  an  imperial  aesthetic.  In  doing  so  we  can  further  identify  
the  role  romantic  history  played  in  making  the  violence  of  imperialism  a  desirable,  if  




Providence and the Aesthetics of “Character” 
  
In  the  antebellum  period,  a  central  concern  of  U.S.  politics  was  defining  its  
relationship  with  the  new  Central  and  South  American  Republics.  This  relationship,  
although  political  and  material,  was  also  temporal.  Were  these  new  nations  followers  of  
the  U.S.  in  their  entrance  into  political  modernity?  How  could  the  U.S.  aid  their  progress  
away  from  the  European  past  into  new  modes  of  economic  and  political  organization?  
In  defining  this  temporal  relationship,  politicians  were  aided  by  historians  like  Prescott  
who  had  written  voluminously  on  the  “character”  of  past  civilizations.  As  James  B.  
Salazar  has  argued,  in  the  nineteenth  century,  character  was  a  central  concept  in  how  the  
U.S.  public  sphere  constructed  individuals  and  their  relative  trustworthiness  and  value  
to  the  nation’s  economic  and  political  life.  Character  referred  to  a  private  quality  of  
discipline  in  the  internal  life  of  citizen-­‐‑subjects  that  marked  them  as  suitable  or  
unsuitable  for  political  life  or  economic  partnership.  But  character  was  marked  by  a  
central  contradiction.  Because  it  was  only  legible  to  others  as  an  embodied  performance,  
the  actual  status  of  character  as  fact  of  private  internal  life  was  indeterminate.  When  
historians  like  Prescott  invoked  character  to  describe  the  internal  dynamics  of  entire  
races  and  civilizations  they  also  had  to  confront  the  tension  Salazar  identifies  between  
“the  sign  and  referent  of  character”  (5).  Given  the  indeterminacy  inherent  in  the  concept,  
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historians  had  to  develop  strategies  for  reading  and  interpreting  the  character  of  
civilizations  as  manifest  in  external  traits  and  appearances.  Prescott  developed  the  
relationship  between  any  given  event  or  civilization  and  its  role  in  the  overall  plot  of  
providence  through  a  reading  of  aesthetic  practices  that  sought  for  signs  of  character  in  
expressive  cultural  forms.    
In  a  series  of  reviews  of  medieval  and  renaissance  narrative  poetry  that  he  
published  at  the  outset  of  his  writing  career  in  publications  like  The  United  States  Literary  
Gazette,  Prescott  drew  links  among  poetic  form,  national  climate,  and  the  potential  of  
societies  for  progress.  In  one  essay  from  1826  he  wrote,  “the  poetry  of  Italy  seems  to  
reflect  clearly  the  unclouded  skies  and  glowing  landscape,  as  that  of  England  does  the  
tranquil  and  somewhat  melancholy  complexion  of  her  climate”  (420).  Prescott  
understood  that  these  poetic  traits  were  related  to  each  nation’s  contribution  to  
providential  history:  “[b]efore  the  time  of  Elizabeth,  all  the  light  of  learning  which  fell  
upon  the  world  had  come  from  Italy,  and  our  own  literature,  like  a  young  and  tender  
plant,  insensibly  put  forth  its  branches  in  the  direction  whence  it  felt  its  invigorating  
influence.  As  it  grew  in  years  and  hardihood,  it  sent  fibres  deeper  into  its  own  soil”  
(411).  Relying  on  a  conventional  romantic  metaphor,  Prescott  described  history  as  a  
cumulative  progression  of  organic  national  cultures,  each  taking  nourishment  from  the  
visible  forms  of  the  past  while  advancing  into  its  own  particular  role  in  history  that  
would  transmit  its  character  to  posterity  in  expressive  forms.  
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In  the  next  decade,  as  Prescott  turned  his  attention  from  poetry  to  history,  these  
aesthetic  theories  informed  how  he  imagined  his  work  and  how  he  represented  places  
like  Spain,  Peru  and  Mexico  in  his  magisterial  volumes.  In  an  essay  on  nineteenth-­‐‑
century  literature,  he  suggested  that  although  both  history  and  literature  can  portray  
“the  truth  of  character,”  they  must  proceed  according  to  different  principles.  Defending  
Sir  Walter  Scott  from  Chateaubriand’s  charge  that  he  had  confounded  history  with  
romance  in  the  former’s  biography,  The  Life  of  Napoleon,  Prescott  attempted  to  manage  
the  epistemological  confusion  of  the  era  of  the  historical  novel  through  a  theory  of  how  
historians  may  adapt  romance  to  their  own  productions  without  losing  the  claim  to  
documentary  truth.  In  his  estimation  of  the  romantic  novelist,  “it  is  enough  […]  if  he  
give  pleasure.  And  this,  everybody  knows,  is  not  effected  by  the  strict  observance  of  
artificial  rules.  It  is  of  little  consequence  how  the  plot  is  entangled”  (281).  In  contrast,  
Prescott  thought  the  historian  must  be  more  restrained,  resist  the  novelist’s  “most  
brilliant  forms  of  fancy”  in  undertaking  a  process  that  is  “at  once  slow  and  laborious,”  
and  only  then  can  the  work  be  “again  clothed  in  elements  of  beauty”(282).  Where  a  
novel  is  an  expression  of  fancy,  ungrounded  in  the  details  of  plot,  history  must  be  
meticulously  mapped  out  according  to  the  truth  of  the  “situation”  it  attempts  to  
represent;  it  must  have  established  causality  derived  from  research  into  sources  and  a  
feeling  for  the  “essence”  of  historical  events.8  However,  Prescott  also  suggested  that  both  
                                                                                                              
8 For more on the importance of essence and feeling as modes of knowing and communicating historical 
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forms  are  able  to  appeal  to  romance  for  examples  of  “how  to  dispose  lights  and  shades  
so  as  to  produce  a  striking  result”  that  might  best  express  the  “truth  of  character”  (385).  
In  accordance  with  his  aesthetic  ideas,  if  literary  nationalism  concerned  itself  with  
reading  works  of  art  to  discover  the  character  of  the  nation,  then  its  cousin  romantic  
history  was  about  clothing  history  in  the  best  distribution  of  “light  and  shadow”  to  
make  apparent  the  character  of  other  times  and  places,  which  in  Prescott’s  
understanding  would  manifest  their  potential  for  historical  progress.9  The  portrayal  of  
character  became  a  central  aspect  of  the  historians’  art,  linking  it  with  early  nineteenth-­‐‑
century  aesthetic  theory.  
   For  many,  the  relationship  between  such  an  aesthetic  theory  and  repressive  
nationalist  and  imperialist  ideologies  will  be  clear.  In  naturalizing  the  historically  
contingent  form  of  the  nation  through  appeals  to  expressive  poetic  forms  and  climate,  
Prescott  reifies  the  material  relations  of  power  into  ideological  abstractions,  and  through  
the  language  of  progress  his  theory  serves  to  justify  imperial  and  racial  heirarchies.  
While  I  agree  with  this  assessment,  I  want  to  suggest  that  the  reliance  of  Prescott’s  
                                                                                                              
  
truth see George Callcott’s, History in the United States (1970). 
 
9 Broadly speaking this dual imperative of Prescott’s aesthetics to discover and construct the “character” of 
the societies it represents rests on the influence of the associationist aesthetics of Scottish Common Sense 
philosophy on U.S. culture and nationalism. For a thoughtful recent account of associationism’s 
relationship with antebellum literary form see Theo Davis’s Formalism, Experience, and the Making of 
American Literature in the Nineteenth Century (2007). For an older but still useful study see Donald 
Ringe’s The Pictorial Mode (1971). 
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theory  of  history  on  aesthetic  categories  reveals  a  hitherto  unexamined  aspect  of  
romantic  history.  Its  achievement  of  a  coherent  vision  of  global  progress  depended  to  a  
large  degree  on  its  ability  to  make  other  spaces  and  times  appear  in  a  manner  that  made  
transparent  their  role  in  the  plot  of  providence  and  their  temporal  subordination  to  U.S.  
republican  governance.  Given  that  Prescott  and  other  romantic  historians  had  come  to  
view  U.S.  national  identity  as  positioned  at  the  forefront  of  that  history,  this  structure  
produced  its  own  inevitable  crisis.  Events  and  cultures  that  escaped  or  resisted  
definition  within  the  ordered  procession  of  providence—and  thus  defied  its  aesthetic  
norms  of  visibility  (i.e.  the  forms  of  government  or  subjectivity  that  constituted  
civilization  and  progress)—came  to  signify  disruptions  in  U.S.  identity  and  soveriegnty  
and  become  a  fantasmic  screen  on  which  historians  projected  their  fears  about  national  
stability.  Prescott’s  Conquest  of  Mexico  used  vivid  and  sensate  descriptions  of  historical  
events  to  manifest  a  transcendent  force  of  providence  as  overcoming  just  such  a  
dissonance  between  his  aesthetic  logic  of  character  and  an  overdetermined  fantasy  of  
Mexican  history  as  unstable  and  illegible  from  the  perspective  of  republican  modernity.    
Prescott’s  aesthetics  of  character  helps  to  locate  how  the  indetermacy  of  the  
various  constructions  of  Mexican  time  that  haunted  the  debates  over  the  U.S.-­‐‑Mexican  
war  can  be  conceived  as  an  aesthetic  and  political  problem.  As  Jaime  Javier  Rodríguez  
has  argued,  far  from  a  clear  assertion  of  U.S.  national  idenity  and  hemispheric  
dominance,  the  U.S.-­‐‑Mexican  war  “blurred  the  comfortable  heirarchy  between  a  noble,  
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progressive,  fully  authroized  United  States  and  a  supposedly  backward,  anachronistic,  
corrupt  Mexico”  (13).  In  place  of  a  coherently  readable  expression  of  its  role  in  
providence,  Mexico  became  a  screen  for  the  anxieties  of  both  anti-­‐‑war  Whigs  like  
Prescott  and  enthusiastically  imperialist  Democrats  about  the  shape  and  direction  of  
national  and  hemispheric  time.  The  indeterminate  position  of  Mexico  in  the  scale  of  
modern  time  helped  imaginatively  produce  imperialism  as  a  consequence  of  
nationalism’s  unstable  grasp  on  the  future—an  affect  of  crisis  excerbated  by  the  
multiplicity  of  alternate  futures  proliferating  through  the  hemisphere  in  the  explosion  of  
revolutionary  political  activity  in  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century.  
  
Fantasies of Mexican Time 
  
   Prescott  was  a  critic  of  both  the  annexation  of  Texas  and  the  war  against  Mexico.  
Although  a  chronicler  of  conquest,  his  anti-­‐‑imperial  sympathies  were  clear  in  his  
frequent  assertions  throughout  The  Conquest  of  Mexico  of  the  superiority  of  contemporary  
morality  to  that  of  both  the  Aztecs10  and  the  Spanish,  the  latter  of  which  he  portrayed  as  
ultimately  morally  compromised  agents  of  a  thankfully  past  (though  necessary)  age  of  
conquest.  Yet,  his  ultimately  heroic  portrait  of  Cortés  and  his  narrative  of  the  liberation  
                                                                                                              
10 I use Aztec throughout instead of the more accurate Mexica to emphasize the extent to which Prescott’s 
history is an imaginative projection that had little to do with actual pre-Columbian civilization and to stay 
consistent with antebellum usage. 
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of  a  barbaric  and  superstitious  land  into  a  Christian  future  was  read  enthusiastically  by  
those  who  dreamed  of  and  participated  in  “the  Second  Conquest.”  In  the  aftermath  of  
the  publication  of  The  Conquest  in  1843  there  was  an  explosion  of  interest  in  the  pre-­‐‑
Columbian  past  of  the  continent,  which  resulted  in  a  number  of  popular  histories  and  
historical  novels  that  were  either  set  during  the  conquest  or  adapted  the  terms  of  
romance  to  more  recent  Mexican  history.11  Whether  or  not  Prescott’s  text  was  directly  
responsible  for  any  given  person’s  association  of  Mexico  with  romance,  his  decision  that  
“the  true  way  of  conceiving  the  subject  is  not  as  a  philosophical  theme  but  as  an  epic  in  
prose,  a  romance  in  chivalry,”  provided  the  foundation  for  many  of  these  future  
imaginative  elaborations  (Literary  Memoranda  31).  Yet,  demonstrating  the  popularity  of  a  
particular  fantasy  does  not  explain  it;  I  want  to  suggest,  then,  that  the  power  of  this  
vision  was  in  proportion  to  its  utility  at  easing  the  psychic  tensions  that  post-­‐‑independence  
Mexico  provoked  in  the  temporal  imagination  of  Whigs  and  Democrats.  
   Whig  opposition  to  territorial  expansion  and  a  Democrat-­‐‑led  war  rarely  arose  
from  sympathy  with  the  objects  of  conquest  and  it  generally  agreed  with  the  dominant  
position  that  viewed  Mexico  as  an  insufficiently  sovereign  political  space.  Whig  anti-­‐‑war  
sentiment  was  a  weak  anti-­‐‑imperialism  that  only  articulated  its  resistance  in  the  form  of  
prophetic  fears  over  what  Prescott  called  the  “most  fatal  symptom  in  the  history  of  
republics”—i.e.  conquest  (“Bancroft’s…”  304n).  A  striking  example  of  the  ultimate  
                                                                                                              
11 For a useful (if dated) catalog of this literary interest in Mexico see John T. Flanagan and Raymond L. 
Grismer’s “Mexico in American Fiction Prior to 1850” (1940).	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complicity  of  this  rhetoric  with  the  Polk  administration’s  war  plan  can  be  found  in  a  
prominent  Whig  response  to  the  president’s  May  11th,  1846  “War  Message”  to  Congress.  
Polk’s  justification  for  the  war  was  deeply  disingenuous.  Looking  for  a  congressional  
authorization  for  the  war,  he  recounted  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  a  border  skirmish  a  
few  weeks  earlier  as  entirely  the  result  of  Mexican  aggression,  claiming,  “Mexico  has  
passed  the  boundary  of  the  United  States,  has  invaded  our  territory  and  shed  American  
blood  upon  the  American  soil.”  Left  out  of  this  narrative  was  any  acknowledgement  that  
the  land  where  the  fighting  had  occurred  laid  between  the  Nueces  River  and  the  Rio  del  
Norte  (Rio  Grande)—territory  that  had  been  in  dispute  since  Texan  Independence.  Polk  
had  likely  ordered  troops  into  the  contested  area  in  order  to  provoke  a  Mexican  attack  
and  provide  an  opening  to  conduct  a  war  whose  territorial  goals  extended  not  just  to  
Alta  California  and  New  Mexico  (the  territory  gained  by  the  U.S.  at  the  conclusion  of  the  
war),  but  to  Baja  California  and  the  Yucatan  as  well.12    
William  Bernard  responded  to  Polk’s  speech  in  the  American  Whig  Review  by  
decrying  the  war  as  “emphatically  an  Executive  war,  and  brought  about,  however  just  
and  necessary  as  against  Mexico,  by  a  series  of  the  most  flagrant  and  alarming  Executive  
usurpations  of  the  Constitution  of  the  country”  (578).  Bernard’s  primary  concern  was  
with  how  the  war  might  undermine  the  constitutional  order.  In  the  Whig  account,  the  
war  had  begun  when  Polk  had  ordered  troops  over  the  Nueces  river  and  gave  their  
                                                                                                              
12 See John S.D. Eisenhower, So Far From God: The U.S. War with Mexico, 1846-1848 (1989), for a 
thorough account of these events around the U.S.-Mexican border. 
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commander  (future  president  Zachary  Taylor)  the  unprecedented  command  that,  
although  he  was  not  to  attack  Mexican  troops,  he  “may  consider  hostilities  commenced”  
if  Mexican  forces  were  to  respond  to  this  provocation.  Polk  had  granted  a  military  
commander  a  power  reserved  for  Congress—that  of  declaring  war.  Thus,  the  Whig  
position  was  based  on  a  fear  of  what  the  historian  Daniel  Walker  Howe  has  called  
“backwards  progress”:  a  sense  that  the  providential  destiny  of  the  nation  could  be  
interrupted  by  the  re-­‐‑emergence  of  phenomena  such  as  tyrannical  executive  power  and  
the  law  of  conquest  that  antedated  the  establishment  of  republican  governance  and  
political  liberty  (69-­‐‑95).  Despite  this  perspicuity  in  regards  to  Polk’s  duplicity,  Bernard  
was  comfortable  with  his  assessment  of  Mexico  as  an  unjustified  aggressor.  
     This  refusal  to  acknowledge  the  legitimacy  of  Mexican  claims  over  Texan  
territory  dated  to  the  oft-­‐‑mythologized  events  of  Texan  independence  and  was  derived  
from  a  vision  of  Mexico  as  unable  or  unwilling  to  protect  the  rights  of  its  citizens,  
making  it  in  some  ways  akin  to  the  colonizers  of  the  Old  World.  In  the  striking  image  of  
martyred  patriots  defending  their  liberty  from  the  tyrannical  Santa  Anna  at  the  Alamo,  
Whigs  and  Democrats  alike  had  seen  a  reflection  of  the  American  Revolution  and  the  
workings  of  historical  providence.  As  annexation  approached  in  the  1840s,  the  two  
parties  split  over  their  interpretation  of  that  event.  While  Democrats  saw  in  the  white  
farmers  and  slave-­‐‑owners  most  closely  associated  with  Texan  independence  natural  
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ideological  kinsmen,  Whigs  warned  that  annexation  would  turn  that  previous  
revolution  into  an  act  of  conquest.    
Prescott  articulated  this  concern  with  the  temporality  of  Texan  independence  in  
one  of  his  rare  overt  political  statements.  Upon  the  re-­‐‑publication  in  the  1840s  of  an  
earlier  review  of  a  volume  of  Bancroft’s  History  of  the  United  States,  Prescott  added  a  long  
footnote  stating  his  concerns  with  annexation.  In  the  original  text,  he  went  to  great  
lengths  to  praise  Bancroft’s  portrayal  of  the  “extent  of  Empire”  in  the  colonial  era.  
Recognizing  that  for  Whigs  in  the  1840s  “Empire”  had  developed  a  negative  connotation  
in  their  critique  of  Democratic  policy,  Prescott  claimed  he  was  unable  to  let  such  
language  “go  forth  into  the  world  with  my  name  on  it.”  He  then  expanded  upon  what  
annexation  might  mean  for  the  future  of  the  hemisphere:    
The  craving  for  foreign  acquisitions  has  ever  been  a  most  fatal  symptom  in  the  
history  of  republics;  but  when  those  acquisitions  are  made,  as  in  the  present  
instance,  in  contempt  of  constitutional  law  and  in  disregard  of  the  great  
principles  of  international  justice,  the  evil  assumes  a  tenfold  magnitude;  for  it  
flows  not  so  much  from  the  single  act  as  from  the  principle  on  which  it  rests,  and  
which  may  open  the  way  to  the  indefinite  perpetration  of  such  acts.  (304-­‐‑305n)  
  
In  his  account,  annexation  would  turn  the  previous  revolution—a  “just”  revolt  against  a  
colonial  oppressor  in  the  name  of  self-­‐‑governance—into  an  act  of  conquest.  It  would  
rewrite  the  previous  meaning  of  that  event  (as  an  advancement  in  the  progress  of  liberty  
across  the  New  World)  into  an  act  undertaken  in  “contempt  of  constitutional  law,”  
establishing  a  principle  for  conquest  within  a  republican  government  that  should  have  
advanced  beyond  that  phase  of  history.  Yet,  just  as  in  Bernard’s  weak  critique  of  Polk’s  
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imperialism,  the  articulation  of  the  norms  of  U.S.  progress  depended  upon  the  
deployment  of  Mexico  as  a  counter-­‐‑image—an  aggressor  against  whom  revolt  was  
justified.  Thus  any  claims  Mexico  had  as  a  nominally  republican  state  that  had  only  two  
decades  earlier  thrown  off  its  own  colonial  shackles  were  disavowed.  
It  is  not  simply  that  Whigs  viewed  Mexican  temporality  as  akin  to  that  of  a  pre-­‐‑
republican  colonial  oppressor.  Mexico’s  image  troubled  a  linear  model  of  development  
by  inhabiting  multiple  positions—at  once  a  colonial  past,  a  republican  present,  and  a  
feared  future  of  decline  and  tyranny.  Prescott  gives  a  hint  of  the  destabilizing  force  of  
this  image  to  provoke  Whig  anxieties  about  the  future  of  republican  liberty.  
Ventriloquizing  what  were  likely  his  own  concerns,  Prescott  wrote:  
There  are  some  skeptics,  who,  when  they  reflect  on  the  fate  of  similar  institutions  
in  other  countries;  when  they  see  our  sister  states  of  South  America,  after  nobly  
winning  their  independence,  split  into  insignificant  fractions;  when  they  see  the  
abuses  which  from  time  to  time  have  crept  into  our  own  administration,  and  the  
violence  offered,  in  manifold  ways,  to  the  constitution  […]  there  are,  we  say,  
some  wise  and  benevolent  minds  among  us  who,  seeing  all  this,  feel  a  natural  
distrust  as  to  the  stability  of  the  federal  compact.  (302-­‐‑302)  
  
Although  Prescott  claims  his  purpose  is  assuaging  the  fears  of  such  “skeptics,”  stating  in  
the  next  paragraph,  “hope  is  the  attribute  of  republics,”  the  length  and  descriptive  
intensity  of  his  litany  (which  I  have  edited  for  the  sake  of  brevity)  suggests  that  many  of  
these  concerns  were  his  own.  His  recitation  of  Whig  fears  over  various  signs  of  
“backwards  progress”  begins,  tellingly,  with  an  oblique  but  obvious  reference  to  Mexico  
(certainly  the  most  prominent  republic  to  the  south).  It  then  rhetorically  links  domestic  
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signs  of  corruption  to  the  “creep”  of  dissolution  that  it  has  already  located  beyond  U.S.  
borders.  Coming  as  it  does  on  the  heels  of  a  discussion  of  the  relationship  among  
governance,  time  and  space,  it  is  reasonable  to  suspect  that  the  anxieties  invoked  in  this  
passage  were  linked  to  their  being  imagined  as  a  result  of  the  porousness  of  sovereignty  
in  the  act  of  conquest.  In  other  words,  Prescott’s  opposition  to  the  annexation  of  Texas  
and  later  the  war  against  Mexico  might  have  sources  beyond  his  resistance  to  conquest  
in  principle  and  have  been  derived  from  an  unacknowledged  fear  that  the  conquest  of  
that  particular  space,  which  had  been  associated  in  his  mind  with  “backwards  
progress,”  would  enable  dissolution  to  “creep”  northward  into  the  national  body  politic.  
In  these  arguments,  Mexico,  in  its  temporal  instability,  becomes  a  container  for  U.S.  
political  anxieties  over  its  own  future.  
   This  bifurcated  fantasy,  which  evacuated  political  crises  in  the  U.S.  to  sources  
beyond  its  borders,  was  on  even  more  vivid  display  in  an  anonymous  pro-­‐‑war  
propaganda  pamphlet  that  shared  its  name  with  Prescott’s  history,  entitled  The  Conquest  
of  Mexico!  If  Whig  rhetoric  looked  to  secure  U.S.  temporal  authority  by  maintaining  the  
integrity  of  sovereign  space  against  the  haunting  semi-­‐‑sovereignty  of  Mexico,  
Democratic  rhetoric  insisted  on  the  necessity  of  incorporation  of  potentially  unstable  
space  within  national  temporality.  Portraying  the  Mexican  government  as  unable  to  
defend  the  rights  of  citizens,  the  pamphlet  imagined  that  the  only  way  to  protect  the  
country  from  re-­‐‑conquest  by  a  European  colonial  power  was  through  the  addition  of  the  
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entirety  of  Mexico  to  U.S.  territory.  In  order  to  establish  the  necessity  of  the  actions  it  
proposed,  the  pamphlet  relied  on  rhetoric  as  slippery  about  temporality  as  the  Whig  
opposition  was  fastidious:  “[a]  once  magnificent  but  now  dissolving  state,  to  which  the  
cabinets  of  Europe  have  been  looking  with  solicitude  as  a  prize  for  their  intrigues,  is  
considered  by  many  to  be  providentially  offered  to  us”  (3).  This  narrative  of  dissolution  
and  inevitable  conquest  is  (purposefully,  I  think)  hard  to  map  onto  historical  specifics.  
The  language  of  “magnificence”  seems  not  to  refer  to  the  Mexican  Republic;  rather,  it  
could  suggest  both  pre-­‐‑Columbian  Mexican  civilization  and  the  Spanish  Empire.  At  the  
same  time,  the  phrase  “now  dissolving”  seems  to  conflate  Spain  with  its  former  
colony—both  of  which  were  understood  to  be  in  decline.  Thus,  the  pamphlet  invokes  
the  image  of  “dissolution”  not  only  to  make  an  argument  about  contemporary  Mexico,  
but  also  to  more  broadly  mythologize  Mexican  space  as  having  an  insecure  temporal  
status—an  association  that  Whigs  like  Prescott  ultimately  shared.  
Of  course,  the  Democratic  response  to  this  image  of  Mexico  was  far  more  
enthusiastic  about  the  opportunities  it  offered  to  national  becoming.  It  is  here  that  the  
romance  of  conquest  overtook  the  political  anxieties  collected  by  Mexico  in  the  U.S.  
imagination  as  a  fantasy  of  resolving  national  temporal  crises.  The  contrast  (and  
continuity)  between  Whig  and  Democratic  politics  is  strikingly  clear  in  the  pamphlet’s  
approach  to  an  issue  that  had  been  pushed  to  the  side  of  political  discourse—that  of  
Mexico’s  juridical  abolition  of  slavery.  Political  arguments  in  the  lead  up  to  the  war  
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often  elided  this  question,  in  part  because  westward  growth  had  already  proven  to  be  an  
explosive  issue  in  the  sectional  politics  of  the  antebellum  period.  Nevertheless,  
abolitionists  struggled  to  make  the  issue  visible  in  stories  of  a  southern  plot  to  expand  
their  empire  of  slavery  (echoed  in  Thoreau’s  “Resistance  to  Civil  Government”)  and  an  
outspoken  resistance  to  the  war  on  the  grounds  that,  as  Martin  R.  Delany  put  it  in  one  of  
his  editorial  letters  to  The  North  Star,  the  incorporation  of  Mexican  territory  into  the  U.S.  
“would  bring  with  it  degradation  and  servility  to  nearly  eight  millions  of  freemen,  
heretofore  enjoying  the  rights  and  privileges  of  a  free  and  equal  people”    (1848).  
Rather  than  merely  ignoring  the  abolitionists’  claims,  the  pamphlet  conscripted  a  
nascent  free  labor  ideology  into  a  counter-­‐‑narrative,  suggesting  that  only  through  
conquest  could  Mexico  be  protected  from  slavery:  
But  Mexico,  with  its  eight  or  nine  millions  of  people,  many  of  them  emancipated  
slaves,  all  of  them  but  little  distinguishable  in  color  from  the  negro,  and  too  poor  
to  be  independent  of  labor,  could  form  a  series  of  States  of  free  laboring  men  
which  would  stand  an  impassable  barrier  to  the  extension  of  slavery  southward.  
Slavery  cannot  exist  amidst  a  vast  mass  of  free  laborers.  But  if  not  annexed,  the  
declension  of  Mexico  must  go  on,  the  slavery  of  Texas  will  gradually  encroach  
upon  the  northern  Mexican  provinces,  and  its  course  be  indefinite.  Let  us  be  in  
haste  then  to  reclaim  Mexico  from  her  degradation;  let  us  form  her  into  States,  
giving  her,  as  we  must,  to  a  suitable  extent,  the  right  of  suffrage  and  
representation  in  our  government,  and  we  shall  thus  save  the  fairest  section  of  
our  continent  from  the  curse  of  slavery.  (26-­‐‑27)    
  
While  it  is  unlikely  that  the  authors  of  the  pamphlet  were  sincere  in  their  promotion  of  
an  imperialist  conquest  as  a  principled  stand  against  slavery  (and  the  war  resulted  in  a  
massive  expansion  of  slave  territory),  this  argument  is  a  significant  divergence  from  the  
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cultural  logic  that  had  married  free  labor  to  imperialism  during  the  build  up  to  the  war.  
Christopher  Taylor  has  called  this  logic  “the  prosthetics  of  empire,”  describing  how  the  
losses  to  autonomy  and  independence  experienced  by  workers  under  industrialization  
were  attached  to  racial  and  imperial  identities  that  “redirected  the  figures  by  which  the  
working  class  critiqued  capitalism”  into  desires  for  “prosthetic”  additions  to  the  nation:  
new  territory  that  would  imaginatively  fill  the  wounds  left  on  worker’s  by  industrial  
exploitation  by  providing  opportunities  for  personal  regrowth  in  the  west  (31).  Free  
labor  ideology  figured  the  threat  of  slavery  as  debilitating  competition  for  white  workers  
looking  to  achieve  autonomy  above  what  they  saw  as  the  degraded  status  of  “wage-­‐‑
slavery”—an  autonomy  that  the  pamphlet,  in  line  with  the  prosthetic  logic  Taylor  
identifies,  attempted  to  write  into  conquest.  However,  where  the  dominant  rhetoric  of  
free-­‐‑labor  had  worked  to  consolidate  a  white  working  class  identity  in  opposition  to  
both  slavery  and  “degraded”  black  labor,  the  pamphlet  articulates  a  desire  for  a  
multiracial  block  of  opposition  to  slavery  in  order  to  secure  the  rights  of  labor.13  While  
this  might  contain  a  seed  of  opposition  to  dominant  racial  logics  of  the  antebellum  
period,  it  would  be  wrong,  I  think,  to  read  the  pamphlet  as  in  any  substantial  way  an  act  
of  resistance.  Rather,  I  want  to  suggest  that  it  attempted  to  imaginatively  appropriate  a  
                                                                                                              
13 The classic account of the formation of white working class racial identity in the nineteenth century 
remains David R. Roediger’s The Wages of Whiteness (1991); see also Alexander Saxton, The Rise and 
Fall of the White Republic: (1991).	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potentially  disruptive  counter-­‐‑logic  of  multiracial  democracy  into  racial  imperialism—a  
romance  with  difference  that  reduces  it  to  the  same.  
   To  explain  this,  we  have  to  turn  towards  the  ways  democracy  had  emerged  and  
was  imagined  in  spaces  other  than  the  United  States.  At  the  heart  of  Mexican  
historiography  of  its  own  independence  was  an  image  of  a  multiracial  peasant  rebellion  
known  as  Hidalgo’s  Revolt  that  set  off  the  revolutionary  process  in  1810.  As  Jaime  
Rodriquez  O.  has  suggested,  it  is  likely  that  the  failed  revolt  the  criollo  (white  colony-­‐‑
born)  priest  Miguel  Hidalgo  y  Costilla  led  against  peninsulares  (metropole-­‐‑born)  elites  
actually  consisted  of  very  few  peasants,  American  Indians,  or  Blacks.  However,  the  
image  of  a  great  peasant  revolt  was  by  the  1840s  prominent  in  politically  contested  
articulations  of  Mexican  identity.  Accounts  of  this  history,  for  different  reasons,  had  
“insisted  that  Indians  dominated  the  insurgent  ranks.”  For  instance,  the  conservative  
historian  Lucas  Alamán  (a  frequent  correspondant  of  Prescott)  had  tried  to  distinguish  
the  independence  of  1821  from  the  earlier  revolt  by  claiming  that  “the  ten  years  war”  
preceding  indepdence  was  an  “effort  in  which  the  intelligent  party  and  property-­‐‑
owners,  united  with  the  Spanish  government,  made  to  repress  the  vandal-­‐‑like  revolution  
which  would  have  destroyed  the  civilization  and  prosperity  of  the  country”  (qtd.  in  
Dysart  120).  In  contrast,  the  famous  “Grito  de  Delores,”  an  unrecorded  speech  Hidalgo  
gave  at  the  outset  of  the  revolt,  has  been  an  ideological  resource  for  liberal  reformers  
and  revolutionaries  looking  to  redefine  power  structures  in  Mexico,  and  played  a  
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prominent  symbolic  role  in  the  political  movements  that  resulted  in  the  Mexican  
Revolution  of  1922.14  Although  in  part  a  historical  myth,  in  the  nineteenth  century  even  
conservatives  like  Alamán  recognized  its  call  for  a  hemispheric  future  that  challenged  
racial  and  property  based  republicanism  established  on  the  U.S.  model.    
   Although  there  is  not  a  direct  link  between  the  pro-­‐‑war  pamphlet  and  images  of  
Hidalgo’s  Revolt,  or  the  guarantee  that  readers  of  the  pamphlet  would  have  recognized  
this  echo,  it  is  worth  viewing  the  pamphlet  as  a  rhetorical  attempt  to  bring  the  futures  
projected  by  such  a  history  under  U.S.  authority.  Even  lacking  this  particular  assocation,  
the  pamphlet  writers  were  drawing  on  dominant  understandings  of  Mexico  as  racially  
hybrid  and  abolitionist.  In  contrast  to  (but  also  in  collaboration  with)  the  image  of  
Mexico  as  racially  debased,  temporally  ambigious,  and  in  need  of  imperial  management,  
the  pamplet  opened  up  another  idea  of  Mexico  as  a  space  that,  once  ordered  by  national  
sovereignty  (and  presumably  its  heirarchies),  contained  potentials  for  solutions  to  
domestic  crises  felt  over  race  and  slavery.  In  suggesting  this,  I  am  not  trying  to  redeem  
the  pamphlet  from  the  charge  of  racial  imperialism,  but  to  show  how  Mexico  not  only  
collected  displaced  U.S.  anxieties  over  its  own  future  but  also  how  the  act  of  conquest  
and  incorporation  became  a  repository  for  fantasies  of  overcoming  these  same  domestic  
crises.  To  answer  my  earlier  question  about  the  role  romantic  history  played  in  
                                                                                                              
14 See, for instance, Suzanne B. Pasztor, The Spirit of Hidalgo (2002), a history of revolutionary activity in 
the northern province of Coahuila. Pasztor traces the symbolic significance of the earlier revolt in the 
province’s “tradition of local autonomy, political independence, and economic self-sufficiency” (30). 
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addressing  the  various  temporal  crises  felt  in  the  domestic  United  States,  I  want  to  
suggest  that  the  romantic  image  of  conquest  produced  in  Prescott’s  history  worked  
alongside  pro-­‐‑war  propoganda  and  other  romantic  texts  about  Mexico  to  supply  
antebellum  imperialism  with  the  imaginative  projection  of  an  action  that  would  purify  
the  temporal  order.15  The  imaginative  displacement  of  temporal  crisis  enabled  the  
subsequent  violent  imposition  of  republican  authority  so  that  both  nations  could  be  
transformed,  securing  the  progressive  future  of  the  hemisphere  (with  the  United  States  
as  it  steward).  Prescott’s  romantic  aesthetic,  in  locating  the  “character”  of  Mexico  in  its  
temporal  dissolution  and  painting  the  conquest  as  a  heroic  action  that  could  bring  
disorganized  space  back  into  the  flow  of  history,  provided  readers  with  imaginative  
experiences  of  heroic  exercises  of  authority  in  shaping  the  future.  This  fantasy  proved  
increasingly  irresistable  to  a  nationalist  public  that  was  confronting  the  loss  of  such  
temporal  guarantees  in  the  disorder  of  slavery  and  imperialism.  
  
                                                                                                              
15 Here we might also think of the novelettes and sensation literature analyzed by Shelley Streeby, Jaime 
Javier Rodríguez, and David Kazanjian, but the first of these works, Harry Hazel’s Inez, the Beautiful; or 
Love on the Rio Grande (1846) was published after the outset of war. In the construction of U.S. ideas 
about Mexico before the war the only literary works that likely compare in influence to Prescott’s history 
were Spanish chronicles, like those of Bernal Díaz, which were the basis for two historical romances set 
during the conquest written by Robert Montgomery Bird: Calavar: or the Knight of the Conquest (1834) 
and The Infidel: or the Fall of Mexico (1835). Prescott’s history was cited as a primary source for two more 
historical romances set during the conquest published in the 1840s, Ingraham’s Montezuma, the Serf; or, 
The Revolt of the Mexitili (1845) and Maturin’s Montezuma, the Last of the Aztecs (1845). We might also 
consider popular travel narratives like Alexander von Humboldt’s many works, Madame Calderón de la 
Barca’s Life in Mexico (translated and published in Boston in 1843), and John Lloyd Stephen’s Incidents of 
Travel in Central America, Chiapas and Yucatán, (1841). For more on the U.S. literary interest in Mexico 
see the aforementioned, Flanagan and Grismer, “Mexico in American Fiction Prior to 1850”; and Iván 
Jaksić, The Hispanic World and American Intellectual Life (2007). 
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Aesthetics, Slavery, Time 
  
   The  highly  unstable  images  of  Mexico—both  enticing  and  repulsive—circulating  
in  and  informing  U.S.  political  debates  around  territorial  expansion  and  the  war  
presented  what  was  to  a  large  degree  an  aesthetic  problem  (which  reflected,  disguised,  
and  distorted  political  crises).  As  I  have  suggested,  Prescott’s  aesthetics  sought  to  make  
visible  in  the  appearance  of  other  times  and  places  their  “character”  and  hence  their  role  
in  the  unfolding  of  providence.  Since  Mexico  could  appear  at  once  like  a  colonial  past,  a  
republican  present,  and  a  future  disordered  by  tyranny,  racial  hybridity,  and  revolt,  its  
image  failed  to  ascribe  to  a  recognizable  position  in  the  spatial  and  temporal  hierarchies  
projected  by  the  providential  vision  of  U.S.  and  republican  futurity.  While  the  images  of  
Mexico  that  circulated  in  political  discourse  were  primarily  fantastic  projections  of  
national  anxieties,  they  attest  to  how  difficult  it  could  be  to  draw  any  coherent  line  
between  domestic  and  international  concerns.  Democrats  and  Whigs  wanted  to  see  
Mexico  as  a  disordered  space  that  could  be  progressively  ordered  through  conquest  or  
kept  definitively  separate  through  consolidation  of  national  boundaries,  but  slavery  and  
its  resistance  could  make  U.S.  space  look  more  like  factionalized  Mexico  while  making  
Mexican  abolition  seem  like  a  desired  national  future.    
Given  such  imaginative  instability,  we  can  read  Prescott’s  historical  romance  of  a  
backwards  empire  liberated  into  progressive  time  by  heroic  and  authoritative  
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conquerors  as  an  enticing  aesthetic  resolution  of  the  crisis  provoked  by  Mexico,  
territorial  expansion,  and  slavery.  Tellingly,  in  order  to  accomplish  a  striking  cathartic  
power,  Prescott  appropriated  a  desire  to  overcome  the  resistance  to  order  posed  by  the  
existence  of  slavery  into  his  portrayal  of  the  conquest  through  frequent  comparisons  of  
Aztec  ritual  sacrifice  to  southern  slavery,  thus  granting  Cortés  the  status  of  an  almost  
mythical  liberator.  At  the  same  time,  the  threats  the  Aztecs  posed  to  the  success  of  the  
Spanish,  and  thus  the  liberation  of  the  continent  into  its  progressive  future,  are  figured  
in  terms  that  relied  on  widespread  fears  about  black  emancipation  and  revolt.  Prescott  
builds  images  that  figure  slavery,  resistance  to  slavery,  and  the  racial  others  who  would  
make  a  claim  as  agents  within  modern  time  as  crises  in  the  temporal  order  that  must  be  
overcome  through  violence  and  conquest.  
   The  overriding  imperative  of  Prescott’s  history  was  to  demonstrate  the  necessity  
of  the  Spanish  Conquest  as  a  condition  for  the  emergence  of  civil  liberty  in  the  New  
World,  and  thereby  raise  the  events  into  a  stable  position  of  legibility  within  the  
spatiotemporal  grid  of  providence  by  portraying  Spanish  and  Aztec  “character.”  So,  
while  he  often  measures  his  praise  of  the  Spanish,  weighing  their  moral  inadequacies  
from  a  nineteenth-­‐‑century  perspective  against  the  worthiness  of  their  underlying  
mission,  he  maintains  a  fundamental  difference  between  the  Spanish  and  the  Aztecs;  
only  the  former  can  carry  forward  providential  time.  Beginning  with  a  long  
ethnographic  section  that  goes  so  far  as  to  celebrate  some  achievements  of  Mexican  
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civilization,  he  repeatedly  works  to  establish  the  limitations  and  relative  degeneracy  of  
the  Aztecs  on  the  eve  of  conquest.  Most  fundamentally  for  Prescott,  the  Aztecs  were  a  
belated  civilization,  inhabiting  the  forms  of  an  earlier  model,  the  Toltecs,  and  were  
unable  to  project  themselves  into  the  future.  He  derives  this  assumption  from  his  
description  of  Aztec  language,  suggesting  that  although  they  produced  abstract  symbols  
of  totality,  such  as  representing  time  as  a  serpent,  they  lacked  the  ability  to  break  that  
time  into  analytical  units.  16  As  a  result,  they  imagined  time  as  cyclical  and  turning  back  
on  itself,  rather  than  linear  and  progressive.  Their  temporal  character  presented  itself  
through  this  manner  of  cultural  expression.  
For  Prescott,  such  a  temporal  imagination  captured  the  essence  of  Aztec  
limitations;  they  looked  backwards  rather  than  forwards  and  were  unable  to  advance  
beyond  a  form  of  civilization  that  had  reached  its  height  centuries  before  the  arrival  of  
Cortés.  In  other  words,  Prescott’s  Aztecs  seemed  to  reflect  growing  Whig  fears  about  
backward  progress.  The  text  generates  a  number  of  structural  associations  between  
Aztec  Mexico  and  trends  in  antebellum  America  that  Prescott  feared  augured  a  temporal  
crisis,  including  the  suggestion  that  the  Aztec  conquest  of  neighboring  states  was  a  
source  of  their  downfall;  a  parallel  between  the  Aztecs’  inhabitation  of  the  antedated  
cultural  forms  of  the  Toltecs  and  the  antebellum  South’s  investment  in  aristocratic  
                                                                                                              
16 Eric Wertheimer has been particularly attentive to how Prescott uses the Aztec hieroglyphic as an 
emblem of a potential for rational advancement that the racialized and feminized Aztecs are unable to 
activate, necessitating the conquest and providing Prescott with a justification for his visually iconographic 
descriptions of Aztec civilization. See his Imagined Empires (1999). 
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privilege  and  honor;  and  most  importantly,  an  explicit  comparison  between  ritual  
sacrifice  and  antebellum  slavery.  These  were  both  systems  that,  according  to  Prescott,  
“spread  the  gloom  of  superstition  over  the  domestic  hearth  until  the  character  of  the  
nation  wore  a  grave  and  even  melancholy  aspect”(Mexico  97).    
   In  establishing  this  comparison,  ritual  sacrifice  was  an  irresistible  image  for  
Prescott:  it  provided  exotic  and  romantic  thrills,  referenced  Aztec  investments  in  cyclical  
time  and  necessity  of  the  conquest,  and  helped  construct  his  readers  as  sympathetic  
towards  the  Spanish  by  establishing  parallels  to  contemporary  slavery.  Take  this  early  
description  of  the  ritual:  
On  the  evening  of  the  last  day,  a  procession  of  priests,  assuming  the  dress  and  
ornament  of  their  gods,  moved  from  the  capital,  towards  a  lofty  mountain,  about  
two  leagues  distant.    They  carried  with  them  a  noble  victim,  the  flower  of  their  
captives,  and  an  apparatus  for  kindling  the  new  fire,  the  success  of  which  was  an  
augury  of  the  renewal  of  the  cycle.    On  reaching  the  summit  of  the  mountain,  the  
procession  paused  till  midnight;  when,  as  the  constellation  of  the  Pleiades  
approached  the  zenith,  the  new  fire  was  kindled  by  the  friction  of  the  sticks  
placed  on  the  wounded  breast  of  the  victim.    The  flame  was  soon  communicated  
to  a  funeral  pile,  on  which  the  body  of  the  slaughtered  captive  was  thrown.  As  
the  light  streamed  up  towards  heaven,  shouts  of  joy  and  triumph  burst  forth  
from  the  countless  multitudes  who  covered  the  terraces  of  the  temple,  and  the  
house-­‐‑tops,  with  eyes  anxiously  bent  on  the  mount  of  sacrifice.  Couriers,  with  
torches  lighted  at  the  blazing  beacon,  rapidly  bore  them  over  every  part  of  the  
country  and  the  cheering  element  was  seen  brightening  on  altar  and  hearth-­‐‑
stone,  for  the  circuit  of  many  a  league,  long  before  the  sun,  rising  on  its  
accustomed  track,  gave  assurances  that  a  new  cycle  had  commenced  its  march,  
and  that  the  laws  of  nature  were  not  to  be  reversed  for  the  Aztecs.  (73)  
  
The  implicitly  iterative  description—the  last  day  being  the  last  day  of  a  regular  
festival—alerts  us  to  the  conception  of  time  at  work.  The  ritual  is  one  of  cyclical  renewal,  
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which,  for  the  Aztecs  ensures  the  continuation  of  the  normal  “laws  of  nature,”  (likely  an  
ironic  description,  calling  attention  to  the  ritual’s  absurdity  in  light  of  scientific  
knowledge).  However,  Prescott  isolates  the  regularity  of  the  practice  and  describes  it  as  
witnessed  in  a  single  instance.  Although  priest  and  captive  are  typical  roles,  Prescott  
singles  them  out  by  description—the  “flower  of  the  captives”—and  then  moves  into  a  
single  instance:  the  fire  was  kindled,  it  “was  soon  communicated  to  the  pyre.”  These  
literal  descriptions  then  give  way  to  expressionistic  painting:  “the  light  streamed  
upward  toward  heaven  […]  with  eyes  anxiously  bent  on  the  mount  of  sacrifice.”  A  
linear  temporality  of  witnessing  a  singular  instance  of  a  striking  spectacle  frames  the  
cyclical  temporality  of  the  experience  for  Aztec  participants.    
Prescott  writes  the  ritual  into  an  aesthetic  experience  that  can  be  consumed  as  an  
image  by  a  reader  for  its  (conventional)  associations  with  terror,  wonder,  and  fear.  
Prescott’s  description  raises  these  associations  to  the  level  of  a  universal,  impartial  
experience,  thus  addressing  his  reader  as  an  inhabitant  of  linear  time  perceiving  events  
in  Mexico  as  temporal  perversions.  The  aesthetic  image  corroborates  a  norm  for  reading  
Aztec  culture’s  position  in  a  spatiotemporal  grid  of  appearances;  Prescott  made  pre-­‐‑
Columbian  America  visible  as  a  time  in  subordination  to  and  deviance  from  U.S.  
futurity.  The  parallel  between  the  ritual  and  antebellum  slavery  (which  Prescott  
references  throughout  the  text)  enables  readers  to  experience  a  temporally  stable  
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position  from  which  to  witness  ancient  (and  contemporary)  crises  as  temporary  
perversions  and  not  fundamental  disruptions.  
   I  describe  the  desire  Prescott  encodes  into  his  text  in  these  moments  as  
envisioning  an  overcoming  of  “resistance  to  order”  to  draw  attention  to  the  fact  that,  
although  a  believer  in  gradual  emancipation,  Prescott  was  hardly  an  abolitionist,  and  
like  other  conservative  Whigs  could  be  just  as  disturbed  by  the  fiery  rhetoric  of  the  
“conscious”  branch  of  U.S.  politics  as  by  slavery  itself.  In  an  important  Whig  party  
newspaper,  Daniel  Bernard  frequently  called  all  abolitionists  “fanatics,”  and  suggested  
that,  although  “we  may  regard  slavery  to  be  as  great  an  evil  as  we  can  well  imagine,  still  
even  in  the  most  frightful  picture  of  the  most  exaggerating  abolitionists,  it  is  not  to  be  
placed  on  the  scale  with  the  demoralizing  effects”  of  the  abolitionists’  attempt  to  place  
moral  conscience  above  “the  sanctions  of  political  oaths”  (xx).  While  it  is  possible  to  read  
Prescott’s  invocation  of  southern  slavery  in  his  description  of  Aztec  civilization  as  an  
attempt  to  teach  his  audience  about  the  incommensurability  of  these  practices  with  
republican  modernity,  it  does  not  suggest  that  he  accepted  the  rights  and  freedoms  
claimed  for  the  enslaved  by  radical  abolitionists.  Rather,  he  collapsed  the  temporal  
character  of  slavery  and  the  forces  that  resisted  slavery  in  his  aesthetic  portrayal  of  Aztec  
resistance  to  progress.  
Jacques  Rancière’s  reassessment  of  the  interrelation  of  politics  and  aesthetics  
helps  us  understand  the  political  stakes  of  Prescott’s  temporal  conflation  of  sacrifice,  
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slavery,  and  resistance  in  his  aesthetic  images.  In  a  number  of  recent  works,  Rancière  has  
suggested  that  politics  consists  of  negotiations  and  conflicts  over  what  he  calls  the  
“distribution  of  the  sensible.”  In  the  normal  political  order  this  consists  of  “the  
configuration  of  a  specific  space,  the  framing  of  a  particular  sphere  of  existance,  of  
objects  posited  as  common  and  as  pertaining  to  common  decisions,  of  subjects  
recognized  as  capable  of  designating  these  objects  and  putting  forth  arguments  about  
them”  (Aesthetics  and  its  Discontents  24).  In  the  context  of  the  racial  regimes  of  antebellum  
America,  Rancière’s  language  is  suggestive.  Dana  Nelson  has  argued  that  white  
republican  subjects  frequently  experienced  their  own  political  agency  in  their  capacity  to  
“designate”  and  “put  forth  arguments”  about  a  particular  category  of  objects—women,  
slaves  and  other  racially-­‐‑marked  populations.  While  Rancière  never  directly  articulates  
the  question  of  race,  the  resonance  continues  in  his  description  of  the  political  order’s  
perception  of  a  distinction  between  speech  and  voice:  “but  the  whole  question  [of  the  
political]  then  is  to  know  who  possesses  speech  and  who  merely  possesses  voice.  For  all  
time,  the  refusal  to  consider  certain  categories  of  people  as  political  beings  has  
proceeded  by  means  of  a  refusal  to  hear  the  words  exiting  their  mouths  as  discourse”  
(Aesthetics  and  its  Discontents  24).17  Under  the  normal  coordinates  of  sensory  experience  
of  the  political  order  in  the  United  States  it  was  not  only  slaves  and  free  blacks  who  were  
                                                                                                              
17 In a number of recent essays Nancy Bentley has utilized Rancière’s conceptualization of the relation 
between the political and the aesthetic to think about artistic responses to U.S. racial regimes, see her “The 
Fourth Dimension” (2009), and “Warped Conjunctions” (2012). 
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deprived  of  voice,  but  an  entire  realm  of  discourse  associated  with  resistance  to  slavery  
that,  through  the  1830s,  had  been  literally  “gagged”  in  formal  political  space.  I  am  
referring  here  to  the  gag  rule  that  had  prevented  the  reading  of  antislavery  petitions  in  
House  of  Representatives  from  1836-­‐‑1844.  Under  this  political  “distribution  of  the  
sensible,”  slavery  itself  was  made  politically  invisible,  even  as  it  wieghed  as  a  crisis  on  
the  constitutional  order,  and  citizenship  was  established  on  the  basis  of  designating  
those  silent  or  muted  bodies  as  lying  outside  of  political  space.  
   Conservative  Whigs  like  Prescott  perceived  abolitionist  speech  not  as  an  
articulate  political  position,  but  merely  as  a  disruptive  sound  that  threatened  the  
forward  momentum  of  the  progress.  It  was  not  only  the  power  of  southern  slave-­‐‑owners  
that  threatened  progress,  but  also  the  disorder  provoked  by  the  resistance  to  slavery—
both  in  domestic  political  movements  and  the  political  upheavals  of  Haiti  or  Mexico—
that  upended  the  dominant  distrubution  of  political  space  (as  a  place  where  white  men  
designated  and  debated  over  black  bodies).  For  such  a  conservative  vision,  the  problem  
with  the  sensible  was  not  its  distributed  order,  but  that  the  intelligible  speech  of  national  
political  subjects  could  be  overwhelmed  by  the  disruptions  of  anti-­‐‑slavery  and  
emancipation;  white  men  could  be  shouted  down,  slaves  could  flee  and  revolt,  and  
political  space  could  be  inhabited  by  non-­‐‑white  representatives  from  spaces  beyond  
national  sovereignty.  Although  Rancière  understands  the  aesthetic’s  ability  to  re-­‐‑order  
the  sensible  as  a  potential  for  radical  politics,  in  Prescott’s  history  we  have  a  
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conservative  aesthetic  in  images  of  providential  time  effecting  the  transcendence  of  
historical  actors  from  such  disorder.  The  “beauty”  Prescott  produces  in  his  romantic  
images  is  that  of  the  progressive  unveiling  of  the  antebellum  political  order  from  the  
morally  messy  conditions  of  the  period  of  the  conquest.  To  achieve  this  effect  he  
appropriated  some  of  the  force  of  anti-­‐‑slavery,  not  to  endorse  abolition,  but  to  overcome  
the  disruptions  slavery  and  resistance  to  slavery  made  apparent  in  republican  order.  His  
romance  also  entailed  the  creation  of  images  of  reactionary  violence  against  racially-­‐‑
marked  bodies  that  he  figured  as  depositories  of  the  forces  inadmissable  in  U.S.  futurity.  
Scholars  have  long  recognized  that  Prescott’s  narrative  art  relied  on  stark  
juxtapositions  between  civilization  and  savagery—a  feature  most  prominent  in  his  many  
vivid  descriptions  of  battle.18  However,  beyond  the  general  framework  of  Enlightenment  
and  Romantic  racism,  Prescott  specifically  incorporated  racial  fears  of  the  antebellum  
period,  utilizing  crises  occasioned  by  shared  embodiment  to  reveal  the  transcendent  
entrance  of  providence  into  human  affairs.  His  aesthetic  incorporation  of  antebellum  
crises  over  resistance  to  slavery  and  racial  republicanism  is  most  prominent  in  his  use  of  
the  aforementioned  distinction  between  speech  and  voice  in  his  representation  of  
conflict  between  the  Spanish  and  the  Aztecs,  as  in  the  following  passage:  
On  they  came  like  an  avalanche,  or  mountain  torrent,  shaking  the  solid  earth,  
and  sweeping  away  every  obstacle  in  its  path.  The  little  army  of  Spaniards  
opposed  a  bold  front  to  the  overwhelming  mass.  But  no  strength  could  
                                                                                                              
18 See Levin, History as Romantic Art. 
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withstand  it.  They  faltered,  gave  way,  were  borne  along  before  it,  and  their  ranks  
were  broken  and  thrown  in  disorder.  It  was  in  vain,  the  general  called  on  them  to  
close  again  and  rally.  His  voice  drowned  by  the  din  of  fight  and  fierce  cries  of  the  
assailants.  For  a  moment,  it  seemed  that  all  was  lost.  The  tide  of  the  battle  turned  
against  them,  and  the  fate  of  the  Christians  was  sealed.  But  every  man  had  that  
within  his  bosom,  which  spoke  louder  than  the  voice  of  the  general.  Despair  gave  
unnatural  energy  to  his  arm.  The  naked  body  of  the  Indian  afforded  no  resistance  
to  the  sharp  Toledo  steel;  and  with  their  good  swords,  the  Spanish  infantry  at  
length  succeeded  in  staying  the  human  torrent.  The  heavy  guns  from  a  distance  
thundered  on  the  flank  of  the  assailants,  which  shaken  by  the  iron  tempest,  was  
thrown  in  disorder.  Their  very  numbers  increased  the  confusion,  as  they  were  
precipitated  on  the  masses  in  front.  The  horses  at  the  same  moment,  charging  
gallantly  under  Cortés,  followed  up  the  advantage,  and  at  length  compelled  the  
tumultuous  throng  to  fall  back  with  greater  precipitation  and  disorder  than  that  
with  which  they  had  advanced.  (238)  
  
Stripped  of  their  semi-­‐‑civilized  cultural  forms,  the  Aztecs  become  mere  bodies  in  this  
violently  racist  passage,  as  Prescott’s  agitatedly  shifts  between  the  descriptions  of  the  
meaningless  but  threatening  noise  of  the  Aztec  force  and  the  supplication  of  these  
racialized  bodies  to  Spanish  violence.  The  Aztecs  become  a  tumultuous  mass  
naturalized  through  metaphor  while  the  voice  of  the  white  commander,  portrayed  as  a  
force  of  order  threatened  by  the  noise  of  resistant  bodies  but  supported  by  a  more  
fundamental  transcendental  “voice”  grants  the  Spanish  the  moral  authority  to  carry  
forward  providence  against  these  threats  progress.  This  racialization  draws  on  
antebellum  fears  that  saw  black  rebellion  and  emancipation  as  violent  ruptures  in  the  
progress  of  civilization.    
In  the  early  antebellum  era,  the  Haitian  Revolution  was  a  well  remarked  upon  
and  widely  known  event  and  there  were  numerous  written  accounts  in  circulation.  This  
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literature  was  dominated  by  a  picture  derived  from  the  writings  of  Bryan  Edwards,  a  
Jamaican  slave-­‐‑owner,  who  published  an  account  of  the  revolution  while  it  was  still  in  
its  early  stages  under  the  title  An  Historical  Survey  of  the  French  Colony  in  the  Island  of  St.  
Domingue  (1794).  In  it,  he  describes  “the  enormities  of  the  negroes  in  the  northern  
provinces,”  who  had  “butchered  [the  whites]  without  distinction  […]  murdering  the  
men  and  ravishing  unfortunate  women  who  fell  into  their  hands”  (349).  Edwards  wrote  
about  these  events  as  a  demonstration  of    “the  sanguinary  spirit  of  revenge  which  
characterizes  the  debased  actions  of  a  slave,  and  which  the  most  ardent  advocate  for  
liberty  must  condemn  and  deplore,”  and  closed  with  the  suggestion  that:    
Experience  has  shown  us,  that  emancipation,  though  requisite  to  make  men  
dignified  and  good,  will  not  operate  without  other  means  to  sublimate  human  
nature.  The  Maroon  negroes  of  Jamaica  […]  are  not  the  slaves  of  white  men,  but  
they  are  still  savages  in  the  midst  of  polished  society;  and  what  these  are  now,  it  
is,  alas!  to  be  feared  that  the  negroes  of  St.  Domingo  will  hereafter  be.  (373-­‐‑348)  
  
In  the  words  of  the  historian  Matthew  Clavin,  Edwards  “provided  the  text  for  images  of  
the  revolution  that  would  haunt  generations  of  American  slave  owners”  (12).  The  text  
also  prefigures  the  violent  temporal  rupture  that  would  continue  to  mark  images  of  
slave  revolt  throughout  the  antebellum  period  (a  topic  to  be  discussed  at  length  in  the  
following  chapter).  In  such  images,  the  normal  effect  of  liberty  on  the  development  of  
man  towards  civilization  is  interrupted  by  the  “debased”  and  “sanguinary”  violence  of  
the  slave.  Communities  like  those  in  Haiti  or  Maroon  Jamaica  were  frequently  portrayed  
as  having  broken  away  from  the  terms  of  modern  freedom  to  live  in  static  savagery  with  
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dire  consequences  for  the  lives  and  property  of  white  subjects  and  for  the  progress  of  
civilization  itself.  Adaptations  of  this  version  of  the  events  in  Haiti  circulated  in  a  
number  of  widely  read  historical  texts,  including  Sir  Archibald  Alison’s  History  of  Europe  
(1842),  and  it  would  be  invoked  repeatedly  in  accounts  of  slave  revolts,  such  as  Samuel  
Warner’s  “Authentic  and  Impartial  Narrative”(1831)  of  Nat  Turner’s  rebellion.19  
Prescott  distilled  these  fears  into  the  image  of  the  naturalized  resistance  of  
racialized  bodies  to  the  progressive  time  introduced  by  the  Spanish.  In  the  face  of  this  
threat,  Cortés’s  speech  strives  to  single  out  the  Spanish  and  enable  them  to  push  forward  
out  of  the  tumult  and  generate  political  and  temporal  order.  However,  because  Prescott  
wanted  to  write  the  conquest  as  more  than  just  the  victory  of  military  force,  the  
embodied  conditions  of  Cortés’s  speech  has  its  own  limitations.  The  necessity  that  
Cortés  be  heard  by  those  he  wants  to  command  for  his  speech  to  order  the  scene  of  
temporal  progress  allows  the  Aztecs  to  begin  to  overwhelm  the  Spanish.  The  dramatic  
tension  of  the  scene  ensures  that  the  threat  of  shared  embodiment  gets  pushed  until  the  
revelation  of  a  transcendental,  primary  voice  of  order  within  the  Spanish  (as  agents  of  
the  will  of  providence)  redeems  the  scene  from  chaos  and  confines  disorder  to  the  
racially  marked  objects  of  aestheticized  violence.  Prescott  confronts  antebellum  images  
                                                                                                              
19 Clavin quotes this pamphlet at length in his study of the imaginative role of the Haitian Revolution 
during the Civil War: “In consequence of the alarming increase of the Black population at the South, fears 
have long been entertained, that it might one day be the unhappy lot of the whites, in that section, to 
witness scenes similar to those which but a few years since, nearly depopulated the once flourishing island 
of St. Domingue” (15).  
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of  racial  rebellion  as  a  source  of  possibly  apocalyptic  disorder  to  add  cathartic  weight  to  
the  emergence  of  providence  in  his  romantic  images  of  history.  In  doing  so  he  
reproduces  the  dominant  political  aesthetic  of  the  antebellum  U.S.  by  portraying  a  white  
man’s  voice  as  giving  order  to  racialized  bodies  excluded  from  political  time  and  space.    
The  text’s  aesthetic  force  in  revealing  the  triumph  of  progress  depends  on  the  
reiteration  of  descriptions  of  the  Spanish  overcoming  threats  through  their  ability  to  
hear  a  transcendental  voice.  Again  and  again,  the  Aztecs’  embodied  power  to  
overwhelm  Cortés’s  ordering  speech  generates  moments  of  crisis.  When,  on  the  death  of  
Montezuma,  the  Spanish  cavaliers  are  surrounded  by  the  furious  Aztecs  looking  to  
avenge  the  insults  of  the  occupation  of  the  capital,  Cortés  attempts  to  threaten  the  mass  
into  allowing  the  Spanish  to  exit  the  city,  exclaiming  that  if  they  do  not  clear  the  way  “I  
will  make  your  city  a  heap  of  ruins!”  This  speech  is  ineffective  because,  as  Prescott  
writes,  “calm  in  their  exterior  and  slow  to  move,  they  were  more  difficult  to  pacify  when  
roused;  and  now  that  they  had  been  stirred  to  their  inmost  depths,  it  was  no  human  
voice  that  could  still  the  tempest”  (428).  Again,  the  civilized  exterior  of  the  Aztecs  gives  
way  to  the  fundamental  racial  “naturalness”  that,  in  its  ability  to  overpower  Spanish  
speech,  threatens  the  emerging  providential  order.  The  resilience  of  the  Spanish  and  
their  ability  to  at  last  overcome  and  escape  the  capital  to  return  and  conquer  the  resistant  
Aztecs  is  again  attributed  to  the  guarantees  of  something  beyond  the  embodied  
limitations  of  their  speech.    
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In  calling  attention  to  the  limits  of  embodiment,  the  text  discloses  the  
dependency  of  Prescott’s  vision  of  providence  on  violence  and  racial  subjugation.  
Because  Prescott  could  only  figure  the  emergence  of  providence  in  a  bifurcated  
depiction  of  the  transcendent  and  violent  ordering  of  embodied  resistance,  the  only  
mechanism  he  gives  the  Spanish  for  becoming  agents  of  progressive  time  is  the  violent  
suppression  of  those  who  have  to  become  (in  the  text’s  representational  norms)  merely  
bodies  without  a  capacity  for  futurity.  The  aesthetic  power  of  the  text  to  give  appearance  
to  providence  depends  on  reducing  the  Aztecs  from  a  semi-­‐‑civilized  empire  to  mere  
containers  of  non-­‐‑transcendent  embodiment,  unable  to  hear  “providence”  without  first  
being  subjugated  within  Spanish  civilizational  order.  In  these  moments,  the  Aztecs  are  
transformed  into  rebellious  slaves,  threatening  the  national  future  with  their  tumultuous  
resistance  to  a  progressive  order.  Since  the  text’s  aesthetics  needs  to  enact  hierarchies  of  
the  transcendent  over  the  embodied  to  generate  images  of  providential  “beauty,”  it  is  
dependent,  despite  its  anti-­‐‑slavery  sympathies,  on  the  most  reactionary  imagination  of  
racial  order  and  disorder  that  was  available  to  antebellum  writers.  In  revealing  the  racial  
and  imperial  subjugation  that  underwrites  visions  of  providential  time,  these  images  
also  attest  to  the  insubstantiality  of  any  metaphysical  claims  to  ground  civic  liberty  to  be  
anything  more  than  justifications  for  violence.  Thus,  the  text  inadvertently  reflects  how  
radical  abolitionist  and  black  resistance  against  slavery  had  disrupted  the  moral  
hegemonies  of  U.S.  racial  republicanism.  In  temporally  flattening  his  portrait  of  the  
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Aztecs  in  his  battle  scenes  to  imagine  then  as  nothing  other  than  a  threat  to  future  
progress,  Prescott’s  aesthetic  production  of  Aztec  blackness  incorporates  and  disavows  
the  racial  antagonisms  that  abolitionists  would  identify  as  fundamental  to  U.S.  ideas  of  
progress.  
   The  final  defeat  of  the  Aztecs  comes  in  the  form  of  an  image  that  figuratively  
liberates  Mexico  from  ritual  sacrifice.  Symbolic  of  both  the  defeat  of  a  backwards  
barbarism  and  the  racial  eruptions  that  threatened  the  future  order,  Prescott’s  text  
provided  antebellum  readers  with  the  cathartic  experience  of  resolving  the  sense  of  
national  temporal  disorder  that  had  been  affectively  associated  with  slavery  and  anti-­‐‑
slavery  resistance.  As  Cortés  conquers  the  capital,  Prescott  describes  the  destruction  of  
the  grand  temple  thus:    
With  shouts  of  triumph  the  Christians  tore  the  uncouth  monster  from  his  niche,  
and  tumbled  him,  in  the  presence  of  the  horror-­‐‑struck  Aztecs,  down  the  steps  of  
the  teocalli.  They  then  set  fire  to  the  accursed  building.  The  flames  speedily  ran  
up  the  slender  towers,  sending  forth  an  ominous  light  over  the  city,  lake,  and  
valley,  to  the  remotest  hut  among  the  mountains.  It  was  the  funereal  pyre  of  
Paganism,  and  proclaimed  the  fall  of  the  sanguinary  religion,  which  had  so  long  
hung  like  a  dark  cloud  over  the  fair  regions  of  Anahuac.  (427)  
  
Revising  the  language  of  the  previously  cited  description  of  a  ritual  sacrifice,  Prescott  
writes  this  moment  as  a  message  transmitted  throughout  the  Mexican  valley  by  way  of  
symbols  of  fire  and  light.  Where  the  completion  of  the  sacrifice  in  the  opening  chapters  
of  the  book  signaled  an  iterative  renewal  of  the  Aztec  calendar  cycle  and  was  written  as  
a  typical  occurrence,  the  destruction  of  the  temple  is  here  given  as  a  singular  event.  In  it,  
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Prescott  presented  the  powerfully  cathartic  image  of  the  passing  of  a  “barbaric”  practice  
from  the  continent  in  the  spectacular  destruction  of  the  scene  of  its  ritual  entrenchment;  
an  event  that  would  be  experienced  by  readers  as  freeing  the  hemisphere  from  the  
decayed  time  of  the  Mexican  past  and  bringing  it  into  the  Christian  progressive  future.    
Such  images  are  what  made  romantic  history  so  compelling  to  antebellum  
readers;  in  the  face  of  crises  and  threats  that  looked  and  felt  like  those  encountered  by  
the  antebellum  nation,  Prescott’s  images  provided  an  experience  of  the  dramatic  
unveiling  of  an  underlying  progressive  order  in  “heroic”  action.  Yet,  despite  the  
appropriation  of  anti-­‐‑slavery  language  to  describe  the  ritual,  Prescott’s  imagined  and  
desired  vision  of  providence  was  not  in  redress  or  resistance  to  antebellum  racial  orders.  
It  reflected  a  conservative  view  of  slavery,  racial  revolt,  and  abolition  as  linked  sources  
of  instability  in  providential  time  and  it  relied  on  images  of  violent  racial  subjugation  to  
ensure  its  readers  of  the  necessity  and  inevitability  of  progress  and  order.  Thus,  
Prescott’s  aesthetics  provided  an  outlet  for  widespread  anxieties  about  time,  slavery  and  
imperialism  in  a  romance  of  conquest.  
The  aesthetics  of  romantic  history  was  a  product  of  historians’  vision  of  the  
triumph  of  linear  progress  over  challenges  to  the  national  future.  Central  to  these  crises  
was  the  problem  of  slavery  and  antislavery  resistance  to  American  imperialist  ordering  
of  the  hemispheric  future.  Prescott  resolved  this  problem  through  a  racial  aesthetic  that  
used  blackness  to  portray  everything  that  had  to  be  suppressed  to  ensure  the  
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progressive  future.  Thus,  blackness  was  structurally  intrinsic  to  the  aesthetic  
representation  of  progress  as  an  excess  to  the  temporal  order  that  had  to  be  continually  
contained.  Abolitionists  and  anti-­‐‑slavery  writers  looking  to  recover  histories  of  black  
freedom  that  had  been  omitted  from  racist  historiography  had  to  confront  the  aesthetic  
problem  posed  by  romantic  history.  Although  they  often  wrote  romantically  to  describe  
the  resistance  of  slaves  to  oppression  and  the  growth  of  black  participation  in  an  already  
defined  political  and  economic  modernity,  a  violent  opposition  to  black  freedom  
structured  the  aesthetic  norms  these  historians  drew  on  to  envision  progress.  In  the  next  
chapter,  I  take  up  a  series  of  writers  who  either  recognized  the  position  of  blackness  and  
slavery  in  historical  aesthetics  or  came  to  upend  those  norms  in  the  act  of  writing  black  
history  (although  not  always  in  its  initial  framework  or  conception).  More  than  just  a  
problem  of  narratives  of  nationally  or  racially  exclusionary  progress  that  had  to  be  
revised  with  new  research,  the  aesthetics  of  history  were  an  important  field  for  black  
writers  to  contest  black  exclusion  from  history  and  to  challenge  political  visions  of  time  
and  modernity.
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3. Abolitionist History and the Aesthetics of Slave Revolution. 
Speaking  of  marks,  traces,  possible,  and  probabilities,  we  come  before  our  
readers.    
–Frederick  Douglass,  “The  Heroic  Slave”  (1852)  
  
It  is  said  that  the  satirists  of  Paris  had  christened  Toussaint,  the  Black  Napoleon;  
and  Bonaparte  hated  his  black  shadow.  
–Wendell  Phillips,  “Toussaint  L’Ouverture”  (1863)  
  
After  returning  to  the  United  States  following  discussions  with  Haiti’s  Emperor,  
Faustin  Solouque,  over  the  possibility  of  African-­‐‑American  emigration  to  the  island  
nation,  the  black  abolitionist  James  Theodore  Holly  was  enflamed  with  the  desire  to  
share  his  experience  of  a  black  government  with  his  companions  in  the  struggle  against  
slavery.  A  correspondent  for  Henry  Bibb’s  newspaper,  The  Voice  of  the  Fugitive,  and  
decided  emigrationist,  Holly  had  spent  a  number  of  years  with  fugitive  slave  
communities  in  Canada  and  participated  in  National  Emigration  Conventions  through  
the  1850s  helping  to  articulate  the  potential  for  black  self-­‐‑government  and  progress.  
Following  his  visit  in  1855  he  composed  a  lecture,  later  printed  and  widely  distributed  in  
abolitionist  circles,  that  described  the  history  of  Haiti  since  the  revolution,  its  “civilized  
progress,”  the  evidence  it  gave  of  black  achievement,  and  the  opportunity  it  provided  
for  those  willing  to  throw  off  America’s  chains  and  emigrate—which  Holly  himself  did  
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in  1861.1  While  it  is  important  to  acknowledge  the  limits  of  Holly’s  picture  of  Haiti—his  
romanticizing  of  its  then  government,  his  ignorance  (strategic  or  otherwise)  of  the  deep-­‐‑
seated  divisions  in  Haiti  between  state  elites  and  the  mass  of  peasants—he  nevertheless  
found  in  Haiti  a  powerful  symbol  for  U.S.  abolitionism:  a  black  nation  that  had  
established  self-­‐‑government  and  a  degree  of  economic  and  industrial  modernization.2  In  
other  words,  an  embodiment  of  the  very  romantic  idea  of  progress  that  had  developed  
out  of  America’s  own  travails  with  expansion,  industrialization,  and  slavery  during  the  
era  of  the  Great  Transformation.  
Holly’s  rhetoric  is  rich  with  the  figures  and  tropes  of  romantic  history.  He  
describes  the  emergence  of  Haiti  as  an  unprecedented  event  in  the  history  of  freedom:  
“never  before,  in  all  the  annals  of  the  world’s  history,  did  a  nation  of  abject  and  chattel  
slaves  arise  in  terrific  might  of  their  resuscitated  manhood”  (264)  and  as  “a  practical  
vantage  ground  which  Providence  has  raised  up  for  us  out  of  the  depths  of  the  sea”  
(279).3    Its  national  heroes,  Toussaint  Louverture  and  Dessalines,  were  “godlike”  and  
                                                                                                              
1  Details  on  the  occasion  of  Holly’s  lecture  and  pamphlet  are  drawn  from  Pamphlets  of  Protest  (2001),  ed.  
Richard  Newman,  Patrick  Rae  and  Philip  Lapsansky.  
  
2  Two  important  works  on  that  deal  with  the  economic  and  political  conditions  in  Haiti  throughout  the  
nineteenth-­‐‑century  (and  demonstrate  the  limits  of  abolitionists’  romanticization)  are  Michel  Rolph-­‐‑
Troulloit’s  Haiti:  State  Against  Nation  (1990)  and  Laurent  Dubois’  Haiti:  The  Aftershocks  of  History  (2012).  
  
3  The  language  here  is  striking  in  its  ambivalence  between  the  figures  and  metaphysics  of  masculine  
progress  and  the  instantaneous,  almost  Lazarean,  rising  of  Haiti  from  the  sea.  Even  this  rhetorically  
romantic  and,  in  many  ways,  liberal  and  progressive  text  contains  irruptions  of  the  submarine  sources  of  
black  political  life  generated  from  its  exclusions  from  historicity,  subjectivity,  and  the  destruction  of  the  
middle  passage.  
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“heroic”  during  the  revolution  and  demonstrated  acuity  at  law  and  advancement  of  its  
population  in  the  aftermath,  “demonstrating  that  the  negro  in  independence  could  carry  
forward  measures  of  industry  for  his  own  benefit  as  well  as  for  whites”  (275).  Holly  
connected  heroic  and  romantic  appearances,  figures,  and  events,  to  descriptions  of  the  
advancement  and  binding  of  the  state  by  law  and  industry.  His  sketch  builds  toward  a  
description  of  the  sometimes-­‐‑monarchical  government  of  Haiti  as  a  beacon  of  liberty,  
more  respectful  of  personal  independence  than  the  United  States  and  its  multitude  of  
private  despots.  He  adapted  historical  aesthetics  to  generate  an  image  of  futurity  that  
subtly,  but  irrevocably  casts  a  shadow  on  U.S.  nationalism,  even  as  he  gets  caught  in  the  
eddies  of  romanticism  to  announce  the  future  he  desires  as  a  singular  work  of  progress,  
grounded  by  a  revolutionary  past.  Both  at  odds  with  U.S.  racial  republicanism  and  
reproducing  its  imperial  tropes  by  way  of  black  nationalism,  Holly’s  lecture  
demonstrates  the  power  of  romanticism  at  both  displacing  and  revealing  the  political  
contradictions  of  the  antebellum  era’s  visions  of  the  future.  
This  chapter  turns  to  a  series  of  more  or  less  ambivalent  responses  to  and  
adaptions  of  the  aesthetics  of  romantic  history  written  throughout  the  militant  period  of  
abolitionism  in  the  lead-­‐‑up  to  the  Civil  War.4  It  makes  two  central  arguments.  First,  
romantic  history  shaped  the  discourse  even  of  those  who  announced  a  profound  
                                                                                                              
4  In  distinguishing  a  militant  period  of  abolitionism  I  am  harkening  back  to  Benjamin  Quarles  argument  that  
after  1830  or  so,  black  abolitionism  had  become  less  obsequious  in  tone  as  it  broke  from  white-­‐‑led  
organizations  like  the  American  Colonization  Society,  and  articulated  its  own  set  of  desires  and  priorities,  
addressing  a  larger  black  literate  audience.  See,  Quarles  The  Black  Abolitionists  (1969).  
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skepticism  about  its  central  claims.  The  abolitionist  William  J.  Watkins,  Harriet  Beecher  
Stowe,  and  Herman  Melville  assert  that  a  nation  in  which  slavery  is  legal  could  never  be  
beautiful.  Watkins  and  Stowe  do  this  directly,  and  Melville  through  his  literary  irony.  
But  each  writer  winds  up  reproducing  a  desire  for  a  connection  between  beautiful  
images  and  historical  progress  and  thus  fails  to  imagine  a  future  effectively  at  odds  with  
romantic  imperialism.    
My  second  argument  is  that  a  number  of  black  abolitionist  historians  nonetheless  
developed  a  more  heterochronic  vision  of  time  and  freedom  at  the  level  of  image,  
rhetoric  and  affect—albeit  one  still  framed  as  a  romantic  metanarrative.  The  different  
forms  of  temporality  evidenced  by  these  works  emerged  both  from  the  struggle  to  
articulate  the  experience  of  slavery—the  repetitious  and  cyclical  temporality  of  labor  
that  has  been  described  by  Lloyd  Pratt—and  the  growing  insufficiency  of  the  concept  of  
“progress”  for  portraying  the  achievements  of  abolitionism  up  to  that  point  in  history.5  
                                                                                                              
5  Lloyd  Pratt  has  described  the  “labor  time”  of  slavery  in  an  essay  “Progress,  Labor,  Revolution:  The  Modern  
Times  of  African  American  Life  Writing”  as  the  “experience  of  labor  under  slavery  that  makes  time  itself  
repetitive,  circular:  time  is  structured  by  the  calendar  of  capital  accumulation  and  the  strength  of  the  seed;  it  
is  not  the  medium  of  progress.”  (61).  Ivy  Wilson  has  stated  this  dynamic  succinctly  and  its  relationship  to  
black  self-­‐‑representation  and  aesthetics  in  the  antebellum  period.  Suggesting  that  the  aesthetics  of  black  
democracy  was  always  an  iterative  repetition  of  the  white  order’s  forms  of  political  representation,  that  
“duplicates  the  original  and  alters  it  as  well,”  Wilson  states  “by  foregrounding  the  latent  issue  of  repetition,  
[we]  underline  the  question  of  how  long  and  to  what  degree  a  peripheral  subject  must  continually  reiterate  
the  vocabularies  of  the  nation  before  he  or  she  is  recognized  as  a  constituent  of  a  given  polity  or,  at  least,  as  
an  influence  on  how  these  politics  imagine  and  construe  themselves”  (9).  Wilson’s  work  is  focused  on  
rhetorical  and  literary  forms  that  articulate  a  shadow  space  of  black  political  life  that  seeks  to  transform  the  
terms  of  the  dominant  order  in  the  aesthetics  of  political  representation.  But  the  time  of  representation’s  
shadow  is  necessarily  belated  and  orbiting  around  the  norms  of  the  nation.  His  work  is  powerful,  but  does  
not  account  for  how  figurations  of  black  freedom  throughout  the  antebellum  period  inhabited  multiple  
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The  ongoing  experience  of  blacks,  in  and  out  of  slavery,  of  something  akin  but  
irreducible  to  what  white  political  groups  like  the  Whigs  feared  as  “backwards  
progress”  was  a  type  of  temporal  absence:  both  a  product  and  productive  of  the  
management  and  suppression  of  black  life  as  outside  the  space  of  history  and  politics.  
And  yet,  it  was  a  position  that  facilitated  an  imagination  of  freedom  as  something  other  
than  developmental  and  progressive.  These  writers  discovered  in  the  repeated  tragedy  
of  black  freedom—its  insubstantial  appearances  and  its  disruptions  by  imperial  
violence—a  way  to  describe  the  emergence  of  freedom  in  history  as  sustained  by  the  
social  activation  of  an  unrestrained  feeling  for  the  future  in  the  present  of  experience  and  
its  reiteration  as  an  affect  in  the  historical  text.  In  contrast  to  romantic  history’s  sense  of  
expectation  for  a  forever-­‐‑deferred  future  across  a  continuous  narrative  of  progress,  the  
texts  of  black  history  register  an  imagination  of  freedom  as  a  series  of  iterative  breaks.    
These  moments  of  freedom  and  immanent  futurity  are  connected  not  by  the  continuous  
feeling  of  a  single  “people,”  but  as  an  affect  that  proliferates  through  both  its  repeated  
eruptions  in  slave  revolts  and  marronage  and  in  the  aesthetic  re-­‐‑description  and  
dissemination  of  those  suppressed  histories  through  print  and  oratory.  Against  the  anti-­‐‑
                                                                                                              
  
times,  orbiting  the  sacred  past,  and  the  Haitian  present,  as  much  as  it  wanted  to  figure  a  transformed  
national  future.  See,  Wilson,  Specters  of  Democracy  (2011).  
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black  violence  of  progress,  but  always  hounded  by  it,  black  history  found  a  future  of  
freedom  in  the  now  of  its  radical  presence.  
Haiti,  scenes  of  black  revolt  and  resistance  to  slavery,  and  participation  of  black  
soldiers  in  the  American  Revolution  and  the  War  of  1812  are  all  central  images  in  these  
texts.  Some,  like  William  C.  Nell’s  The  Colored  Patriots  of  the  American  Revolution  (1855)  
were  assimilationist,  looking  to  recover  a  history  of  black  participation  in  the  founding  
dramas  of  the  nation  to  secure  claims  on  citizenship.  Others—most  prominently  Martin  
R.  Delany’s  The  Condition,  Elevation,  Emigration  and  Destiny  of  the  Colored  People  of  the  
United  States  (1852)—researched  and  wrote  about  black  history  in  America  in  order  to  
testify  to  the  injustice  of  blacks  being  excluded  from  U.S.  political  life  and  insist  on  the  
necessity  of  emigration.  Still  others  looked  at  longer  histories,  making  claims  on  black  
freedom  and  equality  through  appeals  to  biblical  and  ancient  history,  contesting  the  
racist  myths  of  the  dominant  order  with  divine  and  classical  knowledge.6  Each  
                                                                                                              
6  Three  important  works  on  black  history  in  the  nineteenth  century  have  proposed  competing  models  for  
how  these  works  challenge  and  interrogate  romantic  history’s  portrayal  of  time.  Stephen  G.  Hall’s  A  Faithful  
Account  of  the  Race  (2011)  argues  that  black  history  is  best  understood  as  a  return  to  an  older  Enlightenment  
tradition  of  universal  history  and  its  commitment  to  long  time  scales,  stories  of  the  eternal  struggle  between  
slavery  and  freedom,  and  a  universalism  that  pre-­‐‑dates  and  disrupts  nineteenth  century  nationalism.  John  
Ernest’s  Liberation  Historiography  (2004)  emphasizes  the  meta-­‐‑historical  aspects  of  black  history,  its  formal  
defamiliarization  of  the  romantic  narratives  of  progress  that  had  been  denied  to  African-­‐‑Americans  through  
techniques  like  fragmentation  and  messianic  and  projective  interpretations  of  the  past.  Finally,  Laurie  
Maffly-­‐‑Kipp’s  Setting  Down  the  Sacred  Past  (2010)  focuses  on  black  history  as  a  form  of  “collective  
narrative”—in  contrast  to  the  well-­‐‑known  genre  of  personal  and  life  narratives  of  ex-­‐‑slaves.    In  her  
argument,  black  history  tracks  the  formation  and  emergence  of  a  collective  black  protestant  identity  in  the  
New  World,  and  its  commitments  to  religious  liberation.  My  own  argument  draws,  to  varying  degrees,  on  
all  of  these  works,  but  I’m  less  interested  in  the  questions  of  form  and  identity  that  shaped  these  works,  and  
more  in  how  black  history  registered  and  theorized  a  profound  ambivalence  about  temporal  experience  at  
the  level  of  its  invocation  and  revisions  of  the  aesthetic  categories  of  romantic  history  entails  shifting  
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incorporated  romantic  language,  stories  of  civilizational  progress,  images  of  heroism  
and  displays  of  passion  on  behalf  of  liberty  only  to  come  up  against  the  impossibility  of  
explaining  black  history  or  temporal  experience  as  “progress,”  and  subtly  (and  often  
ambivalently)  produced  a  series  of  differing  figures  for  the  emergence  of  freedom  across  
time  and  the  type  of  vision  (and  hearing)  one  has  to  have  to  detect  its  faltering  but  
proliferating  growths,  repetitions,  failures  and  advances.    
By  exploring  the  pull  of  romantic  and  imperial  aesthetic  forms  within  abolitionist  
culture  alongside  the  works  of  black  history  that  disrupted  and  transformed  its  singular  
vision  I  will  expand  on  the  racial  and  political  stakes  of  romantic  history  in  articulating  
national  and  transnational  fantasies  of  the  future  of  freedom  in  the  New  World.  
Romantic  history  was  a  discourse  of  power,  seeking  to  arrest  the  failure  of  the  nation  to  
become  the  singular  authorizing  force  of  temporal  experience  in  the  antebellum  period  
through  figurative  (but  often  all  too  realizable)  violence  towards  the  black  and  
blackened  others  of  its  imperial  aesthetic.  It  was  a  resolution  to  the  ideological  problem  
confronted  by  a  nation  that  claimed  authority  over  the  future  of  liberty  even  as  was  
responsible  for  the  spread  of  slavery.  But  it  was  a  resolution  that  only  displaced  tensions  
and  crises,  even  as  they  became  more  pronounced  and  over-­‐‑determined  by  affective  
                                                                                                              
  
attention  from  the  form  of  the  texts  (their  overall  narrative  structures)  and  their  role  in  the  origins  and  
growth  of  African-­‐‑American  political  and  religious  cultures,  and  articulating  each  text  as  a  theorization  of  
the  experience  and  emergence  of  freedom  in  and  across  time—effects  that  are  registered  in  diction,  breaks  in  
syntax,  and  descriptions  of  the  sights  and  sounds  of  black  freedom.  
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anxiety.  The  position  of  blacks  in  America—of  living  through  slavery  directly  or  through  
the  failures  of  the  nation’s  promise  of  freedom—enabled  abolitionist  historians  to  push  
against  the  limits  of  those  categories  for  resolving  their  own  claims  on  freedom  and  the  
claims  being  made  in  Haiti,  Canada  and  the  West  Indies  in  black  experiences  with  
freedom  that  had  been  disavowed  in  official  romantic  history.  Out  of  the  deprivation  of  
the  very  experience  of  time  that  would  enable  them  to  imagine  a  future  in  the  nation,  
these  writers  began  to  see  (and  hear)  other  possibilities  for  imagining  freedom.  This  
chapter  attends  to  the  limits  of  categories  like  progress  and  beauty  for  a  radical  historical  
imagination  and  how  black  abolitionists’  revisions  of  history  challenged  traditional  
political  forms  like  the  liberal  subject,  progress,  and  nationalism  in  the  militant  period  of  
abolitionism  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  that  would  break  the  spell  of  romantic  
history  in  its  chaotic  violence.7  
  
Beauty, Slavery and Imperial Time 
  
The  appeal  of  romantic  history  was  in  the  emotional  satisfaction  of  experiencing  
one’s  own  position  in  time  as  within  the  continuity  of  an  epic  of  progress.  By  providing  
an  emotional  assurance  of  futurity  in  vividly  experiential  descriptions  of  a  heroic  past,  
                                                                                                              
7  Here  I  am  referring  to  the  general  shift  from  romanticism  and  moral  idealism  to  empiricism  and  
pragmatism  in  U.S.  intellectual  culture  that  Louis  Menand  has  argued  was  a  major  effect  of  the  Civil  War.  
See  his  The  Metaphysical  Club    (2001).  
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romantic  historians  forcefully  displaced  the  contradictions  and  anxieties  of  the  present  
moment  onto  the  scenes  of  already  accomplished  and  mythologized  trials.  When  George  
Bancroft  lectured  on  the  power  beautiful  historical  images  would  have  in  binding  and  
securing  the  future  of  a  nation  in  his  lecture,  “The  Necessity,  the  Reality,  and  the  
Promise  of  the  Progress  of  the  Human  Race”  he  was  articulating  the  emotional  force  
many  Americans  had  felt  in  response  to  history.  But  such  claims,  met  at  the  New  York  
Historical  Society  with  enthusiasm,  also  announced  the  problem  they  disavowed:  the  
lack  of  consensus  over  the  future  within  and  outside  of  the  United  States  and  the  failure  
of  providential  time  to  account  for  the  diversity  of  experience  with  the  American  nation  
and  its  violent  exclusions.  For  abolitionists  (and  others  like  Herman  Melville)  who  
perceived  the  nation  as  a  scene  of  contradiction  and  enslavement,  these  claims  were  only  
so  much  bombast,  exposing  in  their  brassy  tones  the  hollowness  of  the  culture’s  romance  
with  nationalism.  Yet,  despite  protests,  denials  and  outrage  over  Bancroft  and  others’  
association  of  national  history  with  the  enjoyments  of  aesthetic  beauty,  many  of  the  
same  writers  could  not  forsake  the  affective  power  promised  by  romantic  history’s  
imagination  of  time.  They  remained  attached  to  the  idea  that  the  past  could  promise  
something  in  the  future,  and  that  the  truly  beautiful  in  history  secured  their  own  (more  
moral)  political  desires.  This  attachment  to  the  category  of  beauty  (or  in  the  case  of  
Melville,  this  inability  to  articulate  a  positive  counter-­‐‑aesthetic)  trapped  them  in  
romantic  history’s  linear  vision  of  time  and  its  reliance  on  visions  of  racial  subjection  to  
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manage  and  displace  resistant  futures.  In  this  section  I  am  concerned  with  three  writers  
who  attempted  to  disarticulate  beauty  and  nationalism,  only  to  be  find  themselves  
caught  in  the  entanglements  of  beauty,  enslavement  and  imperialism  in  the  romantic  
imagination.    
Interrogations  of  history  through  the  rhetoric  and  symbols  of  nationalism  were  a  
recurrent  feature  of  abolitionist  writing  from  Douglass’s  address,  “What  to  a  Slave  is  the  
Fourth  of  July”  (1841)  to  William  Wells  Brown’s  novel  Clotel:  The  President’s  Daughter  
(1853).    While  Garrisonians  vehemently  rejected  sacrosanct  nationalist  symbols  like  the  
Constitution  as  complicit  with  slavery,  other  abolitionist  texts  incorporated  nationalist  
symbols  to  decry  the  failures  of  the  nation  to  live  up  to  its  principles.  At  the  center  of  
these  contested  discourses  are  symbols  like  Bunker  Hill,  Thomas  Jefferson,  bells  tolling  
liberty,  and  chains  metonymic  for  enslavement.  And  while  these  symbols  carry  more  or  
less  conventional  meanings,  they  were  often  presented  by  way  of  aesthetically  thick  
descriptions.  Bunker  Hill  could  be  a  shining  pillar  on  a  hill  or  a  pile  of  rocks  marking  the  
nation’s  broken  promises.  Such  descriptive  rhetoric  enhances,  questions,  or  disrupts  a  
symbol’s  conventional  meaning  by  enmeshing  it  in  visual  and  sonic  modes  of  
presentation  that  carry  an  excess  of  affect—in  other  words  by  making  symbolic  meaning  
conditional  on  the  way  the  symbol  is  imagined  as  present  to  the  senses  and  thus  as  an  
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aesthetic  object  aimed  at  an  (imagined)  community  of  sensation.8  William  J.  Watkins,  a  
black  abolitionist  who  wrote  a  response  to  Bancroft’s  lecture  in  Frederick  Douglass’  Paper  
made  the  aesthetic  quality  of  nationalist  symbolism  clear.  For  Watkins,  Bancroft’s  
invocations  of  national  history  as  a  beautiful  object  “bound”  to  allure  the  world  to  
liberty,  sounded  out  not  as  a  stirring  call  to  national  pride,  but  as  a  “sounding  brass,  a  
tinkling  cymbal”  that  must  have  “died  on  the  ears  of  Mr.  Bancroft’s  audience”  (256).  
Watkins  deployed  aesthetic  re-­‐‑description  to  craft  a  forceful  and  emotional  
disarticulation  of  beauty  from  nationalism  and  to  re-­‐‑encode  the  same  nationalism  with  a  
different  set  of  sensations:  the  screams  and  terror  of  slavery’s  scenes  of  subjection.    
Watkins  begins  his  rebuttal  by  associating  the  scene  of  Bancroft’s  lecture  with  an  
occasion  full  of  symbolic  significance,  the  Fourth  of  July,  “when  everyone  knows  the  
Truth  has  taken  a  leave  of  absence”  (256).  He  draws  on  and  contributes  to  an  already  
                                                                                                              
8  This  formulation  also  reflects  how  Jacques  Rancière’s  insight  into  the  concept  of  aesthetics:  “Aesthetics  is  
not  the  theory  of  the  beautiful  or  of  art,  nor  is  it  a  theory  of  sensibility.  Aesthetics  is  an  historically  
determined  concept  which  designates  a  specific  regime  of  visibility  and  intelligibility  of  art,  which  is  
inscribed  in  a  reconfiguration  of  the  categories  of  sensible  experience  and  its  interpretation  […]  aesthetic  
experience  implies  a  certain  disconnection  from  the  habitual  conditions  of  sensible  experience.”  (1).  This  
disconnection  allows  perception  to  inhabit  more  than  simply  a  knowledge  of  objects,  their  construction  and  
their  place  in  society  or  the  social  order.  “This  belief  does  not  hide  any  reality.  But  it  doubles  reality,  which  
the  ethical  order  would  like  to  consider  as  only  one.  As  a  consequence  of  this  [perceiving  subjects]  can  
double  their  working  identities;  to  the  identity  of  the  working  at  home  in  a  defined  regime  can  be  added  a  
proletarian  identity  –  in  other  words,  the  identity  of  a  subject  capable  of  escaping  the  assignment  to  a  
private  condition  and  of  intervening  in  the  affairs  of  the  community”  (6).  In  the  case  of  abolitionist  
manipulation  of  nationalist  symbols,  the  added  aesthetic  qualities  generates  a  doubled  mode  of  perception:  
one  that  reads  symbols  for  what  they  mean  conventionally,  for  their  place  in  a  nationalist  system  of  meaning  
from  which  various  identities  are  defined  negatively  and  oppositionally  (the  slave,  the  free  black,  the  white  
abolitionist,  the  sympathetic  European)  and  a  second,  positive  identity—an  abolitionist  way  of  seeing  an  
hearing,  a  community  that  finds  itself  and  addresses  the  nation  from  the  position  of  a  shared  
discernment/perception.  See  Rancière,  “Thinking  Between  Disciplines:  an  aesthetics  of  knowledge”  (2006).  
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rich  well  of  aesthetic  metaphors  that  abolitionists  had  used  to  describe  the  sonic  content  
of  that  day.  These  were  sounds  that  those  who  perceived  the  reality  of  slavery,  its  
creation  of  “a  horde  of  despots”  and  its  “extension,  consolidation,  and  perpetuity  of  a  
system  of  robbery,  and  plunder,  and  oppression,”  already  heard  as  “unmeaning  
twaddle”  (247).  Watkins  connects  the  moral  content  of  nationalism’s  symbols  and  
celebrations  to  their  aesthetically  jarring  sound.  This  aesthetic  discourse  serves  a  two-­‐‑
fold  purpose;  it  rejects  Bancroft’s  central  claim  that  “[o]ur  country  is  bound  to  allure  the  
world  to  freedom  by  the  beauty  of  its  example,”  and  it  consolidates  an  aesthetic  political  
community  whose  moral  perception  is  actuated  in  its  members’  aural  perception  of  U.S.  
nationalism.  If  you  can  hear  Bancroft’s  brassy  tones,  you  become  bound  to  others  on  the  
basis  of  a  shared  aesthetic  and  moral  knowledge.  
Watkins  then  moves  to  reveal  the  true  moral  and  sonic  content  of  Bancroft’s  
“beautiful  example.”  With  arch  irony,  Watkins  offers  “a  slight  alteration  in  the  
phraseology  of  this  sentence.  In  order  to  speak  the  truth,  it  should  read,  ‘Our  country  is  
bound  to  allure  the  world  to  Slavery!”  (256,  emphasis  in  the  original).  The  archness  
continues  throughout  as  Watkins  delivers  an  abolitionist  jeremiad  on  the  tyranny  of  
slavery  and  the  influence  of  the  American  government  abroad  as  “only  an  influence  for  
evil”  (257).  Responding  to  Bancroft’s  aesthetic  language  he  interrogates  his  readers’  
moral  and  aesthetic  perception  of  the  nation’s  history:    
Where  is  its  beauty?  Is  there  anything  very  beautiful  in  whipping  women,  
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burning  them  with  red  hot  irons,  setting  bloodhounds  upon  their  track,  tearing  
their  infant  children  from  them,  and  selling  them  with  other  horses  and  cattle?”  
This  litany  of  slavery’s  scenes  of  subjection  continues  until  Watkins  ends,  
“Anything  specially  beautiful  in  our  chains  and  thumbscrews?  […]  O  what  
beautiful  example  does  America  set  before  the  world!  (257)    
  
Watkins  sets  these  images  in  juxtaposition  to  the  aesthetic  category  of  beauty  as  the  
horrifying  truths  its  false  application  obscures.  But  what  if  we  take  Watkins’  rhetorical  
questions  the  other  way?  The  breaks  in  Watkins’  grammar  register  an  increasing  
rhetorical  agitation,  as  if,  coming  to  the  terrible  recognition  that  these  scenes  were  
precisely  what  Bancroft  meant  by  beauty,  he  could  no  longer  disentangle  the  aesthetic  
surfaces  of  the  nation’s  symbols  from  the  moral  outrage  of  slavery.  If  a  chain  is  beautiful  
and  the  nation  is  bound,  what  futures  can  abolitionists  envision  beyond  the  irony  of  “the  
beautiful  example  America  set[s]  before  the  world”?  
The  problem  Watkins’s  rhetorical  ambivalence  registers  is  that  the  affective  force  
historians  like  Bancroft  claimed  for  beauty  in  binding  the  nation  and  securing  its  future  
might  not  depend  on  moral  truth,  and  that  such  a  binding  of  a  community  might  
proceed  despite  the  hollowness  that  abolitionists  hear.  If  slavery  is  a  part  of  the  object  
that  Bancroft  names  as  beautiful,  then  the  hollow,  brass  notes  of  Bancroft’s  lecture—the  
moral  and  aesthetic  dissonance  identified  by  Watkins—are  not  sufficient  to  unravel  its  
force  or  generate  a  sufficient  counter-­‐‑community  of  aesthetic  discernment.  Watkins’s  
final  ironic  restatement  of  Bancroft’s  central  argument  about  the  “beautiful  example  
America  sets  before  the  world”  is  haunted  by  a  fear  over  the  possibility  that  America  (as  
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symbol  and  as  power)  will  be  a  force  for  the  reinstatement  of  slavery  in  those  places  
where  it  has  been  abolished—as  had  been  the  case  with  Texas,  New  Mexico  and  was  
potentially  the  case  with  the  Yucatan  and  even  Haiti.  That  the  beautiful  is  merely  an  
appendage  of  power  was  a  striking  and,  in  the  context  of  antebellum  culture  and  the  
prominence  of  moral  beauty  in  abolitionist  and  reform  literature,  profoundly  disturbing  
recognition.    
While  the  intimacy  of  beauty  with  power  and  enslavement  remains  an  inference  
in  Watkins’s  editorial,  it  is  left  open  as  a  possibility.  Many  abolitionist  texts  are  haunted  
by  an  anxiety  over  the  need  to  deny  nationalism  the  truth  of  moral  beauty,  and  return  to  
figures  of  sonic  brassiness  or  hollowness  to  expose  the  empty  claims  of  nationalism.  But,  
as  is  the  case  with  Watkins’s  editorial,  the  repeated  attempts  to  replace  beauty  with  
other  sounds  and  images  of  slavery  meant  that  the  aesthetic  community  of  abolitionism  
was  all  too  often  imagined  as  constituted  around  the  spectatorship  of  black  suffering  
and  abjection.9  As  we  will  see,  there  was  a  concerted  effort  in  black  history  to  provide  
images  of  black  social  and  political  life  beyond  the  chains  and  terror  of  life  in  the  
                                                                                                              
9  I  am  referring  in  part  here  to  Saidiya  Hartmann’s  well  known  analysis  of  how  blackness  is  constituted  in  
the  antebellum  period  by  the  display  of  suffering  (and  enjoyment).  The  problem  that  much  abolitionist  
literature  and  accounts  of  slavery  reproduces  is  that,  in  displaying  the  suffering  of  slavery,  they  produce  
black  subjects  as  outside  of  time,  dependent  upon  an  often  implicitly  white  community  of  reform  
(constituted  by  a  type  of  aesthetic  witnessing)  to  generate  a  future  beyond  slavery.  In  this  gesture  slaves  are  
both  deprived  of  time  and  progress,  and  a  linear  form  of  progress  is  claimed  by  the  community  of  reform.  
This  was  not  a  limitation  on  abolitionist  discourse,  even  if  it  seems  all  too  recurrent,  and  there  are  many  
examples  of  abolitionist  literature  providing  representations  of  slavery  that  subvert  this  formal  expectation.  
See  Hartmann,  Scenes  of  Subjection  (1997).  For  more  on  the  subversion  of  this  and  similar  structures  of  
subjection  in  black  performance  in  the  nineteenth  century  see,  Daphne  Brooks’s  Bodies  in  Dissent  (2006).      
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Americas.10  But  arguments  against  the  myths  of  national  beauty  were  often  complicit  
with  modes  of  imagining  time  and  history  that  depended  on  the  spectacle  of  black  
suffering—an  aesthetics  that  reproduced  the  modes  of  temporal  management  at  work  in  
nationalist  history.  Harriet  Beecher  Stowe’s  Uncle  Tom’s  Cabin  was  just  such  a  text.  In  it,  
Stowe  contests  a  southern  patriarchal  aesthetic  of  slavery,  denying  its  status  as  beautiful,  
only  to  reproduce  the  centrality  of  figures  of  black  abjection  in  her  linear  temporalities  of  
progress  and  reform.    
Uncle  Tom’s  Cabin  demonstrates  the  entanglements  of  time,  aesthetics,  and  
slavery  in  Stowe’s  frequent  discourse  on  the  presence  and  absence  of  beauty  in  slavery.  
The  recurring  question  of  whether  anything  within  slavery  could  be  considered  
beautiful  is  introduced  early  when  Stowe  articulates  her  rejection  of  southern  
propaganda  of  the  patriarchal  benevolence  of  the  institution  of  slavery.  Responding  to  
these  images,  she  writes:  
So  long  as  the  law  considers  these  human  beings,  with  beating  hearts  and  living  
affections,  only  as  so  many  things  belonging  to  a  master,—so  long  as  the  failure,  
or  misfortune  or  the  impudence,  or  death  of  the  kindest  owner,  may  cause  them  
any  day  to  exchange  a  life  of  kind  protection  and  indulgence  for  one  of  hopeless  
misery  and  toil,—so  long  as  it  is  impossible  to  make  anything  beautiful  or  
desirable  in  the  best  regulated  administration  of  slavery.  (14-­‐‑15)  
  
Despite  this  blanket  claim  that  slavery  makes  beauty  impossible,  Stowe’s  narrator—the  
moral  voice  of  the  novel  that  interprets  its  events  according  to  a  standard  of  Christian  
                                                                                                              
10  Not  that  this  attempt  to  get  outside  of  slavery  does  not  carry  its  own  set  of  conceptual  and  political  
problems,  many  of  which  will  be  discussed  in  what  follows.  
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morality—is  not  entirely  consistent.  The  novel  frequently  describes  certain  relationships  
as  beautiful,  such  as  those  between  Tom  and  Little  Eva  or  Eliza  and  her  child.  Each  is  a  
relationship  of  familial  dependency—matriarchal  if  not  patriarchal—even  when  they  
cross  the  barriers  between  master  and  slave.  But  each  is  also  under  threat  from  the  
insubstantial  conditions  of  these  relationships  within  slavery.  At  any  time,  one  member  
may  be  deformed  into  a  thing,  sold  away,  and  subjected  to  violence  that,  like  Simon  
Legree’s  assaults  on  Tom,  aims  at  destroying  beautiful  moral  feeling.  The  narrator  
functions  as  a  voice  of  experience  that  knows  about  the  threats  that  confront  beautiful  
relationships  under  the  regimes  of  slavery.  Whereas  the  embodiments  of  beauty,  
particularly  in  the  character  of  little  Eva,  always  retain  an  air  of  naivety  and  innocence,  
unaware  of  the  futures  aimed  against  its  very  possibility.  
This  innocent  beauty  serves  a  political  purpose  in  the  novel;  it  opens  up  an  
imagination  of  the  type  of  relationships  that  are  always  becoming  impossible  under  
slavery,  and  it  anticipates  a  future  of  social  reformation.  Witnessing  beauty  (and  its  
sacrifice  or  destruction  by  slavery)  compels  many  of  Stowe’s  characters  to  become  
abolitionists.  In  witnessing  the  destruction  of  a  morality  that  they  where  either  unaware  
of  or  thought  absent  from  the  regimes  of  slavery,  they  become  agents  of  a  form  of  
historical  progress.  In  the  always-­‐‑interrupted  “beauty”  of  her  images  of  a  benevolent  
and  familial  relationship  between  masters  and  servants,  Stowe  marks  out  the  temporal  
condition  of  the  antebellum  U.S:  its  present  is  an  interregnum  between  an  idealized  
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Christian  past  and  a  future  reintegration  of  that  moral  order  with  the  modern  political  
state.11  That  interregnum  is  New  World  slavery.  Beauty  subsists  as  an  innocent  fragment  
of  a  lost  world  that  has  to  be  sacrificed,  in  Eva  and  Tom’s  deaths,  to  build  a  community  
that  would  insist  on  a  political  overcoming  of  the  present.  But  the  reception  of  these  
beautiful  images  and  their  immense  affective  force  also  serves  to  generate  the  sense  of  
what  it  means  to  inhabit  the  present  through  a  structure  dependent  upon  the  spectacle  
of  Tom’s  being  degraded  and  made  abject  by  the  regimes  of  slavery.  This  image  
generates  temporal  affect  that,  despite  its  opposition  to  the  conditions  of  the  present,  still  
imagines  time  as  linear.  Time  only  passes  through  the  condition  of  the  contemporary  or  
the  modern  on  its  way  towards  its  redemption  in  a  moral  order.  And  the  reader,  in  the  
experience  of  such  aestheticized  violence,  potentially  enjoys  a  vision  of  redeemed  future  
in  a  figure  of  abjection.12  The  regime  of  the  beautiful  at  work  in  Stowe’s  text,  even  in  its  
opposition  to  the  racial  orders  of  the  antebellum  U.S.,  still  retains  the  commitment  of  
                                                                                                              
11  Stowe  is  not  the  first  to  imagine  the  way  an  aesthetic  reception  of  the  beautiful  or  innocent  could  propel  
political  desires  for  revolution  or  reform.  The  German  romantic  Freidrich  Schiller  provided  the  most  
thorough  theoretical  articulation  of  the  role  of  art  in  redeeming  human  societies  and  fueling  moral  progress,  
and  it  is  likely  a  version  of  his  ideas  that  circulated  through  transatlantic  romanticism  to  U.S.  
sentimentalism.  In  his  Letters  on  the  Aesthetic  Education  of  Man  (1794)  and  “On  Naïve  and  Sentimental  
Poetry”  (1795)  he  argues  that  the  beautiful  in  art  provides  an  experience  of  moral  and  rational  harmony  to  
the  senses  that  is  otherwise  absent  from  the  modern  world.  It  helps  bind  a  moral  community  through  an  
“aesthetic  education”  committed  to  a  reintegration  of  the  moral  state.    Like  in  much  romanticism,  his  
temporal  model  is  based  in  a  Christian  lapsarianism,  where  the  profane  present  is  imagined  as  laying  
between  a  past  naïve  era  of  wholeness  and  a  future  rational  order.    
  
12    While  my  use  of  abjection  and  subjection  in  this  chapter  is  fairly  conventional,  I  want  to  clarify  that  they  
are  not  interchangeable.  I  use  abjection  to  refer  to  the  condition  of  being  denied  entrance  into  the  political  
order  projected  by  progressive  temporality,  i.e.  being  cast  off.  Subjection  refers  to  the  condition  of  being  
included  in  those  orders,  but  within  a  specific  subject  position  as  subservient  to  other  positions.    
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romantic  history  to  images  of  racial  subjugation  and  restraint  to  structure  its  feeling  for  
futurity.    
In  contrast  to  the  attempt  of  sentimental  abolitionism  to  retrieve  moral  beauty  as  
a  driving  force  of  history  from  the  falsity  of  romantic  nationalism,  Herman  Melville’s  
Benito  Cereno  is  a  far  more  ambivalent  text.  Like  Watkins’s  editorial,  it  suggests  that  
beauty,  power,  and  enslavement  are  imbricated  in  the  way  the  United  States  nationalism  
subjugates  blackness  in  its  vision  of  the  future.  Melville’s  pronounced  suspicion  of  the  
romantic  and  the  sentimental  meant  that  far  from  seeing  the  beautiful  as  a  force  that  
could  overcome  slavery,  he  was  able  to  portray  its  role  in  the  enforcement  of  slave  
regimes.  Nevertheless,  his  representation  of  the  upheaval  of  linear  orders  in  the  slave  
revolt  does  not  suggest  any  futures  beyond  a  racial  apocalypse  drawn  in  terms  
strikingly  similar  to  those  who  feared  racial  revolt  throughout  the  hemisphere.    
Scholars  have  often  focused  their  readings  of  Benito  Cereno  on  Captain  Delano’s  
ideological  blinders:  his  inability  to  perceive  the  slave  revolt  that  has  taken  place  and  his  
misplacement  of  suspicion  on  Cereno.  Nuanced  accounts  of  this  story  pay  close  
attention  to  how  Melville  tracks  the  interrelationship  between  Delano’s  perceptions  
aboard  the  San  Dominick  and  the  imbalances  of  his  emotional  keel.  For  instance,  Dana  
Nelson  has  suggested  that  Delano’s  trust  and  fellow  feeling  with  the  Spanish  captain  
depend  on  a  bond  generated  by  the  witnessing  of  scenes  of  black  subjection  to  white  
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power.13  Advancing  this  line  of  analysis,  Christopher  Castiglia  and  Russ  Castronovo  
have  identified  how  Melville  describes  these  scenes  of  subjection  in  distinctly  aesthetic  
terms.  They  are  “artful”  compositions  that  assure  Delano  of  peace  and  order  aboard  the  
ship.  In  their  account,  this  demonstrates  how  aesthetic  reception  is  enmeshed  in  political  
and  social  codes.  They  go  on  to  argue  that  Babo,  the  crafter  of  these  images,  fashions  a  
“revolutionary  aesthetic”  that  “challenges  ideas  of  individual  autonomy”  by  showing  
how  “aesthetic  experience  entails  far  more  than  the  bounded  American  captain’s  
consciousness”  and  opens  a  space  for  the  disempowered  and  marginalized  to  upend  the  
normal  relations  of  power.  While  these  images  make  Delano  think  that  he  and  Cereno  
are  in  positions  of  control  and  authority,  he  is  rather  completely  dependent  on  the  
material  control  Babo  has  exercised  over  his  perceptions.14  My  sense  of  how  time  and  
perception  works  in  the  novella  is  developed  from  this  useful  insight  into  the  political  
life  of  aesthetics.    
Throughout,  Melville  structures  a  frisson  between  the  time  Delano  perceives  (or  
perhaps  desires)  himself  to  be  inhabiting  and  the  temporal  and  spatial  origins  of  his  
suspicions  and  the  images  that  haunt  the  fringes  of  his  perception.  From  the  outset,  
Delano  searches  out  signs  that  he  inhabits  a  normal  temporal  order—the  linear  time-­‐‑
scales  of  historical  providence  that,  as  Andy  Doolen  has  suggested,  would  manage  the  
                                                                                                              
13  See  Nelson’s  National  Manhood  (1998).  
  
14  Kelly  Ross  has  argued  that  Babo’s  creative  power  is  found  precisely  in  his  ability  to  manipulate  other’s  
perception  of  time  in  “Heterochronic  Time  in  Benito  Cereno”  [unpublished  conference  presentation]  (2014)  
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transference  of  imperial  and  slave  power  from  a  Spanish  colonial  past  to  the  American  
future.15  Melville’s  adoption  of  gothic  imagery  puts  this  orderly  perception  of  time  at  
odds  with  the  seeming  co-­‐‑presence  of  other  pasts  with  his  present.  Among  other  things,  
Delano  is  haunted  by  visions  of  medieval  Catholicism,  strangely  occasioned  by  his  initial  
perception  of  the  San  Dominick  as  a  monastery.  Melville’s  interest  in  time  is  reflected  in  
the  early  description  of  the  tolling  bell.  The  bell  keeps  time,  giving  it  order  and  pushing  
it  forward.  All  the  same,  the  image’s  archaic  and  gothic  elements  disrupt  the  stability  of  
the  present.  In  part,  the  bell  helps  to  conjure  the  Black  Legend  of  the  Spanish  Empire’s  
cruelty  that,  according  to  Maria  Deguzman’s  insightful  analysis,  the  antebellum  U.S.  had  
imaged  itself  as  overcoming.16    This  frequent  layering  of  complicated  temporal  images  
produces  much  of  the  novella’s  atmosphere  of  suspense  and  tension.  On  the  one  hand,  
these  images  help  to  ease  Delano’s  mind  allowing  him  to  interpret  oddities  and  
anachronisms  like  Cereno’s  uniform  in  terms  of  a  linear  historical  models  (in  this  
instance  a  fashion  that  may  not  yet  have  gone  out  of  style  in  South  America).  On  the  
other,  each  image  produces  new  confusions  by  way  of  their  strange  persistence  and  
irregularities  (the  uniform  is  said  to  still  be  in  style  somewhere,  but  it  also  cloaks  Cereno  
in  an  air  of  decay).    
                                                                                                              
15  See  Doolen’s  Fugitive  Empire  (2005).  
  
16  See  Deguzman’s  Spain’s  Long  Dark  Shadow  (2005).  
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Most  important  in  Melville’s  construction  of  these  temporal  frissons  are  the  
recurring  images  that  Babo  places  before  Delano  to  simultaneously  suggest  a  benevolent  
order  and  covertly  threaten  Cereno  into  obedience.  Babo’s  shaving  of  Delano  produces  
an  aesthetic  image  of  trust  between  master  and  servant,  both  in  its  intimacy  and  in  its  
supposed  regularity.  Like  the  patriarchal  myth  that  Stowe  works  to  expose,  it  
demonstrates  to  Delano  the  recurrent  commitment  of  the  slave  to  the  master’s  decorum  
and  the  upkeep  of  the  ship’s  order  by  all  involved  at  regular  intervals.  But  as  we  read  
(and  re-­‐‑read)  Melville’s  text,  the  specter  of  gruesome  violence  becomes  unavoidable.  
Even  more  fundamental  is  the  recurrent  presentation  of  Atufal  in  chains  before  Cereno  
every  twenty  minutes—“his  time-­‐‑keeper”  as  Delano  calls  him.  The  subjection  of  the  
“mulish  mutineer”  suggests  that,  upon  the  ship,  disobedience  has  been  kept  in  check  
and  that  Cereno’s  seeming  physical  frailty  belies  a  deeper  exercise  of  control  and  
command.  Immediately  before  Atufal’s  first  appearance,  Delano  has  been  thrown  into  
doubt  by  Cereno’s  seemingly  superstitious  response  to  the  mention  of  the  body  of  his  
dead  companion,  Alexandro  Aranda.  According  to  Delano’s  “modern”  understanding  
of  grief,  his  body  should  be  embalmed  and  returned  to  his  family  to  ease  the  suffering  of  
his  passing.  The  suggestion  of  this  progressive  solution  to  grief,  however,  throws  Cereno  
into  a  swoon  (since  as  we  will  learn  the  body  is  attached  to  the  prow  of  the  ship),  which  
Delano  interprets  as  produced  by  a  superstitious  and  anachronistic  belief  in  ghosts  and  
goblins.    
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The  gothic  elements  generate  further  temporal  confusion:  how  can  order  on  the  
ship  be  maintained  by  this  captain  who  seems  to  exists  as  if  in  a  different  time  and  place,  
haunted  by  invisible  terrors?  Babo  produces  the  image  of  Atufal’s  subjection  at  this  
moment  to  assure  Delano  of  Cereno’s  authority.  Atufal  both  keeps  Cereno’s  “time”  by  
marking  its  passing  and  by  producing  the  time  of  the  ship  as  stable,  consonant  with  the  
time-­‐‑scales  that  Delano  comprehends  as  modern,  linear,  and  ordered,  thus  dispelling  
earlier  temporal  confusions.  However,  as  is  typical  throughout  the  text,  this  image  
introduces  yet  new  frissons,  particularly  in  the  dissonance  between  Cereno’s  bodily  
frailty  and  his  seemingly  tyrannical  command.  Melville  stages  this  dynamic  to  produce  a  
tension  for  both  Delano  and  the  reader.  Delano,  unable  to  harmonize  these  appearances  
in  his  mind,  debates  whether  Cereno’s  frailty  is  an  act  and  if  he  is  a  pirate  plotting  
betrayal.  Whereas  the  reader,  particularly  on  subsequent  readings  of  the  text,  is  pushed  
to  interpret  Cereno’s  frailty  as  related  to  the  threat  over  his  life  if  he  were  to  speak  and  
dispel  Delano’s  confusions,  since  he  so  often  falters  right  when  it  seems  he  seems  about  
to  communicate  something  that  would  reveal  the  novella’s  secrets.  Thus,  at  the  formal  
level,  the  deferred  speech  of  a  white  commander  is  held  out  as  a  resolution  to  the  gothic  
plot.  This  tension  over  the  absence  of  white  speech  is  a  conscious  part  of  Melville’s  
irony;  it  calls  attention  to  the  dependency  of  a  supposed  transcendent  providential  order  
on  the  conditions  of  material  embodiment.  Cereno’s  frequent  failure  to  speak  causes  
Delano’s  perceptions  of  time  to  become  confused—a  tendency  that  culminates  in  the  
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climax  of  the  text.  Delano  perceives  Cereno’s  leap  onto  Delano’s  boat  to  save  his  own  life  
as  at  first  a  revelation—not  of  the  slave  revolt—but  of  the  supposed  pirate’s  long  hidden  
intentions.  At  this  point  Melville  writes:  “[a]ll  this,  with  what  proceeded,  and  what  
followed,  occurred  with  such  involutions  of  rapidity,  that  past,  present  and  future  
seemed  one”  (733).    Lacking  the  ordering  of  the  speech  of  a  white  authority,  Delano’s  
perception  of  time  folds  in  on  itself.  
The  aesthetic  images  of  a  benevolent  order  that  Babo  had  constructed  to  fool  
Delano  unravel  with  the  latter’s  perception  of  time.  Those  images  produced  a  temporal  
order  out  of  an  aesthetics  of  racial  hierarchy  and  subjection—but  that  order  was  always  
haunted  by  gothic  pasts  and  violent  futures  suggested  in  Cereno’s  failure  to  speak.  In  
the  end,  these  images  are  unable  to  actually  produce  a  stable  order  because  the  linear  
time  that  structures  Delano’s  perceptions  depends  on  both  black  subjection  and  white  
speech—which  Cereno  (subjected  by  threats  to  his  material  being)  cannot  produce.  It  is  
telling  that,  after  the  long  deposition  that  rewrites  and  imposes  a  sequential  order  on  the  
events  aboard  the  San  Dominick  and  criminalizes  black  disobedience  to  subjugation,  
Melville  ends  the  text  with  a  discussion  between  Delano  and  Cereno  in  which  they  
attribute  their  survival  to  “providence.”    Melville  ironizes  this  invocation  of  the  
dominant  antebellum  theory  of  history.  Where  their  discussion  of  the  “beautiful”  and  
benevolent  will  that  enabled  them  to  survive  assures  the  American  of  providence’s  
transcendental  foundation—and  the  linear  order  of  time  it  entails—the  Spanish  Captain  
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is  haunted  by  his  knowledge  of  providence’s  intimate  relationship  with  the  unstable  
suppression  of  black  rebellion.    
Delano  has  often  been  read  as  a  Melville’s  diagnosis  of  the  blindness  of  the  
stereotypical  American  to  the  apocalyptic  contradictions  emerging  in  the  national  order  
on  the  eve  of  the  Civil  War.  It  is  important  however,  to  keep  in  mind  that  these  
contradictions  were  always  at  once  internal  and  transnational,  and  it  is  telling  that  the  
spatial  trajectory  of  the  San  Dominick—to  the  south  and  outside  of  organized  national  
space—is  what  opens  Delano’s  perception  to  confusion.  Historians  committed  to  the  
national  order  projected  an  image  of  space  and  time  that  attempted  to  view  the  
hemisphere  as  directed  towards  national  republican  liberty.    But  as  I  have  shown  in  
previous  chapters,  this  entailed  at  once  the  displacement  of  national  crises  onto  other  
spaces,  a  fantasy  of  resolving  those  crises  through  romantic  conquest,  and  the  inevitable  
instability  that  resulted  when  those  spaces  spoke  back  to  or  refused  positioning  within  a  
set  of  aesthetic  norms  that  made  their  temporal  signature  readable.  Slave  revolt,  and  the  
projection  of  futures  by  black  political  life  was  perhaps  the  sine  qua  non  of  the  
aesthetically  fugitive—a  production  of  difference  that  was  inassimilable  to  national  
order.  The  imperial  trajectory  of  Melville’s  novel  takes  us  to  South  America  and  to  Haiti  
to  stage  the  internal  crisis  of  the  forms  of  temporal  perception  being  produced  by  
aesthetic  history.  However,  it  also  merely  names  that  crisis  as  the  always-­‐‑immanent  
threat  of  counter-­‐‑imperial  resistance  and  slave  revolution.  It  fails  precisely  where  the  
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aesthetics  of  black  history  picks  up:  at  imagining  a  force  of  freedom  at  work  in  the  
fissures  of  modern  time.  For  black  historians  in  the  antebellum  period  it  was  precisely  
the  conflation  of  temporal  modes—“the  past,  present,  and  future  seeming  one”—at  the  
center  of  white  visions  of  racial  apocalypse  that  opened  up  a  way  to  think  about  history  
other  than  as  a  linear  narrative  of  progress.  Black  writers  between  the  1830s  and  the  
1850s  looked  to  biblical,  ancient,  and  modern  history  as  sources  for  imagining  a  
diffusion  of  multiple  scenes  and  times  of  black  freedom  in  the  modern  world  at  the  
margins  of  the  space  of  the  nation.  
  
Black Nationalism and the Problem of Progress 
 
In  1854,  William  Wells  Brown  delivered  a  strident  and  prophetic  lecture  on  the  
history  of  the  Haitian  Revolution  in  London,  and  then  again  in  Philadelphia.  Reflecting  
the  growing  militancy  of  abolitionist  discourse  in  the  1850s,  Brown  painted  a  vivid  
portrait  of  the  destruction  of  the  war  from  which  the  revolution  emerged:  
During  the  conflict  the  city  [Cap  Francais]  was  set  on  fire,  and  on  every  side  
presented  shocking  evidence  of  slaughter,  conflagration,  and  pillage.  The  strife  of  
political  and  religious  partisanship,  which  had  raged  in  the  clubs  and  streets  of  
Paris,  and  had  caused  the  guillotine  to  send  its  two  hundred  souls  every  day  for  
many  weeks,  unprepared,  to  eternity,  were  trans  planted  to  St.  Domingo,  where  




Imagining  how  the  spread  of  the  revolutionary  conflagration  moved  from  France  to  its  
colony  as  an  effect  of  exclusion  of  blacks  from  the  new  political  order  and  the  
continuation  of  slavery,  prophesizes  its  re-­‐‑emergence  in  the  U.S.  South.    
And,  should  such  a  contest  take  place,  the  God  of  Justice  will  be  on  the  side  of  
the  oppressed  blacks.  The  exasperated  genius  of  Africa  would  rise  from  the  
depths  of  the  ocean,  and  show  its  threatening  form;  and  war  against  the  tyrants  
would  be  the  rallying  cry.  The  indignation  of  the  slaves  of  the  south  would  
kindle  a  fire  so  hot  that  it  would  melt  their  chains,  drop  by  drop,  until  not  a  
single  link  would  remain;  and  the  revolution  that  was  commenced  in  1776  would  
then  be  finished.  (30)  
  
Brown’s  lecture—with  its  prophetic  imagery,  focus  on  masculine  heroes  like  Toussaint  
Louverture,  and  reliance  on  metaphors  of  flame  to  describe  the  sudden  emergence  and  
spread  of  revolution,  its  repetition  and  reiteration—displays  many  of  the  key  features  of  
black  history  in  the  antebellum  period.  These  works  adapted  and  reproduced  the  
framework  of  romantic  history—its  attempts  to  make  progress  palpable  in  the  aesthetics  
of  revolutionary  heroism—even  as  they  came  upon  the  limits  of  that  discourse  for  
accounting  for  a  history  of  black  freedom.  Like  Brown’s  deferral  of  revolutionary  closure  
in  the  image  of  “the  genius  of  Africa”  rising  “from  the  depths  of  the  ocean,”  black  
history  reimagined  the  temporal  order  of  progress  so  that  the  present  was  still  within  a  
revolutionary  break.  In  this  extended  present,  immanent  demands  for  freedom  could  at  
any  moment  bring  about  the  fiery  emergence  of  black  freedom,  unconditioned  by  the  
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history  of  slavery  and  imperialism  it  insistently  refused.17  Where  romantic  historians  
wanted  their  readers  to  feel  progress  in  the  (temporal  and  spatial)  past  in  order  to  
confine  and  constrain  the  present  and  future  to  a  linear  continuity,  black  historians  
wanted  their  audiences  to  feel  the  ongoing  heat  of  the  demand  for  freedom,  and  to  
produce,  through  their  description  of  the  scenes  of  black  revolt  further  iterations  of  
revolutionary  experience.  
In  attempting  to  write  history  to  communicate  suppressed  stories  of  black  
achievement  and  struggle,  black  historians  were  entering  into  a  discursive  field  
structured  by  oppression,  imperialism  and  patriarchy.  From  the  universalist  histories  of  
Robert  Benjamin  Lewis  and  W.C.  Pennington  in  the  1840s  to  the  militancy  of  Martin  R.  
Delany  and  William  C.  Nell  in  the  1850s,  these  writers  were  far  from  consistent  in  their  
resistance  to  those  forms.  Like  nationalist  historians,  they  focused  on  male  military  
figures.  Toussaint  Louverture,  Crispus  Attucks,  Henry  Diaz,  Denmark  Vesey  and  Nat  
Turner  all  featured  prominently  in  their  works.  They  frequently  announced  their  
purpose  in  writing  history  as  refuting  racist  blindness  of  black  achievement  as  such  
achievement  had  been  defined  by  the  white  supremacist  and  imperialistic  society  to  
which  they  both  did  and  did  not  belong.  These  writers  were  largely  black  nationalists,  
                                                                                                              
17  This  reflects  Eric  Sundquist’s  observation  that  unlike  the  majority  of  White  Americans  who  understood  
themselves  to  one  degree  or  another  as  a  post-­‐‑revolutionary  generation  in  the  antebellum  period,  black  
Americans  still  felt  themselves  to  be  within  a  revolutionary  period.  I  would  add  to  this  formulation  that  
sustaining  that  revolutionary  affect  was  not  simply  something  natural  that  happened,  but  was  a  concerted  
project  that  relied  on  the  ongoing  struggle  for  emancipation  throughout  the  world  to  sustain  itself  as  slavery  
became  more  entrenched  in  the  United  States.  See  Sundquist,  To  Wake  the  Nations  (1993).  
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looking  for  the  history  of  a  yet  to  emerge  black  nation  out  of  the  fragments  of  its  
revolutionary  history.18  Scholars  from  Wilson  Moses  to  Maggie  Montesino  Sale  and  
Maurice  Wallace  have  all  pointed  towards  the  inherent  conservatism  of  the  black  
nationalist  rhetoric  and  images  of  the  period.  As  Moses  argues  “black  nationalism  [was]  
a  prime  vehicle  for  acculturation  processes,  because  black  nationalism  in  the  nineteenth  
century  was  much  concerned  with  preserving  Anglo-­‐‑American  values  and  transmitting  
them,  in  modified  form,  the  black  community”  (11).  In  The  Slumbering  Volcano  (1997),  
Sale  shows  how  the  trope  of  black  masculine  revolt  was  a  response  to  and  repetition  of  
constructions  of  white  masculinity  that  imagined  black  slavery  as  a  result  of  African’s  
feminine  reticence  to  engage  in  revolutionary  struggle.  And  Maurice  Wallace  examines  
how  photography  of  black  soldiers  serving  in  the  Civil  War  covered  both  the  suffering  
and  wounds  of  slavery  and  the  labor  of  black  women  with  the  garments  of  patriotic  
service  in  his  essay  “Framing  the  Black  Soldier”  (2012).    
All  of  these  critiques  of  black  militancy  touch  on  the  problems  presented  by  the  
rhetoric  of  progress  for  accounting  for  black  political  life.  Black  nationalism,  in  part,  
imagined  the  future  of  black  freedom  secured  by  a  nascent,  but  emerging,  black  nation  
(either  within  or  outside  of  the  United  States).  It  imagined  the  roots  of  that  future  
political  state  growing  out  of  the  present,  and  a  new  national  identity  bound  by  a  shared  
                                                                                                              
18  This  concurs  with  a  point  made  by  John  Ernest  in  Liberation  Historiography.  The  only  way  for  black  
historians  to  imagine  a  black  past  that  would  secure  a  black  future  was  through  an  attention  to  
fragmentation—since  black  history  only  existed  in  the  wake  of  its  suppression  by  the  slave  trade  and  
imperialism.    
  167  
blackness.  Black  militancy  constructed  images  of  black  masculine  subjects  progressing  
out  of  slavery  into  a  realm  of  universal  political  recognition  (a  linear  empty  time)  in  
scenes  of  heroic  revolt  modeled  after  U.S.  nationalist  portraits  of  the  American  
Revolution.  Such  heroism  often,  as  in  the  case  with  Douglass’s  construction  of  his  own  
commitment  to  freedom  in  witnessing  his  aunts’  scream  (as  it  has  been  famously  
analyzed  by  Saidiya  Hartman),  depended  on  the  construction  of  black  women  and  
children  as  merely  suffering  bodies  that  need  to  be  saved  by  men.    However,  these  
models  of  progress  and  subjectivity  that  merely  repeat  and  confirm  the  violence  and  
oppression  of  U.S.  nationalism  and  racial  republicanism  are  only  part  of  the  story  of  
black  history  in  the  period.  Although  the  culture  of  historical  knowledge  within  which  
these  historians  wrote  was  thoroughly  dominated  by  the  concept  of  progress,  black  
experience  with  national  progress,  as  both  a  withheld  promise  and  an  imminent  peril,  
had  resulted  in  a  far  more  ambivalent  and  ultimately  destabilizing  adaptations  of  
romantic  norms  for  representing  progress  in  the  black  history  of  the  period.    
What  I  am  proposing  is  that  instead  of  viewing  these  histories  from  the  
perspective  of  the  intervening  history  since  then—the  failures  of  Reconstruction,  Jim  
Crow,  and  the  post-­‐‑civil-­‐‑rights  incarceration  state—that  reveals  in  such  stark  terms  to  us  
the  dangers  of  the  concept  of  “progress”  for  speaking  about  and  evaluating  political  
movements,  we  approach  these  writers  as  fellow  theorists  of  progress  and  its  limitations.  
Critiques  of  the  sexism  and  complicit  imperialism  of  these  texts’  reliance  on  black  male  
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militancy  remain  valid,  but  there  was  also  in  these  texts  a  powerful  re-­‐‑imagination  of  the  
romantic  aesthetics  of  progress  that  reappropriated  them  in  startlingly  radical  forms.  
These  historians  struggled  with  progress  because  the  conditions  experienced  by  blacks  
in  the  United  States  in  the  antebellum  period,  in  and  out  of  slavery,  were  such  that  the  
form  of  political  subjectivity,  the  entrance  of  the  individual  through  education  and/or  a  
struggle  for  freedom  into  universal  representativeness  and  progressive  time,  had  always  
been  withheld  by  the  dominant  white  supremacist  order  (and  as  afro-­‐‑pessimists  would  
assert  the  violence  of  that  withholding  was  constitutive  of  political  modernity).19  The  
more  black  individuals  who  escaped  slavery,  who  resisted  their  oppression  in  revolt,  
who  gained  literacy  and  education  and  addressed  publics  about  politics,  the  more  the  
order  reacted  against  black  life  and  political  speech  in  the  form  of  the  gag-­‐‑rule  against  
anti-­‐‑slavery  petitions;  the  expansion  of  slavery  to  the  west  and  south;  the  refusal  to  
allow  blacks  entrance  to  white  institutions;  the  growing  surveillance  of  black  life  in  the  
south  and  north  after  the  expansion  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law;  and  the  consolidation  of  
political  subjectivity  around  universal  white  male  suffrage.    
As  a  result,  by  the  1850s,  the  idea  of  progress  was  exceptionally  troubled  in  
abolitionist  texts.  An  interrogation  of  the  concept  of  progress  is  on  display  in  William  
Wells  Brown’s  Clotel,  for  instance  where  the  promise  of  personal  advancement  is  
repeatedly  held  out  to  characters—in  benevolent  owners,  marriages,  or  professional  
                                                                                                              
19  See  Frank  Wilderson’s  Red,  White  and  Black  (2010)    
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advancement  and  respect—only  to  be  withheld  in  vivid  scenes  of  separation  and  
abjection  that  echo  in  seemingly  infinite  repetitions  across  generations.  A  key  example  of  
such  repetition  is  Clotel’s  own  melancholy  re-­‐‑experience  of  her  mother’s  symbolic  
abandonment  by  the  nation  (in  the  form  of  Jefferson),  when  the  white  man  she  has  been  
involved  with,  Horatio  Green,  abandons  her  and  her  children.  Another  example  can  be  
found  on  the  various  published  arguments  on  behalf  of  emigration  written  by  Martin  R.  
Delany.  Here  the  theme  of  the  blocked  possibility  of  Afro-­‐‑American  advancement  
returns  again  and  again  as  he  alternates  between  portraits  of  black  writers  and  
businessmen  and  accounts  of  the  utter  failure  of  life  in  the  U.S.  to  sustain  their  
enterprise.  Most  famously,  Delany’s  pamphlet  “The  Political  Destiny  of  the  Colored  
Race”  (1854)  develops  a  profound  criticism  of  voting  rights,  a  primary  demonstration  of  
citizenship  and  the  capacity  for  political  progress.  “To  have  the  ‘right  of  suffrage’  as  we  
rather  proudly  term  it,  is  simply  to  have  the  privilege—there  is  no  right  about  it—of  
giving  our  approbation  to  that  which  our  rulers  may  do,  without  the  privilege,  on  our  
part,  of  doing  the  same  thing”  (228).  What  many  had  seen  as  a  path  to  advancement  and  
inclusion,  Delany  decries  as  the  reproduction  of  the  status  quo  of  black  subservience  in  
performances  of  freedom  that  were  in  fact  a  form  of  coercion  and  forced  consent.20    
                                                                                                              
20  We  may  also  think  about  this  forced  performance  of  progress  along  the  line  of  David  Scott’s  idea  of  
“Conscripts  of  Modernity.”  In  a  reading  of  C.L.R.  James’  Black  Jacobins,  Scott  describes  the  Toussaint  
Louverture’s  embrace  of  the  language  and  discursive  norms  of  the  Enlightenment—its  romantic  
commitments  to  progress  and  liberation—as  necessarily  ambivalent:  an  intervention  into  a  ground  of  action,  
modernity,  that  “was  not  his  to  choose…it  was  the  context  in  which  his  options  were  themselves  constituted  
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This  ambivalence  about  progress—and  the  performance  of  progress—was  also  a  
response  to  the  experience  of  slavery.  Those  who  had  been  enslaved  simply  were  not  
able  to  experience  the  time  of  enslavement  as  one  of  growth  or  progress  in  the  linear  
model.  As  Lloyd  Pratt  has  argued,  slave  labor  “makes  time  itself  repetitive,  circular:  time  
is  structured  by  the  calendar  of  capital  accumulation  and  the  strength  of  the  seed;  it  is  
not  the  transparent  medium  of  progress”  (61).  This  repetition  is  not,  importantly,  merely  
a  residual  form  of  temporal  experience,  within  which  slaves  were  held  in  order  to  bar  
their  entry  into  the  properly  “modern”  experience  of  personal  growth  and  political  
progress.  Nor  was  it  simply  a  deprivation  of  time  (as  scholars  like  Henry  Louis  Gates  
have  argued).  It  was  a  specific  structure  of  modern  capitalism  and  slavery  that  produced  
the  slave’s  temporal  experience  as  “natural,”  outside  of  politics  and  history,  and  existing  
merely  for  the  cycles  of  crop  production  and  the  extraction  of  labor,  in  order  to  facilitate  
political  control  and  subjugation.  
Histories  like  Brown’s  of  the  Haitian  revolution,  or  Robert  Benjamin  Lewis’  Light  
and  Truth,  often  used  a  temporally  marked  language  of  degradation  to  write  about  the  
effects  of  slavery  and  the  life  of  the  enslaved.  In  doing  so,  they  were  forced  to  confront  
                                                                                                              
  
and  made  visible  and  recognizable  as  options-­‐‑as-­‐‑such”(90).  This  movement  in  and  through  the  terrain  of  
modernity  and  modern  political  forms  happens  (and  has  potency  in  the  moment  of  the  Haitian  Revolution)  
despite,  in  Scott’s  assessment,  that  such  a  terrain  is  necessarily  tragic  for  black,  anti-­‐‑colonial  politics,  since  it  




and  describe  the  sudden  and  startling  emergence  of  the  demand  for  freedom  against  
slavery  from  the  very  same  “degraded”  and  enslaved  groups.  The  norms  for  imagining  
progress  consisted  of  depicted  a  long  tradition  of  Anglo-­‐‑American  political  forms,  their  
laborious  encoding  in  law,  and  the  occasional  heroic  champion  who  would  advance  the  
cause  of  freedom  in  times  of  crisis.  But  the  Haitian  Revolution,  and  other  instances  of  
slave  revolt,  presented  the  radical  eruption  of  freedom  from  the  least  “elevated”  groups  
of  blacks  in  the  New  World,  the  enslaved  population.  Similarly,  many  heroes  of  black  
freedom,  from  Crispus  Attucks  to  Toussaint  Louverture  were  killed  and  defeated.  They  
were  tragic  martyrs  who  never  would  see  the  end  of  slavery  and  whose  
accomplishments  often  produced  no  discernable  material  progress,  as  the  flames  of  
revolution  they  lit  were  quickly  extinguished  by  the  violence  of  white  reaction.  Thus,  
progress  was  both  withheld  from  free  and  enslaved  blacks  in  the  United  States  and  
frequently  took  the  form  of  imperialist  violence  against  whatever  communities  had  
managed  to  escape  the  nation’s  racial  orders.  
While  the  dominant  culture  of  history  imposed  a  progressive  model  of  time  as  
productive  of  political  subjectivity,  black  history  was  written  from  within  an  intimate  
awareness  that  such  an  experience  of  time  was  not  the  only  possibility  offered  by  
modernity.  Although  many  abolitionist  writers  of  history  relied  on  categories  like  
progress  to  imagine  a  future  beyond  slavery  (as  evidenced  by  the  frequency  with  which  
words  like  “elevation”  “advancement”  and  even  “progress”  are  used  in  the  titles  of  
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these  documents)  from  the  1840s  onwards  these  writers  began  engaging  a  much  wider  
variety  of  temporal  models  to  describe  black  history,  some  of  which  scholars  have  begun  
to  recover.  Most  writing  on  temporality  in  antebellum  writing  by  black  authors  has  
focused  on  the  overall  narrative  and  intellectual  frameworks  of  their  imagination  of  
time.  Stephen  G.  Hall  has  argued  that  writers  like  Pennington  and  Lewis  were  
harkening  back  to  Christian  and  Enlightenment  models  of  history  that  had  utilized  
stories  of  the  rise  and  fall  of  civilizations  to  explain  the  relative  decline  of  Africa  in  the  
present  moment  and  the  inevitability  that  the  United  States  would  undergo  such  a  
decline  in  the  future.  Lloyd  Pratt  has  read  Frederick  Douglass’  fictionalized  account  of  
the  1842  revolt  aboard  The  Creole,  “The  Heroic  Slave”  (1852),  as  imagining  a  messianic  
time  of  revolution  (at  odds  with  linear  temporality)  that  “brings  the  past  into  the  present  
in  order  to  effect  an  unbending,  universal  justice  for  all  times.  The  moment  of  true  
revolution  is  in  no  way  homogeneous  or  empty  but  unimaginably  full;  the  moment  of  
revolution  conjures  all  moments  at  once  and  distributes  universal  justice.”  (68)  
Purposefully  eschewing  any  concept  of  linear  progress,  both  of  these  approaches  to  
black  temporality  emphasize  the  radicalism  of  Enlightenment  and  religious  calls  to  
justice  in  the  context  of  progressive  and  secular  post-­‐‑revolutionary  modernity.  Yet,  they  
remain  dependent  on  romantic  metanarratives  that  look  to  absent  totalities  in  the  past  
and  the  future  to  ground  the  value  of  the  fragmented  experiences  of  freedom  in  the  
present.  Such  fragmentation  is  also  a  key  theme  in  the  most  thorough  study  of  black  
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historical  writing  in  the  antebellum  period,  John  Ernest’s  Liberation  Historiography.  Ernest  
argues  that  the  desperate  black  narratives  of  history  were  seen  by  writers  and  readers  as  
fragments  of  an  absent  totality:  a  future  moral  and  political  order  that  would  enable  
black  writers  to  finally  consolidate  a  coherent  history  out  from  under  a  white  
supremacist  order.    
These  readings  are  compelling  and  accurate  as  to  the  intellectual  and  narrative  
framework  of  black  historical  writing,  but  they  fail  to  account  for  how  troubled  any  
attempt  to  recuperate  the  present  to  a  future  beyond  slavery  that  might  never  come  
could  be  to  black  writers  as  the  antebellum  period  wore  on.  The  problem  of  the  negative  
temporal  space  that  black  political  life  had  been  violently  constrained  to  is  narratively  
disavowed  by  the  projection  of  fuller  futures  and  pasts,  where  black  freedom  would  
once  again  be  possible.  The  texts  of  black  history  register  that  problem  and  a  radically  
different  imagination  of  freedom  when  they  attempt  to  describe  visually  and  
emotionally  what  black  freedom  looked  and  felt  like.  I  want  to  suggest  that  we  try  to  
think  these  fragments  without  the  (highly  modern  and  romantic)  gesture  towards  an  
absent  totality—that  is,  to  think  them  as  unredeemable  in  an  absent  future  order  and  of  
substantive  value  in  the  present  of  their  experience.  What  if  in  their  repetition,  
dissemination,  and  hesitating  growth,  these  portraits  of  black  freedom  produce  a  feeling  
for  the  possibility  of  freedom  in  the  now,  absent  a  structure  of  temporal  stability  that  
would  give  root  to  a  singular  future?  What  if  we  highlight  instead  the  affective  and  
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ethical  capacity  of  freedom  in  the  present  tense  to  institute  a  break  in  the  temporalities  of  
political  progress?  Such  a  temporal  imagination  registers  freedom  as  proliferating  in  the  
feeling  of  black  social  life  for  an  unbounded  future  at  the  fringes  of  national  time  and  
space  and  reimagines  the  spread  linear  progress  to  those  spaces  as  a  tragic  and  deathly  
encounter  with  imperial  violence.  This  temporal  aesthetic  was  a  response  not  only  to  the  
repetitious  conditions  of  slavery,  but  to  how  the  discourse  of  progress  seemed  to  bar  a  
recognition  of  sites  of  black  political  activity  and  freedom  that  were  hesitating  in  their  
emergence,  unproductive  of  a  future  beyond  the  immediate  experience  of  freedom,  and  
unable  to  be  consolidated  in  a  linear  epic  of  the  formation  of  a  black  nation  or  identity  
because  they  emerged  in  such  disparate  times  and  places.    
The  remainder  of  this  chapter  will  be  concerned  with  three  important  images  in  
black  history  and  how  their  portrayal  in  works  by  Lewis,  Delany  and  Nell  contributed  to  
a  black  aesthetics  of  history  that  proliferates  existing  experiences  of  freedom.  I  will  move  
from  Delany’s  account  of  Crispus  Attucks’s  martyrdom  at  the  Boston  Massacre  (the  
image  most  loaded  with  a  desire  for  national  inclusion)  to  Lewis’s  contributions  to  the  
black  abolitionist  effort  to  redeem  the  Haitian  Revolution  from  racist  anxieties  over  
black  revolt,  and  I  will  end  with  Nell’s  singular  portrait  of  Black  Seminoles.  I  will  show  
how  the  aesthetic  practice  of  black  history  exceeded  the  boundaries  of  nationalism  and  
linear  experiences  of  progress.  I  describe  this  engagement  and  revision  of  nationalist  
history  as  aesthetic  because  it  is  at  the  local  level  of  description  of  the  sounds  and  images  
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of  black  freedom  that  the  discourse  of  progress  is  interrupted  by  the  impossibility  of  
recuperating  black  freedom  to  the  violence  (and  violent  aesthetics)  of  progressive  time.  
Because  a  scene  of  progress  had  to  generate  the  expectation  of  its  own  future,  it  was  
impossible  for  these  historians  to  adapt  those  aesthetic  norms  to  histories  of  black  
freedom  that  had  been  suppressed  and  defeated.  It  is  through  the  struggle  to  make  black  
freedom  apparent  as  productive  of  new  sites  of  possibility  and  resistance  that  black  
history  radically  revised  the  aesthetics  of  history.  
  
The Aesthetics of Slave Revolution 
  
Just  as  nationalist  historians  had  used  the  aesthetics  of  history  to  generate  
emotional  experiences  of  the  past  that  would  testify  to  the  continued  existence  of  a  
national  community  and  thereby  ease  anxieties  over  progress  provoked  by  slavery  and  
imperialism,  black  abolitionist  writers  utilized  aesthetics  to  produce  a  community  of  
readers  committed  to  the  cause  of  antislavery.  But  it  became  increasingly  difficult  to  
imagine  the  time  that  they,  their  historical  subjects,  and  their  readers  inhabited  as  
constituted  in  terms  of  a  continuity  conceived  in  terms  of  linear  progress.  In  the  early  
national  period  writers  like  Absalom  Jones  and  Richard  Allen  made  appeals  to  a  
predominantly  white  public  on  behalf  of  the  ideals  of  the  American  Revolution  and  the  
universality  of  the  human  race.  Relying  on  moral  suasion,  they  observed  the  lack  of  
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black  inclusion  in  the  political  life  of  the  nation  and  wrote  to  project  themselves  from  
that  temporally  absent  position  into  the  capacity  to  inhabit  modern  time  and  make  
claims  on  the  future.  As  Benjamin  Quarles  has  demonstrated,  the  tone  of  black  
abolitionism  changed  radically  in  the  1830s.  As  the  progress  of  abolitionism  stalled,  after  
having  advanced  through  1810  with  laws  against  slavery  in  the  northern  states  and  a  
ban  on  the  international  slave  trade,  and  the  politically  compromised  white-­‐‑led  
American  Colonization  Society  became  the  most  prominent  voice  against  slavery,  black  
abolitionists  grew  dissatisfied  with  the  tone  of  the  previous  generation.21    
Large  political  changes  in  the  1820s  shifted  the  dynamics  of  the  abolitionist  
movement.  The  discourse  of  American  politics  became  less  genteel  with  the  rise  of  
Jacksonianism  and  universal  white  male  suffrage,  while  white  supremacist  attitudes  
became  more  entrenched.22  By  the  end  of  the  1820s  the  further  exclusion  of  blacks  from  
political  life  in  the  north  and  the  expansion  of  slavery  into  the  lower  south  were  
punctuated  by  the  prosecution  of  Denmark  Vesey  and  his  companions  in  1822  for  slave  
conspiracy  and  Nat  Turner’s  open  revolt  in  Virginia  in  1831.  In  the  midst  of  these  
                                                                                                              
21  Compromised  because,  as  black  abolitionists  throughout  the  antebellum  period  pointed  out,  the  
Colonization  Society  had  focused  on  the  removal  of  free  blacks  as  a  way  to  resolve  tensions  within  the  
United  States,  while  still  maintaining  national  control  over  black  colonies  in  Africa.  Colonization  schemes  
did  not  propose  a  path  to  emancipation  and  equality  so  much  as  a  redistribution  of  racial  hierarchies  
throughout  global  space.  David  Kazanjian  has  detailed  the  imperialism  at  the  heart  of  the  colonizing  
movement  at  length  in  his  Colonizing  Trick  (2003).  See  especially  chapter  two:  “Racial  Governmentality:  The  
African  Colonization  Movement.”    
  
22  The  concurrent  rise  of  universal  white  male  suffrage  with  white  supremacism  has  been  detailed  in  
Alexander  Saxton’s  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  White  Republic  (1990).  
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upheavals  David  Walker  published  his  Appeal:  the  definitive  statement  of  the  growing  
frustrations  in  black  communities  with  the  failed  promises  of  the  American  revolution  
and  the  announcement  of  the  agenda  of  black  abolitionism  for  the  next  three  decades.  
Rejecting  the  deference  of  the  past  for  a  sharper  tone,  Walker’s  pamphlet  spoke  directly  
to  a  growing  black  audience  for  works  of  political  protest  and  explorations  of  black  
history  and  identity.23  In  contrast  to  Jones  and  Allen,  Walker’s  emotionally  charged  call  
for  action  on  behalf  of  justice  spoke  from  what  he  acknowledged  was  a  position  outside  
the  national  community,  and  outside  its  progress,  to  radically  ask  what  progress,  if  any  
at  all,  could  be  claimed  on  behalf  of  the  nation.  
The  increasing  militancy  of  black  abolitionism  from  the  1830s  onwards  resulted  
in  a  renewed  historical  awareness  of  past  struggles  against  slavery  and  a  sense  that  any  
continuity  with  that  past  had  barred  the  national  construction  of  which  subjects  and  
what  events  could  and  could  not  carry  forward  the  flame  of  political  progress.  As  many  
writers  came  to  question  the  moral  suasion  tactics  of  an  early  generation,  they  sought  
out  stories  of  a  black  past  that  would  inflame  black  pride  and  unity  while  condemning  
the  racism  of  the  nation  that  had  continued  to  oppress  them  in  seeming  contradiction  to  
its  revolutionary  ideals.  T.  Morris  Chester  captured  the  tone  of  much  of  this  writing  in  a  
pamphlet  published  in  the  midst  of  the  Civil  War,  “[t]ake  down  from  your  walls  
                                                                                                              
23  For  more  on  the  centrality  of  David  Walker  in  shifting  the  tone  of  black  abolitionism,  see  “Introduction”  
Pamphlets  of  Protest.  Elizabeth  Ruah  Bethel  has  described  at  length  the  cultural  processes  that  formed  
African-­‐‑American  racial  identity  in  the  black  public  sphere  throughout  this  period  in  The  Roots  of  African-­‐‑
American  Identity.  (1997)  
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pictures  of  WASHINGTON,  JACKSON,  and  MCLELLAN;  and  if  you  love  to  gaze  upon  
military  chieftains,  let  the  gilded  frames  be  graced  with  the  immortal  TOUSSAINT”  
(308).  Black  history  found  outlets  for  expression  in  abolitionist  newspapers,  oratory  in  
churches  and  conventions,  and  pamphlet  literature.  At  the  center  of  this  output  there  
were  a  number  of  full-­‐‑length  histories  published  by  abolitionist  societies.  As  Stephen  G.  
Hall  has  pointed  out,  this  writing  responded  to  the  call  of  David  Walker  to  “trouble  the  
pages  of  the  historians,”  and  much  of  it  was  directly  shaped  by  the  political  concerns  of  
abolitionism  and  the  need  to  respond  to  the  absence  of  a  black  past  in  dominant  
accounts  of  history  and  then  prominent  religious  and  scientific  myths  of  racial  
inferiority.  In  contrast  to  romantic  history,  which  despite  its  anxiety  about  progress  was  
written  as  if  progress  and  continuity  were  a  natural  mode  of  historical  experience,  the  
absence  of  the  black  past  in  cultural  memory  meant  that  black  history  had  to  imagine  its  
audience  as  capable  of  being  constituted  and  of  sharing  in  a  feeling  for  freedom  on  the  
ground  of  profound  temporal  discontinuity.  
Martin  Delany’s  hybrid  history/emigration  pamphlet,  The  Condition,  Elevation,  
Emigration,  and  Destiny  of  the  Colored  People  of  the  United  States  (1952),  contains  a  powerful  
example  of  a  discussion  of  the  aesthetic  qualities  of  historical  images  that  registers  black  
abolitionist  ambivalence  about  nationalist  models  of  progress  as  a  necessary  foundation  
for  a  community  committed  to  anti-­‐‑slavery.  The  text  is  ultimately  an  argument  in  favor  
of  African  emigration,  but  it  begins  with  a  thorough  critique  of  the  American  
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Colonization  Society  on  the  grounds  that  black  American’s  had  every  “claim  as  Citizen’s  
of  the  United  States”  and  that  the  colonization  plans  supported  by  the  society  were  
merely  a  way  to  remove  “free  colored  people  from  the  land  of  their  birth,  for  the  security  
of  slaves,  as  property  of  the  slave  propagandists”  (58).  In  order  to  make  his  claim  on  
behalf  of  black  citizenship,  Delany  recounts  a  great  deal  of  history,  primarily  in  the  form  
of  brief  biographies  of  black  soldiers  who  served  in  the  Revolutionary  War  and  the  War  
of  1812,  black  scholars,  women  and  men  of  letters  (like  Phyllis  Wheatley),  businessmen,  
and  mechanics.  These  biographies  are  a  conscious  attempt  to  consolidate  a  memory  of  
black  contributions  to  the  American  nation,  while  at  the  same  time  raising  communal  
awareness  of  achievements  that  have  been  excluded  and  omitted  from  the  dominant  
culture’s  historical  knowledge.  While  we  might  read  these  biographies  as  exercises  in  
citizen-­‐‑subject  formation,  providing  portraits  of  black  women  and  men  as  able  to  
experience  and  participate  in  linear  forms  of  progress  like  “elevation”  and  “moral  
advancement,”  Delany  suggests  that  his  writing  has  purpose  that  exceeds  the  case  for  
citizenship.    
When  the  text  turns  to  its  recovery  of  black  historical  figures,  about  half  way  
through,  Delany  begins  with  Crispus  Attucks,  an  African  American  who  was  killed  in  
the  Boston  Massacre.  Delany  was  not  himself  recovering  the  story  of  Attucks.  By  1852  it  
was  the  centerpiece  of  contributionist  abolitionism,  and  Delany  cites  Nell’s  earlier  
pamphlet  (discussed  in  what  follows)  as  an  important  source.  Delany  introduces  his  
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account  of  this  story  stating  that  he  wishes  to  present  Attucks  before  his  reader  to  
“establish  our  right  of  equal  claims  of  citizenship  with  other  American  people.”    But  he  
expands  on  this  rhetoric,  suggesting  that  in  remembering  Attucks  story:    
We  shall  be  able  to  prove,  that  colored  men,  not  only  took  part  in  a  great  scene  of  
the  first  act  for  independence,  but  that  they  were  actors—a  colored  man  was  
really  the  hero  in  the  great  drama,  and  actually  the  first  victim  in  the  
revolutionary  tragedy—then  indeed,  shall  we  have  more  than  succeeded,  and  
have  reared  a  monument  of  fame  to  the  history  of  our  deeds,  more  lasting  than  
the  pile  that  stands  on  Bunker  Hill  (92).  
  
Here  Delany  engages  a  historical  discourse  on  visuality  only  to  subvert  it  through  his  
shifting  aesthetic  metaphors.  Revolutionary  history  is  a  scene—a  type  of  painting—in  
which  he  is  locating  a  color—blackness—hitherto  unacknowledged.  Visual  appearance  
in  the  present  tense  is  (typically  for  antebellum  history)  the  arena  in  which  historical  
truth  is  established.  The  second,  dramatic,  metaphor  derives  from  the  discourse  of  
political  representation.  John  Ernest  has  argued  that  placing  black  subjects  into  the  
representational  theater  of  politics  enabled  black  writers  to  make  claims  on  the  nation’s  
laws  and  future.  But  what  can  we  make  of  the  final  claim  to  monumentality?  
Monumental  history  (after  Nietzsche)  has  typically  been  described  as  totalizing  and  
limiting:  an  exercise  of  power  by  history  over  those  citizens  who  are  imagined  as  
collected  by  the  nation.  As  Russ  Castronovo  has  written,  monumentality  helps  us  
understand  that  “it  is  indeed  power  that  shapes  the  history  that  defines  people  as  
citizens  and  collects  them  in  the  nation”  (109).  So  does  Delany’s  monumental  
imagination  subjugate  the  future  of  black  political  life  within  its  own  militant  terms?  
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This  is  an  unavoidable  aspect  of  Delany’s  rhetoric,  and  he  wrote  his  text  as  a  
salvo  in  the  emigrationist  contention  with  the  assimilationists  over  the  future  of  blacks  
in  America.  Delany’s  militarism  also  contributed  to  a  narrative  of  race  elevation  formed  
in  the  aftermath  of  Jacksonian  politics  that  emphasized  assertions  of  masculinity  and  
power  to  imagine  a  future  in  terms  strikingly  similar  to  nationalist  monumentality  (as  
described  by  Maggie  Montesino  Sale).  However,  it  is,  in  my  view,  important  that  the  
only  actual  monument  that  Delany  figures  in  his  rhetoric  is  Bunker  Hill,  which  he  
describes  as  a  “pile.”  The  Bunker  Hill  monument  had  great  symbolic  significance,  both  
in  national  myth  and  as  the  embodiment  of  the  retrospective  bombast  many  antebellum  
writers  opposed.  It  was  the  location  of  one  of  Daniel  Webster’s  most  famous  patriotic  
speeches,  as  well  as  a  target  of  scorn  and  humor  in  works  Emerson  and  Melville  who  
saw  it  as  a  sign  of  America’s  subservience  to  the  past.  But  rather  than  simply  turning  
away  from  this  monument  and  the  model  of  nationalist  commemoration  it  represents,  
Delany  suggests  its  time  is  limited,  and  even—in  the  language  of  “pile”—hints  at  its  
destruction.  In  order  for  Delany  to  project  the  type  of  historical  memory  that  would  take  
Crispus  Attucks  as  heroic  and  exemplary  he  has  to  speculate  on  it  emerging  from  the  
ashes  of  a  nationalist  memory  and  its  projections  into  the  future.  Similarly,  writing  
Crispus  Attucks  into  the  great  drama  of  history  changes  the  very  terms  of  that  drama  
from  within,  shifting  historical  romance  into  the  tragedy  of  a  martyr  whose  cause  has  
yet  to  come  to  fruition  and  whose  rightful  monument  is  withheld  by  the  forms  of  
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memory  that  refuse  to  commemorate  him.  Black  memory  in  the  antebellum  period  was  
forced  to  work  within  a  dynamic  where  for  every  claim  on  representative  inclusion  in  
the  terms  of  the  nation,  another  counter-­‐‑claim  emerged  that  promised  a  future  in  which  
the  monuments  of  that  nation  would  no  longer  be  remembered.  These  obscure  but  
desired  futures  would  radically  revise  the  present’s  relationship  to  the  past  in  ways  that  
black  historians  could  only  articulate  as  fundamentally  different  from  existing  modes  of  
commemoration.  Delany  registers  in  his  discourse  on  monumentality  a  recognition  that  
the  experience  of  temporal  continuity  and  of  inhabiting  a  position  within  an  epic  of  
progress  articulated  by  romantic  nationalist  history  was,  for  black  Americans,  at  the  
very  least  withheld  to  a  future  that  could  only  be  imagined  negatively,  as  everything  
that  was  not  the  present  experience  of  time.  
Nationalist  discourse  had,  quite  simply,  blocked  the  forms  of  recognition  that  
black  historians  sought  to  provide  for  the  black  community.  The  aesthetic  circuit  that  
romantic  history  imagined  between  the  witnessing  of  historical  beauty  and  the  binding  
of  the  contemporary  nation  in  linear  present  was  unavailable  to  black  historians,  for  
whom  history  was  more  tragedy  than  romance.  But  in  place  of  this  linear  vision  of  time,  
these  historians,  beginning  with  Robert  Benjamin  Lewis  and  continuing  in  with  Delany  
and  Nell,  began  to  articulate  another  way  of  imagining  how  coming  into  contact  with  
history  could  produce  a  community  committed  to  anti-­‐‑slavery.  They  began  to  imagine  
the  history  of  slavery  as  a  sort  of  aesthetic  blank,  an  experience  of  deprivation,  out  of  
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which  came  the  ability  to  experience  freedom  differently—not  as  secured  by  a  past,  but  
as  proliferating  between  and  across  temporal  and  spatial  borders,  both  in  the  past  
represented  in  texts  and  between  that  past  and  present  in  which  they  were  read.    
The  foundation  for  this  type  of  imagination  was  provided  by  Lewis,  who  
allowed  for  multiple  temporal  logics  to  co-­‐‑exist  in  the  same  work  of  history  in  his  
profligate  mixing  of  sacred  and  profane  time.  John  Ernest  has  pointed  that  Lewis’s  
history  was  the  only  truly  “Bancroftian”  work  of  black  history  in  its  sweeping  scope.  
While  its  exhaustive  accounting  of  biblical,  classical  and  modern  history  begins  as  if  it  
will  proceed  as  a  similar  linear  story  of  progress  (or  cycles  of  rise  and  fall),  moving  from  
the  book  of  Genesis  to  the  Haitian  revolution,  the  order  to  the  text  quickly  fragments.  
Lewis  constantly  advances  and  reverts,  moving  back  and  forth  among  each  major  era  
with  little  attention  to  causation  or  teleology.  The  organization  of  the  text,  while  framed  
by  a  chronological  beginning  and  ending,  is  primarily  thematic.  It  is  organized  into  
chapters  with  headings  like  “Ancient  Kings  and  Wars,”  “Colored  Generals  and  
Soldiers,”  “The  Arts  and  Sciences.”  Ernest  has  explained  this  organization  as  “meta-­‐‑
historical”  in  how  it  calls  attention  to  the  normal  linear  presentation  of  historical  texts  as  
arbitrary  and  prods  the  reader  to  think  through  the  connections  between  the  Bible  and  
modern  slavery.  There  is  a  more  straightforward  and  less  anachronistic  explanation  
though;  Lewis  was  a  minister  and  orator  and  he  was  writing  the  texts  for  others  like  
him.  The  book  was  not  meant  to  serve  as  a  comprehensive  account  of  black  history,  but  
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to  recover  various  stories  that  abolitionists  and  preachers  could  then  incorporate  into  
their  public  lectures  and  sermons.  The  organization  of  the  book  allows  for  just  such  a  
parsing  by  enabling  readers  to  easily  find  stories  of  the  struggle  against  slavery  and  
black  achievement  that  fit  many  of  the  themes  that  were  common  in  to  abolitionist  
oratory.  Lewis  himself  made  no  pretensions  to  originality,  and  stated  at  the  outset  that  
he  “publish[ed]  this  volume  of  collections  from  sacred  and  profane  history,  with  a  
determination  that  correct  knowledge  of  the  Colored  and  Indian  people,  Ancient  and  
Modern,  may  be  extended  freely”  [emphasis  added]  (v).  Lewis  meant  for  these  stories  of  
freedom  to  be  reiterated  and  dispersed  (as  he  had  copied  many  from  earlier  texts)  so  as  
to  establish  a  widespread  imagination  of  black  freedom  in  his  present  moment—a  
moment  that  contained  multiple  political  and  temporal  possibilities  for  overcoming  
slavery.  Lewis  structured  the  text  according  to  its  imagined  social  life  in  the  present,  and  
not  according  to  the  order  of  events  in  the  past.  He  wanted  to  articulate  discontinuous  
connections,  not  provide  an  epic  narrative.  
Light  and  Truth  is  concerned  then,  not  with  a  singular  vision  of  temporal  
progress,  but  the  proliferation  of  stories  (and  times)  of  freedom.  And  where  many  
romantic  historians  were  careful  about  parsing  different  orders  of  time  (in  distinctions  
between  the  sacred  and  secular,  or  between  European  progress  and  Aztec  intransigence)  
Lewis  was  more  concerned  with  opening  up  multiple  models  of  the  emergence  of  
freedom  rather  than  insisting  on  a  single  order  that  would  secure  the  future  he  wanted  
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to  project.  The  lack  of  organization  has  resulted  in  a  reputation  as  a  haphazard,  
repetitious,  and  flawed  text—a  canonical  judgment  first  made  by  Delany  in  The  
Condition,  Elevation,  Emigration  and  Destiny.  Yet,  as  Stephen  Hall  reminds  us,  Delany’s  
complaint  derived  from  his  own  project  of  developing  a  more  concrete  and  materialist  
account  of  Africa  and  blacks  in  the  modern  world  that  rejected  earlier  religious  modes  of  
history.  It  does  not  mean  that  Delany  was  opposed  to  the  fundamental  necessity  of  
proliferating  images  of  black  freedom  that  would  exceed  the  order  of  historical  
knowledge.  Lewis’s  a-­‐‑chronological  narrative  technique  is  not  at  all  dissimilar  from  the  
thematic  approach  taken  up  by  Delany  in  his  own  history.  
As  Bancroft’s  works  ceaselessly  advance  towards  the  American  Revolution,  
Lewis’  text  moves,  in  its  haltering  and  redoubled  path,  towards  a  final  chapter  on  the  
Haitian  Revolution,  positioning  it  as  the  culmination  of  the  struggle  for  black  freedom  
thus  far.  Rather  than  simply  recounting  what  were  becoming  well  known  stories  of  the  
heroism  of  Toussaint  Louverture  or  Vincent  Ogé  at  the  pinnacle  of  the  revolution’s  
climactic  scenes  of  resistance  and  revolt,  Lewis  spends  the  majority  of  the  chapter  on  
events  in  Haiti  after  the  revolution.  There  is  a  canny  recognition  in  this  decision  of  the  
need  to  portray  black  political  life  as  capable  of  achieving  ongoing  organization  and  
stability  to  effectively  petition  for  representational  equality  within  dominant  
historiographical  norms.  But  it  is  those  same  norms  that,  as  Michel-­‐‑Rolph  Trouillot  
notes,  produced  the  Haitian  Revolution  as  impossible.  Outside  of  a  normal  
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understanding  of  history  as  productive  of  coherent  subjectivities  and  more  or  less  stable  
forms  of  political  organization,  the  Haitian  Revolution  was  unimaginable  to  many  
observers  all  of  the  world.  
As  discussed  in  the  last  chapter,  the  dominant  portrayal  of  the  Haitian  
Revolution  in  the  antebellum  period  (as  found  in  Bryan  Edward’s  history)  was  one  of  
apocalyptic  violence.  There  was  also  a  more  sympathetic  counter-­‐‑image  of  Haiti  
circulating  in  abolitionist  writing  based  on  Marcus  Rainsford’s  account  in  An  Historical  
Account  of  the  Black  Empire  of  Hayti  (1802).  But  this  version  was  also  temporally  troubling.  
Written  by  captain  in  the  British  Army  who  claimed  to  have  met  Toussaint  Louverture,  
it  presents  the  revolution  in  favorable  terms,  explaining  how,  although  many  had  
believed  “in  the  talents  and  virtues  of  these  people  […]  it  remained  for  the  close  of  the  
eighteenth  century  to  realize  the  scene,  from  a  state  of  abject  degeneracy:-­‐‑-­‐‑to  exhibit,  a  
horde  of  negroes  emancipating  themselves  from  the  vilest  slavery,  and  at  once  filling  the  
relations  of  society,  enacting  laws,  and  commanding  armies”  (xi).  Rainford’s  text  grants  
Haiti  a  position  of  importance  in  the  history  of  the  modern  world  and  it  anticipates  the  
problems  faced  by  abolitionists  looking  to  draw  on  the  revolution  as  a  resource  for  black  
emancipation.  While  he  attempted  to  position  his  reader  from  the  standpoint  of  an  
impartial  (and  thus  Euro-­‐‑American)  witness  to  Haiti,  the  scene  he  presents  short-­‐‑circuits  
normal  narratives  of  progress;  former  slaves  come  to  inhabit  political  forms  arising  “at  
once”  from  “abject  degeneracy,”  rather  than  slowly  developing  a  national  culture  over  
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time.  There  is  a  sense  in  texts  like  these  that  the  writer  is  struggling  against  not  only  
previous  prejudicial  accounts  (Rainsford  refers  to  Edward’s  book  by  name)  but  also  the  
incredulity  of  readers  attempting  to  imagine  the  temporally  impossible.  
Already  operating  outside  the  norms  of  progressive  history,  Lewis  reimagines  
the  meaning  of  Haiti  for  black  freedom.  He  begins  with  a  brief  summation  of  the  initial  
revolution  of  1791-­‐‑1801:    
This  most  horrid  war  terminated  the  expulsion  of  the  whites  from  all  of  the  
island,  and  the  establishment  of  an  independent  government,  administered  by  a  
colored  people.  Dessalines,  a  chief,  was  proclaimed  Emperor  of  Hayti,  under  
whose  virtue,  talents,  and  bravery,  the  people  of  this  government  succeeded  in  
the  arduous  struggle  for  liberty.  (386)  
  
  In  part,  Lewis  was  attempting  to  portray  political  upheaval  in  Haiti  in  a  positive  light  to  
correct  dominant  U.S.  fantasies  of  the  apocalyptic  violence  and  dissolution  of  slave  
revolution  by  saying  that  this  revolution’s  “comparatively  peaceful  character  reflects  
much  credit  on  the  often  calumniated  people  of  that  land”  (389).  However,  he  exceeds  
the  criteria  of  such  judgments  by  upending  the  normal  temporal  conditions  out  of  which  
liberty  was  thought  to  emerge.  Lewis  layers  language  drawn  from  dominant  discourse  
on  progress  with  an  alternate  vision  of  futurity  that  asserts  the  necessity  that  liberty  be  
conditioned  by  nothing  in  the  past.    
Take  the  following  claim  about  the  treatment  of  the  defeated  regime:  “but  the  
clemency  of  the  victorious  party,  and  the  moderation  they  evinced,  is  much  to  their  
honor,  and  serves  clearly  to  show  that  Hayti  has  an  improved  and  improving  
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people”(391).  The  language  of  improved  and  improving  suggests  dominant  modes  of  
historical  development.  However,  notice  that  the  occasion  of  the  demonstration  of  that  
improvement  is  not  what  U.S.  historians,  nervous  about  political  dissolution,  would  
normally  consider  a  sign  of  progress:  i.e.,  the  decay  of  Boyer’s  regime  into  tyranny  and  
its  necessary  overthrow.  Lewis  consciously  invokes  tyranny  and  privilege  to  describe  
Boyer’s  regime  to  suggest  a  comparison  with  the  U.S.  and  the  slave  system  that  leaves  
the  latter  coming  up  short.  The  constantly  improving  Haiti  is  not  a  development  in  a    
temporal  model  of  freedom’s  emergence  and  institutionalization  authorized  by  the  
United  States,  but  away  from  it  into  futures  unclaimed,  but  always  being  announced  
and  made  immanent  by  emancipatory  politics  of  undoing  the  grip  of  tyranny  (now  well  
understood  as  slavery)  in  the  New  World.    And  if  the  revolutionary  break  marks  the  
conditions  of  displaying  improvement,  it  is  a  display  of  improvement  that  Lewis  has  
already  implicitly  denied  the  U.S.,  whose  history  he  does  not  reproduce  in  any  form  in  
his  text.  Lewis  wrests  the  connotation  of  “improving”  from  the  context  of  progress  or  
providence,  deploying  it  to  suggest  the  repetition  of  a  demand  for  freedom,  always  
articulated  as  a  lived  rejection  of  tyranny.    
William  C.  Nell’s  Colored  Patriots  of  the  American  Revolution  produces  a  similar  
reiterative  aesthetic  of  history  in  its  portrayal  of  “patriots”  whose  acts  of  political  
resistance  cut  across  and  away  from  U.S.  nationalism.  While  Nell  begins  the  text  with  
descriptions  of  African-­‐‑Americans  who  participated  in  the  foundational  scenes  of  
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American  Independence,  he  quickly  moves  beyond  that  framework  in  portraits  of  slave  
revolts,  the  Haitian  Revolution,  and  the  resistance  of  maroons  in  Florida  to  the  
imperialism  of  the  U.S.  army.  The  title  of  the  text,  along  with  an  introduction  by  Harriet  
Beecher  Stowe,  obscures  the  subversions  of  nationalism  found  within.  Stowe’s  
introduction  attempts  to  describe  the  quality  of  the  portraits  in  the  text,  linking  them  to  
standard  accounts  of  national  founding  and  patriotic  bravery:    
In  considering  the  services  of  the  Colored  Patriots  of  the  Revolution,  we  are  to    
Reflect  upon  them  as  far  more  magnanimous,  because  rendered  to  a  nation  
which  did  not  acknowledge  them  as  citizens  and  equals,  and  in  whose  interests  
and  prosperity  they  had  less  at  stake.  It  was  not  for  their  own  land  they  fought,  
not  even  for  a  land  which  had  adopted  them,  but  for  a  land  which  had  enslaved  
them,  and  whose  laws,  even  in  freedom,  oftener  oppressed  than  protected.  
Bravery,  under  such  circumstances,  has  a  peculiar  beauty  and  merit.  (xiv)    
  
This  address,  aimed  at  sympathetic  white  audiences,  points  towards  the  limitations  of  
the  project  of  merely  drawing  black  soldiers  into  a  previously  framed  portrait  of  
American  history.  The  presence  of  black  soldiers  exceeds  the  frame  of  that  history,  
outshining  and  calling  into  question  what  elsewhere  had  been  called  the  bravery  of  
white  soldiers  and  shifting  the  criteria  for  judging  the  relationship  between  time  and  
progress.  Stowe’s  description  of  selfless  benevolence  on  the  part  of  these  patriots  is  at  
odds  with  a  text  whose  catalog  of  black  patriots  includes  not  only  those  who  served  in  
the  revolutionary  conflicts  but  also  heroes  of  black  revolt  against  the  national  order  like  
Nat  Turner  and  Denmark  Vesey.    
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Nell’s  text  constantly  moves  beyond  its  stated  purpose  of  cataloguing  black  
soldiers  lost  to  history.  It  starts,  as  was  typical  for  this  type  of  historiographical  work,  
with  Massachusetts  and  the  story  of  Crispus  Attucks.  In  other  words,  it  starts  by  placing  
a  black  figure  at  the  foundational  scene  of  sacrifice  in  the  cause  of  U.S.  independence  
and  political  freedom.  And  this  would  seem  to  be  the  principle  of  the  work:  to  recover  
the  obscured  presence  of  black  soldiers  in  the  fight  for  freedom  so  as  to  attest  to  the  
capacity  and  deservingness  of  black  Americans  for  partaking  in  liberty  and  citizenship.  
While  Nell  does  attempt  to  reconstruct  the  histories  of  a  number  of  black  soldiers  
throughout,  he  exceeds  this  framework  and  implicitly  questions  the  idea  that  the  
American  Revolution  had  come  to  an  end  with  the  emergence  of  the  United  States.  In  
this,  Nell  does  more  than  simply  catalogue  figures  of  black  patriotism  or  revolt,  he  
revises  the  norms  of  description  in  romantic  history  concerning  what  the  past  would  
have  to  look  and  feel  like  to  ground  a  present  and  future  of  freedom.  This  revision  
emerges  from  the  fundamental  problem  Nell  confronted  in  writing  about  black  history  
in  terms  of  progress:  the  history  of  black  revolt  in  the  U.S.  up  to  the  point  of  his  writing  
was  one  of  unrepentant  failure  and  retributive  white  violence.  By  refusing  to  make  a  
categorical  distinction  between  the  black  patriots  who  served  in  the  successful  war  for  
independence  and  those  who  fought  in  unsuccessful  revolts,  the  text  demonstrates  the  
inadequacy  of  linearity  and  continuity  for  describing  the  emergence  of  a  black  demand  
for  freedom  against  slavery  and  imperialism.  
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The  chapter  on  South  Carolina  begins  with  testimony  of  black  service  in  the  
Revolutionary  War,  but  it  concludes  with  a  re-­‐‑telling  of  the  planned  revolt  and  trial  of  
Denmark  Vesey  in  1822—clearly  suggesting  a  relationship  between  the  former  and  the  
latter  that  nonetheless  cannot  be  traced  as  one  of  direct  cause  and  effect  or  filiation.  
Although,  as  some  commentators  have  noted,  it  is  difficult  to  determine  whether  this  
particular  instance  of  slave  rebellion  was  actually  being  plotted  or  was  merely  a  
phantasm  of  white  paranoia  (both  were  realities  of  life  in  the  antebellum  south,  and  they  
fed  into  each-­‐‑other),  Nell  accepts  the  accounts  produced  at  Vesey’s  trial  and  widely  
reported  at  the  time  that  Vesey  had  indeed  plotted  a  revolt  and  that  his  plot  involved  
retributive  violence  against  the  white  population  of  Charleston  and  the  surrounding  
areas.  It  is  possible,  then,  that  Nell  was  as  conscious  of  the  ways  white  paranoia  
produced  these  phantasms  of  violence  as  of  the  frequent  resistance  of  slaves  to  white  
terror,  and  was  seeking  to  conflate  the  two  in  furthering  the  construction  of  a  mythical  
figure  of  black  liberation.  This  purpose  is  attested  at  the  outset  of  the  section  in  which  
Nell  traces  Vesey’s  origins  to  the  Caribbean:  “[d]uring  the  Revolutionary  War,  Captain  
Veazie,  of  Charleston,  was  engaged  in  supplying  the  French  in  St.  Domingo  with  slaves  
from  St.  Thomas.  In  the  year  1781,  he  purchased  Denmark,  a  boy  of  about  fourteen  years  
of  age,  and  afterwards  brought  him  to  Charleston,  where  he  proved,  for  twenty  years,  a  
faithful  slave”  (245).  This  section  brings  together  the  time  scales  of  the  revolutionary  war  
and  the  dissemination  of  black  revolt  outward  from  the  Caribbean  and  Haiti—a  
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connection  that  will  be  re-­‐‑affirmed  at  the  conclusion  of  this  episode  when  Nell  writes  
that:  “[h]istory,  faithful  to  her  high  trust,  will  engrave  the  name  of  Denmark  Veazie  on  
the  same  monument  with  Moses,  Hampden,  Tell,  Bruce,  Wallace,  Toussaint,  Lafayette,  
and  Washington”  (247).  By  placing  national  heroes,  memorializing  and  authorizing  the  
nation,  alongside  religious  figures  and  Toussaint  Louverture,  Nell  invites  his  readers  to  
question  what  entity  history  memorializes  if  not  a  national  culture.  What  do  monuments  
commemorate  if  it  is  not  emergence  of  a  singular  nation  and  what  times  exist  alongside  
that  of  the  nation  if  Haiti  and  black  insurgents  who  have  been  tried  and  killed  by  the  
state  are  remembered  in  the  same  breath  as  Washington?  Nell’s  writing  articulates  two  
radically  disjunctive  historical  events  together  to  show  how  the  active  creation  of  
historical  memory  in  the  actions  and  feeling  of  resistance  bridges  the  discontinuous  
without  disavowing  the  tensions  and  contradictions  between  these  two  events.  
Such  a  radical  tension  can  only  be  maintained  though  by  the  activity  of  
revolutionaries  that  withholds  both  nationalist  violence  and  the  romantic  rewriting  of  
history  into  a  false  continuity  in  which  those  tensions  are  disavowed.  Nell  describes  the  
plan  of  the  revolt  thus:    
In  1822,  Denmark  Veazie  formed  a  plan  for  the  liberation  of  his  fellow-­‐‑men  from  
bondage.  In  the  whole  history  of  human  efforts  to  overthrow  slavery,  a  more  
complicated  and  tremendous  plan  was  never  formed.  A  part  of  the  plan  matured  
was,  that  on  Sunday  night,  the  16th  of  June,  a  force  would  cross  from  James'ʹ  
Island  and  land  on  South  Bay,  and  march  up  and  seize  the  Arsenal  and  guard-­‐‑
house;  another  body,  at  the  same  time,  would  seize  the  Arsenal  on  the  Neck;  and  
a  third  would  rendezvous  in  the  vicinity  of  the  mills  of  Denmark'ʹs  master.  They  
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would  then  sweep  the  town  with  fire  and  sword,  not  permitting  a  single  white  
soul  to  escape.  (245-­‐‑6).  
  
Nell  immediately  follows  this  with  the  statement  that  “[t]he  sum  of  this  intelligence  was  
laid  before  the  Government.”  The  phrasing  leaves  ambiguous  the  status  of  the  plot;  such  
a  plan,  in  all  the  history  of  human  efforts  was  “never  formed,”  and  it  is  only  given  here,  
in  a  text  making  claims  on  Vesey  as  a  martyr  of  black  liberation,  as  the  intelligence  that  
was  laid  before  the  authorities  that  resulted  in  swift  and  violent  suppression.    The  tenses  
used  in  the  description  also  hint  at  this  ambiguity;  they  suggest  a  possible  future  that  
did  not  occur,  split  off  at  the  side  of  what  did,  in  a  biblical  image  of  retribution  
“sweeping  the  town  with  fire  and  sword”  that  is  promised  but  left  unfulfilled.  This  un-­‐‑
fulfillment,  according  to  Nell,  was  a  product  of  four  years  of  meetings  held  in  secret  in  
which  both  futures—that  of  black  revolt  and  that  of  betrayal,  exposure  and  white  
violence—remained  possible.  The  time  of  unfulfillment,  in  which  futures  (and  pasts)  
become  immanent  in  the  present  moment  and  are  held  in  tension  and  multiply  historical  
possibility  while  withholding  the  violence  of  progress,  is  the  substance  of  the  temporal  
affect  that  Nell  and  other  black  historians  wanted  to  recover.  It  was  imagined  as  a  
shared  feeling  for  other  temporal  possibilities  around  which  a  community  committed  to  
black  freedom  could  constitute  itself  in  the  face  of  retributive  violence  against  such  
difference  in  the  national  temporal  order.  
Nell’s  text  produces,  not  a  romantic  portrait  that  guarantees  a  future  of  progress,  
but  an  iteration  of  those  revolts  and  desires  that  have  managed  to  hold  the  oppressive  
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linearity  imagined  by  romantic  nationalism  in  abeyance.  History  writing  becomes  a  site  
of  that  recovery  and  the  production  of  the  continued  possibility  of  opening  up  such  
imaginative  space  because  it  is  where  the  obscured  histories  suppressed  by  nationalist  
history  introduce  startling  and  ambiguous  figures  of  irresolution.  To  harken  back  to  the  
ideas  of  Derek  Walcott  explored  at  the  outset  of  this  dissertation,  history  as  a  structure  of  
feeling  and  form  of  knowledge  that  projects  a  singular  future  is  here  disrupted  by  an  
active  aesthetic  forgetting  of  that  future  in  a  different  affective  knowledge  of  what  has  
been  and  what  can  be.  These  works  do  not  just  articulate  counter-­‐‑narratives  or  
revisionist  histories  in  the  senses  we  have  become  accustomed  to  in  the  twentieth-­‐‑
century;  they  produce  a  feeling  for  other  possibilities  in  time  that  disrupts  the  affective  
power  of  nationalist  history  to  transform  the  past  into  a  resource  for  securing  a  sense  of  
the  future.  They  are  histories  in  which  non-­‐‑existent  monuments  can  monumentalize  a  
history  of  liberation  that  features  Toussaint  and  Denmark  Vesey:  histories  that  have  not  
yet  happened  but  exist  in  a  feeling  for  resistance  and  differentiation  that  withholds  and  
shadows  white,  nationalist,  and  imperialist  violence.  
Nell’s  text  portrays  these  scenes  of  irresolution  and  active  forgetting  as  
proliferating,  appearing  and  reappearing  across  the  line  of  a  nominally  linear  
development  of  freedom.  One  of  the  most  important  sections  of  Nell’s  text  is  his  
recovery  of  the  story  of  the  destruction  of  a  Black  Seminole  community  at  Blount’s  Fort  
in  Florida  at  the  hand  of  Andrew  Jackson’s  army.  The  scene  stages  an  aesthetic  
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mourning  of  a  lost  time  of  black  freedom  and  a  will  to  recovery  it  as  holding  possibilities  
for  rethinking  time  and  political  resistance  in  the  present.24  This  history  of  the  Black  
Seminoles  in  Florida  has  not  been  well  kept  by  modern  historians.  While  most  know  that  
slaves  in  southern  Georgia  had  fled  into  Spanish  held  Florida  and  joined  the  Native  
Americans  who  lived  there,  only  later  to  be  subjugated  in  the  First  and  Second  Seminole  
Wars  as  the  United  States  moved  to  incorporate  Florida,  few  consider  it  an  important  
site  of  slave  revolution.25  Yet,  as  J.B.  Bird  has  documented  on  his  web  resource,  Rebellion,  
the  Black  Seminole  rebellion  from  1835-­‐‑1838  was  the  largest  slave  revolt  in  U.S.  history,  
consisting  of  hundreds  of  plantation  slaves  in  southern  Georgia  fleeing  to  join  other  
black  Seminoles  in  Florida  in  an  uprising  that  consisted  of  over  a  thousand  slaves.  The  
majority  of  these  slaves  were  either  returned  to  plantations,  or  later  emigrated  west  out  
of  Florida  when  Indian  Removal  policies  reached  the  peninsula.  The  word  Seminole  
itself  is  a  corruption  of  the  Spanish  cimmaron,  meaning  run-­‐‑away,  the  same  word  from  
which  maroon  is  derived.  While  Nell’s  text  is  about  an  event  at  the  outset  of  the  first  
Seminole  war  (beginning  in  1816)  and  not  directly  concerned  with  this  larger  slave  
revolution,  both  are  echoed  in  his  descriptions  and  his  decision  to  include  the  Seminoles  
in  his  history  of  “colored  patriots.”  We  are  very  far  from  the  nationalist  norms  that  
                                                                                                              
24  Nell  draws  on  the  research  of  the  anti-­‐‑imperialist  Congressmen,  Joshua  Reed  Giddings,  who  would  
publish  his  own  account  of  the  Seminole  Wars  in  1858  as  The  Exiles  of  Florida.  Reed’s  text  however  is  more  
committed  to  detailing  U.S.  atrocities  against  the  Seminoles  than  accounting  for  black  political  life  in  Florida.    
  
25  For  a  full  account  of  the  history  of  the  Seminole’s  resistance  to  U.S.  imperialism,  and  the  tribe’s  
complicated  Indigenous  and  Black  identity,  see  Kevin  Mulroy’s  The  Seminole  Freedmen  (2007).  
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structured  the  beginning  of  the  text,  as  Nell  navigates  the  challenges  of  portraying  a  
revolution  that  not  only  failed,  but  was  utterly  forgotten  both  as  a  revolution  and  as  
consisting  of  slaves.  
Here  is  how  Nell  introduces  the  flight  of  slaves  out  of  Georgia  into  Florida:    
Little  is  yet  known  of  that  persecuted  people;  their  history  can  only  be  found  in  
the  national  archives  at  Washington.  They  had  been  held  as  slaves  in  the  state  
referred  to  [Georgia];  but  during  the  Revolution,  they  caught  the  spirit  of  liberty,-­‐‑
-­‐‑at  the  time  so  prevalent  throughout  our  land,-­‐‑-­‐‑and  fled  their  oppressors,  and  
found  asylum  among  the  aborigines  living  in  Florida.  (249)  
  
The  slaves  hold  the  revolutionary  break  of  1776  open  by  fleeing  the  nation.  The  ideals  of  
freedom  do  not  progress  in  one  time  or  place,  but  rather  are  reinvented  in  the  spread  of  
ideals  in  the  feeling  of  the  fugitive  slaves  facing  the  closure  of  possibility  promised  by  
Nell’s  past-­‐‑tense:  “the  spirit  of  liberty—at  the  time  so  prevalent.”  He  goes  on  to  conflate  
the  idea  of  resistance  with  flight  “they  had  effectually  eluded  or  resisted  all  attempts  to  
re-­‐‑enslave  them”  (249).    The  challenge  of  telling  this  story  is  that  there  is  no  romantic  
violence,  and  there  is  no  authorization  of  the  present.  Everything  that  happens  is  a  flight  
from  violence  and  the  closure  of  revolutionary  possibility  and  its  scene  of  action  is  
confined  entirely  to  the  past,  in  that  it  produces  no  concrete  future  political  order.  
At  the  same  time,  Nell  clearly  wants  his  reader  to  feel  both  the  tragedy  that  befell  
these  “patriots”  and  the  possibility  of  a  different  way  of  feeling  and  experiencing  
freedom  they  make  possible.  “They  were  true  to  themselves  and  to  the  instinctive  love  
of  liberty  which  is  planted  in  every  human  heart.  Most  of  them  had  been  born  amidst  
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perils,  reared  in  the  forests  and  taught  from  childhood  to  hate  the  oppressors  of  their  
race  […]  of  the  three  hundred  an  eleven  residing  in  ‘Blount’s  Fort’  not  more  than  twenty  
had  been  held  in  actual  servitude”  (249).    The  possibility  that  Nell  wants  his  readers  to  
imagine  is  that  of  a  life  beyond  slavery  that  nonetheless  retains  a  commitment  to  
opposing  slavery,  since  freedom  is  occasioned  by  that  flight  of  resistance.  It  is  a  form  of  
resistance  that  emerges  from  a  sense  that  freedom  does  not  progress  out  of  slavery,  but  
breaks  with  it  as  the  occasion  from  which  the  iterative  renewal  of  liberty  emerges.      
This  freedom  is  necessarily  a  threat  to  the  progress  it  announces  a  difference  
from—the  narrative  of  and  feeling  for  linear  history  it  disrupts—and  so,  as  Nell  writes,  
the  slaveholders  in  Georgia  petitioned  the  U.S.  government  to  recapture  the  fort.  Under  
the  orders  of  Andrew  Jackson,  American  troops  are  sent  to  destroy  the  fort.  When  word  
reaches  the  maroons  harbored  inside,  Nell  observes  the  distress  of  those  inside  fearful  
they  will  be  returned  to  slavery,  and  shows  how  the  experience  of  slavery  (of  the  
inability  to  progress  beyond  it)  also  produces  and  disseminates  the  force  and  sentiments  
of  its  opposition,  regardless  of  a  promised  future:    
This  was  observed  by  an  old  patriarch,  who  had  drank  the  bitter  cup  of  servitude  
—  one  who  bore  on  his  person  the  visible  marks  of  the  thong,  as  well  as  the  
brand  of  his  master  upon  his  shoulder.  He  saw  his  friends  falter,  and  he  spoke  
cheerfully  to  them.  He  assured  them  that  they  were  safe  from  the  cannon-­‐‑shot  of  
the  enemy  —  that  there  were  not  men  enough  on  board  to  storm  their  fort;  and,  
finally,  closed  with  the  emphatic  declaration,  "ʺGive  me  liberty,  or  give  me  death!"ʺ  




The  repetition  of  the  American  Revolutionary  sentiment  at  this  scene,  so  distant  from  
American  Nationalism,  in  direct  opposition  to  its  official  agents,  and  in  a  ruin  of  past  
imperial  incursion  into  Florida,  captures  both  the  intensity  of  ex-­‐‑slaves’  resistance  to  
slavery  and  how  such  a  feeling  disseminates  regardless  of  gender  and  national  
allegiance,  projective  of  an  unknowable  future  that  their  children  promise  but  that  they  
will  never  see.  The  nameless  patriarch  who  speaks  is  less  a  nationalist  hero  of  this  
nascent  (and  soon  to  be  defeated)  group  than  a  conduit  for  these  words  of  liberty  that  
can  be  produced  and  reproduced,  or  rather,  iterated  and  reiterated  outside  of  the  
demands  of  citizenship  and  subjectivity.  It  is  a  social  affect,  sustained  only  by  the  active  
participation  of  all  the  members  of  this  impromptu  community  without  the  need  to  be  
authorized  by  concretization  into  a  future  of  political  progress.  For  the  fort  is  soon  to  be  
destroyed  and  there  will  be  no  advancement  into  freedom  and  citizenship,  only  a  
momentary  lived  future  beyond  slavery,  felt  in  the  agony  of  its  annunciation.    
Nell  describes  how  this  scene  is  commemorated  after  an  explosion  has  destroyed  
the  fort  and  all  but  fifteen  inhabits  killed  (and  those  fifteen  returned  to  slavery):    
But  the  dead  remained  unburied;  and  the  next  day,  the  vultures  were  feeding  
upon  the  carcasses  of  young  men  and  young  women,  whose  hearts  on  the  
previous  morning  had  beaten  high  with  expectation.  Their  bones  have  been  
bleached  in  the  sun  for  thirty-­‐‑seven  years,  and  may  yet  be  seen  scattered  among  
the  ruins  of  that  ancient  fortification.  (254)  
  
Nell  links  images  of  black  defeat  and  abjection,  so  typical  to  romantic  history,  not  to  the  
advancement  of  liberty,  but  to  the  advancement  of  the  imperial  nation  since  that  day.  In  
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his  portrayal,  the  nation’s  progress  is  a  scene  of  death;  the  drawing  of  this  space  beyond  
the  nation  into  that  temporality  is  a  scene  of  destruction  that  helps  produce  the  present  
Nell  lives  in,  where  black  freedom  needs  to  be  recovered  from  the  ruins  of  history.  
However,  the  recovery  of  the  iterative  liberty  of  the  maroons  in  their  reproduction  of  the  
words  of  liberty  despite  their  lack  of  any  claim  on  being  agents  of  progress  or  citizens  of  
the  nation.  As  a  result,  their  temporary  escape  from  the  violence  of  progress  (living  not  
in  a  modern  industrial  society,  but  in  a  ruin  of  past  imperialism)  produces  an  entirely  
different  temporal  affect  than  progressive  history.  Rather  than  trying  to  envision  pasts  
that  help  readers  feel  secure  in  progress  towards  a  desired  political  future,  black  history  
tarries  with  the  knowledge  of  where  freedom  is  not  and  asserts  the  primacy  of  flight  and  
continued  flights  away  from  the  security  of  the  nation  as  an  experience  valuable  
regardless  of  the  violence  that  has  interceded  between  that  past  and  the  present.  Each  
experience  with  freedom  in  the  past  is  written  as  a  tenuous  and  insecure  flight  into  an  
unknown  future,  felt  as  valuable  not  because  it  guarantees  the  present,  but  because  it  
differs  from  it,  unsettling  the  sense  that  the  imperial  nation’s  control  of  the  future  is  
inevitable.  
By  moving  from  Crispus  Attucks,  to  Haiti,  to  Blount’s  Fort,  black  history  in  the  
antebellum  period  responded  to  the  problems  the  historical  model  of  progress  had  
created  for  representing  and  addressing  black  political  life.  Forms  of  citizenship  and  
romantic  nationalism  that  depended  on  an  experience  of  time  as  progress  were  made  
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unavailable  to  black  writers  by  the  cyclical  times  of  slavery  and  the  abrogation  of  the  
progress  of  black  freedom  in  imperial  violence.  But  out  of  that  experience  came  a  need  to  
commemorate  the  mere  iteration  of  the  demand  for  freedom  and  the  fleeting  experience  
of  it  in  scenes  that  lacked  a  future  or  security.  Although  the  language  of  progress  and  
citizenship  hangs  over  these  texts  in  their  scenes  of  revolt  and  masculine  militancy,  they  
also  register  other  temporal  possibilities.  They  introduce  other  temporal  affects  
produced  by  the  experience  they  provide  their  readers  of  freedom  at  the  margins  of  
national  time  and  space,  capable  of  spreading  only  through  an  escape  from  the  
progressive  time  of  the  nation.  In  its  ongoing  imagination  of  a  time  and  space  beyond  
slavery  (but  always  haunted  by  it)  that  emerges  and  re-­‐‑emerges  from  each  experience  of  
oppression  and  resistance,  black  history  proliferates  temporal  affects  at  odds  with  
nationalist  history’s  violent  will  towards  the  same.  
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Coda: Romance, The Black Masses, and the Future of the 
Aesthetics of History. 
  
What  is  the  political  art  of  historical  writing?  And  how  do  we  evaluate  its  
aesthetic  dimensions?  This  dissertation  has  been  aimed  at  considering  history  written  in  
the  antebellum  period  not  only  as  literature,  but  also  as  a  romantic  aesthetic  project  that  
emerged  at  the  intersection  of  nationalist  concerns  about  time,  race  and  imperialism.  As  
I  have  argued,  antebellum  romantic  history  produced  temporal  affects:  feelings  for  the  
future  encoded  in  a  racialized  aesthetic  that  marked  blackness  as  an  unsettling  threat  
and  disruption  in  the  providential  order  of  time.  So  far,  my  argument  has  been  
historicist  in  nature.  I  have  explored  the  emergence  of  this  aesthetic  in  a  specific  place  
and  time.  In  this  coda  I  would  like  to  extend  beyond  that  temporal  frame  to  explore  two  
texts  from  the  twentieth  century  that  engage  and  revise  romantic  aesthetics  for  an  anti-­‐‑
racist  and  anti-­‐‑colonialist  project:  W.E.B.  Du  Bois’  Black  Reconstruction  in  America  (1935)  
and  C.L.R.  James’  The  Black  Jacobins  (1938).  As  will  show,  both  texts  are  heavily  
influenced  by  the  aesthetic  norms  of  romantic  antebellum  history,  but  their  revision  of  
the  concept  of  the  black  masses  points  towards  how  historical  writing  can  produce  
alternate  visions  of  the  past  that  upend  our  sense  of  the  present  and  future.    
I  have  chosen  to  focus  on  these  two  texts  for  a  few  reasons.  Black  Reconstruction  
and  The  Black  Jacobins  are  both  romantic  texts,  produced  long  after  the  romantic  era,  but  
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sharing  many  of  the  aesthetic  aspects  and  political  tensions  of  romantic  history.  Both  are  
extraordinarily  rich  literary  works  written  with  a  great  deal  of  dramatic  skill  and  
overflowing  with  poetic  language.  And  yet,  despite  the  overt  literariness  of  both  texts,  
both  have  rarely  been  analyzed  as  literature.  This  is  more  clearly  the  case  with  Black  
Reconstruction  than  The  Black  Jacobins,  which  has  received  some  limited  treatment  as  
literature.  While  a  number  of  scholars,  including  Cedric  Robinson,  Anthony  Bogues  and  
Nahum  Chandler,  have  looked  beyond  Du  Bois’s  historical  analysis  in  order  to  explore  
Black  Reconstruction  as  a  contribution  to  American  and  black  radical  political  thought,  the  
book’s  primary  legacy  has  been  as  an  accomplishment  in  historiography.1  At  its  time,  a  
powerful  work  of  revisionism,  Black  Reconstruction  and  its  famous  final  chapter  “The  
Propaganda  of  History”  was  a  polemic  against  the  so-­‐‑called  Dunning  School  of  history,  
which  was  ascendant  in  the  academic  and  popular  consciousness  of  1930s  and  served  as  
an  ideological  appendage  of  Jim  Crow.  The  Dunning  School  saw  Reconstruction  as  a  
disaster  brought  on  the  nation  by  unscrupulous  carpetbaggers  and  was  hostile  to  any  
acknowledgement  of  black  political  achievement  during  and  after  slavery.  Du  Bois’s  
intervention  was  a  rigorous  and  objective  work  of  historical  scholarship  aimed  at  tracing  
out  the  agency  of  black  slaves  in  securing  their  own  freedom  during  the  Civil  War  and  
the  accomplishments  of  the  short-­‐‑lived  abolition-­‐‑democracy  that  had  power  in  the  South  
                                                                                                              
1  See  Robinsons’s  Black  Marxism  (1983)  Bogues’s  Empire  of  Liberty  (2010)  and  Chandler’s  “Of  Exorbitance,”  
(2008)  as  well  as  his  just  published  X:  The  Problem  of  the  Negro  as  a  Problem  for  Thought  (2013).  
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during  the  years  of  radical  Reconstruction.  Although  received  indifferently  in  the  1930s,  
Du  Bois’s  revision  of  the  historiography  of  the  Civil  War  and  Reconstruction  has  now  
become  the  foundation  of  historical  research  into  the  period.  As  the  historian  Eric  Foner  
has  recently  written,  “Black  Reconstruction  is  replete  with  insights  that  have  become  
almost  commonplace  today  but  were  revolutionary  in  their  implications  for  the  
scholarship  of  the  1930s”  (411).  Though  well  deserving  its  regard  as  a  foundational  work  
of  historiography,  this  epochal  achievement  has  cast  a  shadow  over  the  text’s  reception,  
hiding  from  view  its  literary  form  and  incisive  revision  of  historical  aesthetics.2  
In  contrast,  scholars  have  recently  begun  to  think  about  The  Black  Jacobins  in  
literary  terms.  Beyond  a  biography  that  emphasized  the  relationship  between  James’s  
political  and  literary  pursuits  and  important  writing  by  Sylvia  Wynter  arguing  for  a  
coherent  poetic  project  across  James’s  fiction  and  non-­‐‑fiction,  a  number  of  scholars  have  
conducted  formal  literary  analyses  of  The  Black  Jacobins.3  Yet,  much  of  this  work  treats  
the  literary  (and  more  specifically,  the  romantic  form)  of  James’s  history  as  a  political  
problem.  Kara  M.  Rabbitt  has  suggested  that  James’s  political  materialism  and  his  
analysis  of  the  contending  forces  that  made  the  Haitian  Revolution  possible  are  in  
tension  with  his  attempt  to  draw  a  romantic  literary  portrait  of  Toussaint  Louverture  as  
                                                                                                              
2  Du  Bois  has  frequently  been  treated  as  a  literary  writer,  but  scholars  interested  in  him  for  these  reasons  
(most  famously,  Henry  Louis  Gates  and  Houston  Baker)  have  focused  most  of  their  attention  on  his  career  
as  an  essayist  and  his  novels.    
  
3  See  Paul  Buhle’s  C.L.R.  James:  The  Artist  as  Revolutionary  (1989)  and  Sylvia  Wynter’s  essay,  “Beyond  the  
Categories  of  the  Master  Conception:  The  Counterdoctrine  of  the  Jamesian  Poesis”  (1992).    
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a  paradigmatic  figure  of  the  revolution.  As  she  argues,  “James  emphasis  on  the  figure  of  
Toussaint  in  The  Black  Jacobins  may  obscure  the  importance  of  the  elements  of  resistance  
James  himself  will  later  celebrate  in  Facing  Reality—the  works  (the  slaves)  themselves  
and  their  repeated  demonstrations  of  the  capacity  for  self-­‐‑government”  (128).    
In  a  far  more  extensive  analysis,  David  Scott  in  Conscripts  of  Modernity  (2004)  
defends  James’s  decision  to  emplot  the  text  as  a  revolutionary  romance,  arguing  that  it  
enabled  James  to  write  his  narrative  of  the  Haitian  revolution  as  an  anti-­‐‑colonial  allegory  
with  political  relevance  for  the  present  of  the  1930s.  As  Scott  suggests,  James’s    
“indignant  vindication  of  the  negated  achievements  of  blacks”  in  the  historical  past  
speaks  to  “the  justice  of  their  anticolonial  claims  to  self-­‐‑determination  and  political  
sovereignty,”  in  the  present  (64).  However,  Scott  goes  on  to  argue  that  the  critical  
saliency  of  romance  was  limited  to  James’s  historical  moment,  where  the  dreams  of  
decolonization  where  still  unfulfilled.  James’s  narrative  structure  emplotted  colonialism  
as  a  negative  force  that  suppressed  the  self-­‐‑determination  of  the  slaves  until  the  slaves  
overcame  that  oppressive  power  and  freed  themselves.  In  the  1930s,  that  narrative  had  
vivid  correspondences  to  the  situation  of  blacks  in  the  West  Indies  and  Africa,  which  
James  did  not  hesitate  to  point  out  throughout  the  text.  In  Scott’s  assessment,  the  
political  demands  of  our  “after-­‐‑Bandung”  historical  moment  are  sufficiently  different  to  
drain  romance  of  its  critical  edge.  Because  we  need  to  re-­‐‑think  colonial  power  as  positive  
(rather  than  negative  force)  that  constitutes  subjectivities  and  subordinates  them  in  a  
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global  distribution  of  power  (outside  of  direct  colonial  oppression),  Scott  emphasizes  
James’s  revisions  in  the  1960s  that  rewrote  the  downfall  of  Toussaint  as  a  tragic  narrative  
demonstrating  the  impossible  choices  faced  by  subjects  who  have  been  abducted  or  
conscripted  into  modernity  by  colonial  and  imperial  power.  For  Scott,  although  romance  
once  had  critical  saliency,  it  is  now  a  problematic  mode  for  any  critical  post-­‐‑colonial  
project.  
In  Scott’s  terms,  Both  Black  Reconstruction  and  The  Black  Jacobins  are  structured  as  
romances  or  in  Hayden  White’s  analysis  of  the  form,  “dramas  of  disclosure”  that  
describe  “the  liberation  of  a  spiritual  power  fighting  to  free  itself  from  the  forces  of  
darkness,  a  redemption”  (152).  Just  as  The  Black  Jacobins  tells  the  story  of  the  dramatic  
entrance  of  oppressed  slaves  into  the  drama  of  world  history,  freeing  themselves  from  
colonial  oppression,  Black  Reconstruction  re-­‐‑envisions  the  Civil  War  as  a  conflict  whose  
terms  of  encounter  were  transformed  into  a  war  of  liberation  by  the  action  oppressed  
slaves  took  to  free  themselves  and  institute  a  new  democracy  in  the  South.  In  addition,  
James  and  Du  Bois  are  self-­‐‑conscious  about  the  aesthetic  power  of  their  histories  
throughout,  frequently  acknowledging  that  the  political  effects  they  desire  for  their  texts  
exceed  a  merely  positivist  recovery  of  a  forgotten  past.  Although  both  texts  make  a  
claim  to  being  objective  and  scientific  in  their  anti-­‐‑racist  and  materialist  analysis  of  the  
forces  that  shaped  these  two  great  antislavery  revolutions,  they  both  contain  overt  
aesthetic  appeals  to  their  readers.  James  begins  his  history  with  a  preface  that  
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emphasizes  the  historical  moment  of  its  composition  by  echoing  and  displacing  William  
Wordsworth’s  famous  idea  about  poetry  as  “experience  recollected  in  tranquility”:  “It  
was  in  the  stillness  of  a  seaside  suburb  that  could  be  heard  most  clearly  and  insistently  
the  booming  of  Franco’s  heavy  artillery,  the  rattle  of  Stalin’s  firing  squads  and  the  fierce  
shrill  turmoil  of  the  revolutionary  moment  striving  for  clarity  and  influence.  Such  is  our  
age  and  this  book  is  of  it,  with  something  of  the  fever  and  the  fret”  (xi).  In  striking  
contrast  to  the  way  institutionalized  historians  since  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  
had  insisted  on  the  suppression  of  the  subjectivity  and  experience  of  the  historian,  James  
emphasizes  the  sensations  and  emotions  of  the  political  crises  of  his  moment  as  shaping  
forces  in  his  history  of  the  Haitian  Revolution.    
Du  Bois  was  more  circumspect  in  his  acknowledgement  of  his  own  perspective  
than  James,  but  he  was  no  less  vigorous  in  his  description  of  the  historical  moment  in  
which  he  wrote.  Closing  his  history  with  a  note  of  cataclysmic  irony,  he  compared  the  
unfulfilled  desires  of  the  ex-­‐‑slaves  and  radical  reconstructionists—“the  finest  effort  to  
achieve  democracy  for  the  working  millions  which  this  world  had  ever  seen”—with  the  
present  moment  of  composition,  in  which  teachers  of  history  propagandize  against  “the  
negro.”  In  this  present,  Du  Bois  writes  prophetically,  “in  Africa,  black  backs  run  red  
with  the  blood  of  the  lash;  in  India,  a  brown  girl  is  raped;  in  China,  a  coolie  starves;  in  
Alabama,  seven  darkies  are  more  than  lynched;  while  in  London,  the  white  limbs  of  a  
prostitute  are  hung  with  jewels  and  silk.  Flames  of  jealous  murder  sweep  the  earth,  
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while  brains  of  little  children  smear  the  hills”  (728).  It  should  also  be  remembered  that  
Du  Bois’s  understanding  of  all  history  as  “propaganda”  echoes  an  earlier  claim  he  made  
on  behalf  of  art  and  literature  in  “The  Criteria  for  Negro  Art”  (1926):  both  are  forms  that  
militate  on  behalf  of  truth  and  both  are  prophetic  annunciations  of  a  possible  future  of  
freedom.4    
As  suggested  above,  this  romanticism  has  been  perceived  as  a  political  problem  
by  many  scholars  concerned  with  James.  While  the  romantic  plot  of  Black  Reconstruction  
has  been  less  remarked  upon,  scholars  have  frequently  understood  Du  Bois’s  interest  in  
aesthetics  and  his  theory  of  beauty  found  in  “The  Criteria  for  Negro  Art”  and  Darkwater  
(1920)  as  an  unfortunate  and  regressive  elitism  at  odds  with  his  commitments  to  radical  
democracy  and  Marxist  analysis.  Although  not  an  overtly  critical  account,  Robert  
Gooding-­‐‑Williams’s  discussion  of  Du  Bois’s  aesthetics  demonstrates  the  problem  many  
have  identified  with  his  romanticism.5  As  Gooding-­‐‑Williams  argues,  Du  Bois’s  
conception  of  beauty  was  intimately  linked  with  his  “politics  of  expressive  self-­‐‑
realization:”    
                                                                                                              
4  As  Ross  Posnock  has  pointed  out,  Du  Bois  use  of  the  word  “propaganda”  should  not  be  read  as  if  it  were  a  
naïve  Stalinism  that  would  subordinate  truth  and  beauty  to  narrow  political  causes.  Rather,  Du  Bois  re-­‐‑
deployment  of  propaganda  was  an  attempt  to  overcome  shallow  perceived  oppositions  between  art  and  
politics.  As  Posnock  writes,  Du  Bois  “turns  the  aesthetic  into  a  militant  part  of  a  political,  economic,  and  
cultural  movement”  (520).  
  
5  For  critical  feminist  account  of  the  same  problem  in  Du  Bois,  see  Elizabeth  Schlabach’s  “Du  Bois’  Theory  of  
Beauty:  Battles  of  Femininity  in  Darkwater  and  Dark  Princess”  (2012).  For  defense  of  Du  Bois’s  aesthetics  (an  
elitism)  as  part  of  his  democratic  pragmatism  see  Ross  Posnock’s  “The  Distinction  of  Du  Bois:  Aesthetics,  
Pragmatism,  Politics”  (1995).    
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For  Du  Bois,  a  politics  suitable  to  counter  Jim  Crow  had  both  to  uplift  the  black  
masses—that  is,  assimilate  them  to  the  norms  of  modernity  by  battling  prejudice  
and  backwardness—and  to  articulate  the  ethos  of  the  black  folk.  In  short,  it  had  
to  be  a  politics  of  modernizing  “self-­‐‑realization”  (Du  Bois’s  term)  that  expressed  
the  spiritual  identity  of  the  folk.  (206)    
  
Beauty  was  a  tool  and  product  of  uplift,  where  the  self-­‐‑consciousness  of  the  black  
masses  became  formalized  in  folk  forms  (like  the  sorrow  songs)  that  would  lift  them  out  
of  backwardness  and  into  modern  forms  of  political  self-­‐‑awareness.6  In  a  more  critical  
discussion,  Ronald  A.  T.  Judy  has  argued  that  this  approach  to  aesthetics  led  Du  Bois  
into  an  embrace  of  black  vanguardism  that  was  at  odds  with  his  desire  for  radical  
democracy.7  One  way  to  summarize  these  engagements  with  Du  Bois’s  and  James’s  
romanticism  would  be  to  suggest  that  these  critics  are  describing  how  these  romantic  
narratives  of  slave  agency  and  art  disclose  the  entrance  of  oppressed  black  subjects  into  
the  political  and  temporal  conditions  of  modernity.  Their  romanticism  is  a  product  of  a  
shared  meta-­‐‑narratives  of  how  New  World  blacks  in  America  and  the  Caribbean  became  
self-­‐‑aware,  rational  agents,  committed  to  their  own  sovereignty  and  progress  as  a  
people;  how  they  produced  vanguard  political  and  intellectual  leaders  like  Frederick  
Douglass  and  Toussaint  Louverture  who  embodied  the  romantic  spirit  of  the  people;  
                                                                                                              
6  For  a  very  different  take  on  the  “Sorrow  Songs”  that  understands  Du  Bois  deployment  of  them  as  self-­‐‑
consciously  anti-­‐‑essentialist,  technologically  sophisticated  and  as  an  exploration  of  the  haunting  absent  
presence  of  a  full  past  in  the  present,  see  Alexander  G.  Weheliye’s  “The  Grooves  of  Temporality”  (2005).  
  
7  See  Judy’s  “The  New  Black  Aesthetic  and  W.E.B.  Du  Bois,  or  Hephaestus,  Limping”  (1994).  
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and  how  that  past  promised  a  future  after  colonization  and  Jim  Crow  of  political  
freedom.    
This  line  of  argument  (which  I  acknowledge  is  a  conflation  of  a  number  of  
complex  ideas)  suggests  that  Du  Bois  and  James  took  up  romanticism  and  romantic  
history  almost  precisely  as  it  had  been  written  by  the  nationalists  of  the  nineteenth  
century,  only  altering  it  by  rejecting  its  racially  exclusive  nationalism.  They  deploy  the  
romantic  mode  as  a  proposition  about  the  linear  path  of  political  progress,  up  from  
slavery  and  a  pre-­‐‑modern  folk  culture  into  modern  proto-­‐‑nations,  and  in  doing  so  
reproduced  the  political  elitism  and  essentialisms  inherent  in  that  narrative.  
Romanticism  becomes  a  path  by  which  the  temporalities  of  the  modern  nation-­‐‑state  and  
subjectivity  are  imposed  on  a  pan-­‐‑African  history  of  anti-­‐‑slavery  and  anti-­‐‑colonial  
revolt.  However,  as  I  have  shown  in  the  last  chapter,  black  abolitionists  of  the  
antebellum  period,  lacking  the  tools  of  materialist  analysis  and  overt  commitments  to  
radical  democracy  of  Du  Bois  and  James,  did  not  reproduce  Romantic  history  so  blindly  
and  it  is  unlikely  that  their  successors  in  writing  histories  of  slave-­‐‑revolt  would  develop  
such  a  blindness  to  the  aesthetics  of  history.  The  critical  view  of  romance  also  suggests  
that  the  primary  thought  that  went  into  Du  Bois  and  James’s  histories  was  at  the  level  of  
conceptualization  and  not  in  the  writing  of  history.  I  want  to  suggest,  rather,  that  
because  blackness  and  slavery  were  already  problems  in  how  romantic  history  
envisioned  time  and  progress,  James  and  Du  Bois  were  forced  to  reimagine  the  romantic  
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aesthetics  they  deployed  at  the  level  of  description.  Both  were  thinking  carefully  about  
how  race  and  time  were  represented  and  both  offer  models  for  thinking  about  the  
disjunctions  of  the  modern  experience  of  time  that  exceeds  the  romantic  emplotment  of  
their  texts.  I  want  to  close  this  dissertation  then  with  an  analysis  of  a  few  moments  in  
Black  Reconstruction  and  the  Black  Jacobins  where  I  think  James  and  Du  Bois  are  
powerfully  interrogating  the  aesthetics  of  romantic  history.  Finally  I  want  to  suggest  that  
such  an  attention  to  aesthetics  might  be  of  use  in  thinking  about  how  we  envision  
political  potentials  in  history  without  reverting  to  linear  romantic  forms  that  ultimately  
would  re-­‐‑inscribe  nationalist  and  progressive  concerns  with  linear  time  and  the  
development  of  sovereign  subjects.  
  
Revisionary History and the Temporality of the Black Masses 
  
In  order  to  make  this  argument  and  to  attempt  to  see  Du  Bois’s  and  James’s  
historical  aesthetic  in  a  new  register,  I  want  to  suggest  that  we  consider  the  central  object  
of  their  analysis,  the  black  masses,  as  an  aspect  of  their  aesthetic  practice.  Du  Bois  and  
James  helped  produce  this  political  concept  through  their  visionary  revision  of  its  
temporal  aesthetic.  By  calling  the  black  masses  an  aesthetic  category  I  do  not  mean  to  
refer  to  an  aesthetics  of  the  black  masses  in  a  vernacular  or  folk-­‐‑cultural  sense  registered,  
echoed,  or  reproduced  in  Du  Bois’s  or  James’s  writing  (as  scholars  like  Houston  Baker  
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have  argued,  at  least  about  Du  Bois),  nor  is  it  about  their  use  of  materialist  category  as  
part  of  their  intervention  in  Marxism  (a  la  Cedric  Robinson).  I  mean  rather  the  structural  
role  the  figuration  of  the  black  masses  fills  in  their  descriptions  of  historical  events.  In  
antebellum  romantic  history,  the  mass  of  black  bodies  played  a  central  structural  role  in  
how  those  historians  described  apocalyptic  threats  of  progressive  time.  It  was  a  
constitutive  excess  on  which  was  projected  the  temporal  crises  produced  by  imperialism  
and  slavery  that  had  to  be  constrained  by  the  progress  of  the  nation  to  secure  the  future  
order.  In  James  and  Du  Bois,  the  black  masses  are,  in  contrast,  a  central  motor  of  the  
future,  a  source  of  true  knowledge  of  freedom,  and  an  overwhelming  source  of  power  
whose  movements  can  alter  the  very  course  of  history.  However,  there  is  also  a  tension  
in  these  texts:  both  writers  struggle  to  envision  the  black  masses  as  a  source  of  future  
liberty,  but  both  frequently  figure  the  need  for  the  black  masses  as  such  to  be  educated,  
taught  discipline,  and  otherwise  constrained  by  the  progress  of  freedom.  What  I  want  to  
explore  is  whether  this  traditionally  romantic  and  linear  narrative  arc—from  the  
explosion  of  creative  potential  in  the  revolutionary  break  to  the  constraints  of  
civilizational  progress—is  ever  upended  by  the  way  James  and  Du  Bois  actually  describe  
the  emergence  of  the  black  masses  onto  the  scene  of  history.  This  can  only  be  done  
through  an  aesthetic  analysis  that  understands  them  to  be  engaging  with  the  racialized  
temporal  aesthetic  of  romantic  history.  
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While  both  The  Black  Jacobins  (one  of  James’s  earliest  works)  and  Black  
Reconstruction  (perhaps  the  ultimate  statement  of  Du  Bois’  understanding  of  history,  race  
and  democracy)  emphasize  the  role  of  the  black  masses  in  shaping  the  revolutions  they  
discuss,  they  are  both  works  that  are  surprisingly  (at  least  from  a  contemporary  
perspective)  focused  on  the  careers  of  significant  heroic  individuals  and  are  willing  to  
deploy  an  antedated  great  man  theory  of  history—although  in  a  more  limited  sense  than  
their  nineteenth-­‐‑century  forebears.  It  is  well  known  that  The  Black  Jacobins  is  also,  in  part,  
a  biography  of  Toussaint  Louverture  and  an  argument  for  his  place  among  the  great  
men  of  history.  As  James  wrote,  “The  history  of  the  San  Domingo  revolution  will  
therefore  be  a  record  of  his  achievements  and  his  political  personality  […]  with  the  
single  exception  of  Bonaparte  himself,  no  single  figure  appeared  on  the  historical  stage  
more  greatly  gifted  than  this  Negro,  a  slave  till  he  was  45”  (x).  Black  Reconstruction,  
although  more  known  for  its  class  analysis,  also  focuses  to  a  surprising  degree  on  the  
role  of  exemplary  individuals  in  shaping  events,  including  Frederick  Douglass,  Charles  
Sumner  and  Thaddeus  Stevens.  Throughout  the  text  there  is  an  emphasis  on  the  growth  
and  education  of  individuals  as  essential  elements  of  revolutionary  history,  in  ways  that  
are  remarkably  opposed  to  what  we  might  expect  of  a  social  history  focused  on  the  
achievements  of  laborers  and  slaves,  although  perhaps  explainable  by  Du  Bois’s  well  
known  elitism  and  vanguardism.      
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  Although  often  structured  by  such  elitism,  Du  Bois’s  narrative  exposes  an  
aesthetic  tension  between  the  roles  of  elite  figures  and  the  oft-­‐‑surprising  actions  of  the  
black  masses  on  their  own  behalf  that  the  author  never  fully  reconciles.  Early  on  Du  Bois  
develops  the  difference  in  condition  and  achievement  between  the  enslaved  and  free  
blacks  in  the  antebellum  era.  Women  and  men  like  Frederick  Douglass  and  Harriet  
Tubman  were  central  to  abolition  in  being  proof  of  the  contradictions  inherent  in  slavery  
and  the  leadership  they  provided  for  resistance  movements.  As  Du  Bois  writes,  “These  
free  Negroes  were  furnishing  a  leadership  for  the  mass  of  black  workers,  and  especially  
they  were  furnishing  a  text  for  the  abolition  idealist.  Fugitive  slaves  like  Frederick  
Douglass  and  others  humbler  and  less  gifted,  increased  the  number  of  abolitionists  by  
thousands  and  spelled  the  doom  of  slavery”  (13).  Fugitive  slaves  and  free  blacks  were  in  
their  very  existence  a  threat  to  slavery  because  they  testified  to  slavery’s  failure  to  turn  
humans  into  docile  property.    
In  contrast,  this  is  how  Du  Bois  describes  the  conditions  of  the  enslaved:    
Negro  slaves  in  America  represented  the  worst  and  lowest  conditions  among  
modern  laborers.  One  estimate  is  that  the  maintenance  of  a  slave  in  the  south  cost  
the  master  about  $19  a  year,  which  means  that  they  were  among  the  poorest  paid  
laborers  in  the  modern  world.  They  represented  in  a  very  real  sense  the  ultimate  
degradation  of  man.  Indeed,  the  system  was  so  reactionary,  so  utterly  
inconsistent  with  modern  progress,  that  we  simply  cannot  grasp  it  today.  (10)  
  
While  slavery  itself  is  “inconsistent  with  modern  progress,”  it  is  also  unable  to  actually  
prevent  the  intellectual  and  political  growth  of  a  figure  like  Douglass,  whose  existence  
proves  the  lie  of  slavery.  Slavery  is  both  degrading,  holding  its  objects  out  of  modern  
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time  and  development,  and  unable  to  fully  accomplish  that  end.  For  Du  Bois,  the  key  
problem  is  that,  unlike  the  white  working  class,  who  were  developing  through  the  
antebellum  period  political  leadership  and  agendas,  the  black  workers,  the  majority  of  
whom  were  held  in  slavery,  were  prevented  from  entering  into  those  forms  of  
association  that  would  help  produce  class-­‐‑consciousness.  What  they  were  left  with  were  
the  few  elite  personalities  who  could  fill  that  role  and  give  testimony  to  the  potential  of  
black  political  life,  but  who  also,  because  of  the  conditions  of  slavery,  had  to  divorce  
themselves  from  the  experience  of  slavery  and  those  still  in  its  grip  to  grow  into  that  
political  role.  In  contrast  to  the  overtly  romantic  structure,  there  is  a  fundamental  
division  between  the  elites  and  the  mass  that  cannot  be  resolved  by  simply  claiming  that  
the  former  are  representatives  of  the  latter.  
What  if  we  think  of  this  division  between  the  elite  and  the  black  masses  as  one  
defined  by  temporality?  The  white  working  class  had  access  to  the  education  and  
political  institutions  (the  right  of  assembly,  voting  rights)  that  enabled  them  to  enter  
onto  the  antebellum  political  stage  and  participate  in  the  growth  (industrial  and  
geographic)  of  the  nation.  They  were  national  political  actors  inhabiting  a  familiar  
modern  temporality  understandable  from  the  perspective  of  an  idealist  or  in  this  case,  
Marxist,  philosophy  of  progress.  In  contrast,  from  the  perspective  of  Du  Bois’s  own  
understanding  of  progress,  he  can  only  describe  the  black  workers  as  degraded  and  
unable  to  inhabit  those  political  forms  except  through  the  symbolic  growth  of  an  elite  
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few  like  Douglass.  In  the  racial  and  aesthetic  regimes  of  modernity  within  which  Du  
Bois  was  writing,  but  also  displacing,  slaves  are  a  limit  condition.  Supposedly  incapable  
of  progress  on  their  own  behalf  they  are  historically  portrayed  as  either  needing  to  be  
held  outside  of  politics,  educated  and  controlled  by  a  beneficial  order,  or,  in  becoming  
political,  an  enormous  threat  to  the  political  order.  This  figuration  of  slave  revolt  as  an  
apocalyptic  break  emerged  in  the  antebellum  period,  but  retained  its  vividness  in  the  
popular  historical  imagination  during  Reconstruction  and  its  failure.  In  Black  Marxism,  
Cedric  Robinson  has  described  Du  Bois’s  intervention  and  displacement  of  a  progressive  
model  of  political  time  at  length  as  a  matter  of  ideological  intervention.  What  I  want  to  
suggest  is  that  in  the  way  Du  Bois  described  the  politics  of  the  mass  of  slaves—the  
sudden  emergence  of  political  consciousness  from  the  most  degraded  conditions—there  
arises  an  aesthetic  revision  of  the  traditional  figuration  of  the  black  masses  in  romantic  
history  that  exceeds  and  disrupts  its  progressive  frame.    
That  romantic  and  progressive  frame,  despite  structuring  the  text,  is  a  matter  of  
ambivalence  for  Du  Bois.  As  often  as  he  embraces  temporally  marked  language  about  
the  progress  of  slaves,  their  degradation,  and  the  halting  education  and  achievements  of  
fugitive  slave  leadership,  he  was  also  prone  to  ironize  romantic  and  nationalist  
language.  Like  the  black  abolitionists  who  protested  Bancroft’s  aesthetic  nationalism,  Du  
Bois  saw  the  institution  of  slavery  as  fundamentally  incommensurable  with  any  myths  
of  progress.  Early  in  the  text,  Du  Bois  takes  up  the  language  of  aesthetic  nationalism  and  
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draws  an  ironic  portrait  of  the  effect  of  slavery  on  history,  which  is  worth  quoting  at  
length  for  the  way  it  uses  a  black  figure  to  put  progressive  temporality  in  crisis.  
America  thus  stepped  forward  in  the  first  blossoming  of  the  modern  age  and  
added  to  the  Art  of  Beauty,  gift  of  the  Renaissance,  and  to  Freedom  of  Belief,  gift  
of  Martin  Luther  and  Leo  X,  a  vision  of  democratic  self-­‐‑government;  the  
domination  of  political  life  by  the  intelligent  decision  of  free  and  self-­‐‑sustaining  
men.  What  and  idea  and  what  an  area  for  its  realization—endless  land  of  richest  
fertility,  natural  resources  such  as  Earth  seldom  exhibited  before,  a  population  
infinite  in  variety,  of  universal  gift,  burned  in  the  fires  of  poverty  and  caste,  
yearning  toward  an  unknown  God;  and  self-­‐‑reliant  pioneers  unafraid  of  man  or  
Devil.  It  was  the  Supreme  Adventure,  in  the  last  Great  Battle  of  the  West,  for  that  
human  freedom  which  would  release  the  human  spirit  from  lower  lust  for  mere  
meat,  and  set  it  free  to  dream  and  sing.  And  then  some  unjust  God,  leaned,  
laughing,  over  the  ramparts  of  heaven,  and  dropped  a  black  man  in  the  midst.  
It  transformed  the  world.  It  turned  democracy  back  to  Roman  Imperialism  and  
Fascism;  it  restored  caste  and  oligarchy,  it  replaced  freedom  with  slavery  and  
withdrew  the  name  of  humanity  from  the  vast  majority  of  human  beings.  (29-­‐‑30)  
  
This  highly  literary  quotation  should  not  be  mistaken  for  offering  a  chronological  
sequence  of  events.  Du  Bois  was  well  aware  of  the  foundations  of  American  democracy  
in  white  supremacy  and  discusses  the  connection  between  the  growth  of  universal  
suffrage  and  slavery  throughout  Black  Reconstruction.  Rather,  the  sequence  Du  Bois  
provides  interrogates  the  temporality  and  aesthetics  of  American  philosophies  of  
progress.  The  cruel  God  who  sets  down  the  black  man  in  the  midst  of  plenty  is  an  ironic  
figure  that  deflates  the  typical  portrayal  of  oppressed  blacks  as  exceptions  to  modern  
progress,  as  if  they  were  placed  in  the  midst  of  a  moral  social  order  by  a  transcendent  
force.  Du  Bois’s  rhetoric  suggests  both  the  arbitrary  foundations  of  racial  prejudice  and  
the  absurdity  of  those  ideas  about  slavery  (still  circulating  in  the  1930s)  that  understood  
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it  as  an  intrusion  into  American  politics,  rather  than  an  intrinsic  part.  The  black  figure  
that  occasions  the  world’s  return  to  forms  of  tyranny  is  not  a  transcendent  intrusion  of  
difference  into  the  temporal  order  of  progress,  but  the  very  thing  visionaries  of  progress  
had  willfully  blinded  themselves  to  in  order  to  envision  America  in  the  pure  utopian  
tones  Du  Bois  adopts  and  ironizes  at  the  beginning  of  this  paragraph.  Throughout  Black  
Reconstruction  the  humanity  of  the  black  figure  is  used  to  show  the  contradictions  in  the  
order  whose  disavowal  of  its  own  history  transforms  blackness  into  a  transcendent  and  
apocalyptic  intrusion.  Du  Bois  is  being  self-­‐‑consciously  aesthetic  here,  juxtaposing  two  
portraits  of  progress  and  regression  to  demonstrate  the  role  of  blackness  in  constituting  
and  deforming  modern  political  temporalities.  Du  Bois  identifies  blackness  as  a  primary  
exclusion  in  the  philosophy  of  progress  that  returns  in  its  aesthetics  as  an  apocalyptic  
intrusion.  
In  Black  Reconstruction,  blackness,  and  to  a  greater  degree,  the  black  masses,  
challenge  and  question  the  dominant  temporal  logics  of  progress,  even  when  Du  Bois  is  
adapting  that  a  model  of  progress  to  describe  the  growth  of  black  political  self-­‐‑
conscious.    It  reveals  tensions  in  the  text’s  overt  linear  narrative  of  the  advance  and  
defeat  of  black  political  life  in  the  “abolition-­‐‑democracy,”  because  as  an  aesthetic  figure,  
the  black  masses  remains  transcendent  to  the  idea  of  progress.  A  key  example  of  how  
Du  Bois  interrogates  this  aesthetic  is  found  in  how  he  describes  the  emergence  of  the  
black  masses  from  southern  slavery  during  “The  General  Strike.”  At  first,  Du  Bois  
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describes  the  more  educated  among  the  slaves  as  conveyers  of  the  news  of  the  war,  and  
of  the  opportunity  for  fugitivity.  Here,  the  opportunity  for  progress  and  revolution  
emerges  linearly;  representative  elites  educate  and  bring  up  the  black  masses  through  
traditional  forms  of  class-­‐‑consciousness.  Yet,  this  secular  model  of  the  political  is  quickly  
overcome  and  outpaced  by  the  slaves’  transcendent  knowledge  of  their  coming  religious  
redemption  that,  in  misperceiving  the  northern  army  as  a  liberating  army,  transforms  it  
into  one.  Political  progress  proceeds  apace,  keeping  the  Union  together,  but  the  black  
masses,  as  a  creative  agent  placed  outside  of  progress,  and  thus  granted  a  vision  beyond  
the  constraints  of  modern  time  opens  up  another  order  and  generates  the  break  of  
freedom  through  its  creative  action.    
Du  Bois  once  again  employs  an  aesthetic  vocabulary  to  describe  what  emerged  
from  this  creativity.    
A  great  song  arose,  the  loveliest  thing  born  this  side  of  the  seas.  It  was  a  new  
song.  It  did  not  come  from  Africa,  though  the  dark  throb  and  beat  of  that  Ancient  
of  Days  was  in  it  and  through  it.  It  did  not  come  from  white  America—never  
from  so  pale  and  hard  and  thin  a  thing,  however  deep  these  vulgar  and  
surrounding  tones  had  driven.  Not  the  Indies  or  the  hot  South,  the  cold  East  or  
Heavy  west  made  that  music.  It  was  a  new  song  and  its  deep  an  plaintive  beauty,  
its  great  cadences  and  wild  appeal  wailed,  throbbed  and  thundered  on  the  
world’s  ears  with  a  message  seldom  voiced  by  man.  It  swelled  an  blossomed  like  
incense,  improvised  and  born  anew  out  of  an  age  long  past,  and  weaving  into  its  
texture  the  old  and  new  melodies  in  word  and  thought.  (124)  
  
Du  Bois’s  aesthetics  of  freedom  questions  and  transcends  the  aesthetics  of  progress.  
Where  progress  is  figured  as  having  sources,  deep  roots,  institutional  basis,  and  a  shared  
love  of  liberty,  Du  Bois’  song  of  freedom  is  new,  radically  transformative  of  the  old  
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institutions  and  their  intentions.  It  does  not  come  from  anywhere  (as  if  it  came  from  
outside  of  time)  and  it  communicates  and  drives  a  creative  freedom  that  does  not  need  
other  temporal  categories  to  exist  and  assert  itself  within  linear  time.  Du  Bois  is  so  
consciously  aesthetic  in  his  language  here  because  the  version  of  progress  he  is  
interrogating  was  itself  an  aesthetic  that  made  blackness  its  opposite  and  excluded  it  
from  its  visions  of  the  future.  Here  aesthetics  is  not  primarily  visual  (although  the  
temporally  jarring  blackness  of  earlier  sections  is  important),  the  black  masses  are  
rewritten  as  aural  phenomena  in  a  way  that  belies  linear  progress.  They  are  heard,  and  
communicate,  recreating  themselves  and  the  world  around  them.  This  constitutive  
excess  of  progressive  history  returns  in  Du  Bois  aesthetics  not  as  it  had  in  romantic  
history—as  an  apocalyptic  threat—but  rather  as  a  fundamentally  transformative  creative  
force  that  reorders  linear  time.  
How  can  we  describe  this  other  time,  represented  by  black  figures  and  the  black  
masses,  that  erupts  into  the  time  of  political  progress,  setting  it  at  odds  with  itself  and  
reconstituting  the  flow  of  political  time?  Once  it  emerges,  the  black  masses  do  not  then  
enter  into  progressive  time,  so  much  as  announce  a  perennial  difference  in  time.  The  
black  masses  announce  an  always  latent  possibility  in  the  slave  and  colonial  regimes  of  
modernity  for  a  different  temporal  order  that  is  never  exhausted  by  its  own  betrayal  in  
narratives  of  black  progress  towards  self-­‐‑sovereignty.  Even  within  that  narrative  
structure,  the  aesthetic  figure  remains  in  tension  with  the  linear  trajectory  of  time  (rather  
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than  violently  suppressed,  as  it  is  in  more  traditional  romantic  history).  The  Black  Jacobins  
develops  this  perennial  potential  of  the  black  masses  to  creatively  announce  temporal  
difference  even  further.  Even  as  James  makes  excuses  for  Toussaint’s  reincorporation  of  
the  actual  black  masses  of  Haiti  into  a  labor  regime  not  at  all  dissimilar  from  the  slavery  
they  have  just  escaped,  he  figures  the  black  masses  as  capable  of  maintaining  autonomy  
even  from  those  figures  like  Toussaint  who  claim  to  be  its  representative  within  modern  
linear  political  time.    
In  James’s  history  again  we  are  confronted  with  the  indeterminate  temporality  of  
the  black  masses,  both  excluded  from  progressive  time  and  yet  of  fundamental  
importance  to  the  future  James  desired.  In  another  text  from  the  same  period,  A  History  
of  Negro  Revolt  (1938,  republished  in  1969  as  A  History  of  Pan-­‐‑African  Revolt),  this  problem  
is  laid  out  concisely  in  a  brief  discussion  of  slave  revolts  in  the  antebellum  south.  James  
offers  three  rather  ambivalent  formulations  in  describing  successively  Gabriel’s,  
Denmark  Vesey’s  and  Nat  Turner’s  revolts.  He  begins  by  claiming  that  on  the  whole,  
“[t]he  slaves  gained  nothing  by  these  revolts.  No  attempt  is  made  to  treat  them  more  
kindly.  Instead  revolts  are  savagely  repressed  and  the  severity  of  slave  legislation  
increased.”  Then  after  discussing  the  scope  of  Gabriel’s  revolt  he  writes,  “[y]et  these  
American  revolts  between  1670  and  1860  follow  certain  laws.  […]  While  their  masters  
lived  in  constant  terror,  the  Negroes  themselves  seemed  unconscious  of  their  
revolutionary  potentialities  when  organized  on  an  extensive  scale.”  Then  again  a  page  
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latter  he  writes,  “[t]he  revolt  ended  as  always  in  failure  and  bloody  suppression.  Yet  
Gabriel  and  his  followers  were  slave  revolutionaries  above  the  average,”  and  then  
discusses  their  plans  to  exempts  Quakers  and  the  French  from  violence  for  their  anti-­‐‑
slavery  leaning.  Finally,  discussing  Nat  Turner  he  writes  “[s]o  far  Nat  Turner’s  revolt  
was  commonplace.  But  this  revolt  had  an  effect  out  of  proportion  to  its  size,”  but  gives  
little  sense  of  what  he  means  by  that  effect  (25).  
The  ambiguity  of  this  analysis  lies  in  the  difficulty  of  accounting  for  failed  slave  
revolts  within  a  form  of  historical  writing  aimed  at  recounting  linear  progress.  As  in  the  
accounts  of  abolitionist  historians  of  these  and  other  revolts,  the  agency  of  the  slaves  in  
resisting  their  own  oppression  is  a  matter  of  great  importance,  but  because  the  revolts  
failed  and,  in  the  short  term,  the  oppression  only  grew  more  severe  James  struggles  to  
understand  the  precise  character  of  that  significance.  While  this  is  evidently  a  political  
problem  that  has  preoccupied  much  writing  about  slave  experience,  it  is  useful  to  also  
understand  it  as  an  aesthetic  problem  that  James  attempted  to  resolve  in  The  Black  
Jacobins.8  In  that  text  the  context  of  the  French  Revolution  and  the  leadership  of  
Toussaint  Louverture  opens  up  the  possibility  that  a  slave  revolt  could  become  a  
significant  driver  of  history.  At  the  same  time,  the  agency  of  the  slaves  only  enters  into  
the  narrative  through  the  shaping  persona  of  Toussaint  Louverture  and  a  few  other  
                                                                                                              
8  For  a  thoughtful  discussion  and  intervention  into  debates  over  slave  agency  in  the  historiography  of  
slavery,  see  Walter  Johnson’s  “On  Agency,”  (2003).  
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black  leaders.  The  responsiveness  of  the  black  masses  to  Toussaint  enables  its  
constituents  to  be  represented  within  the  flow  of  historical  progress  and  thus  generate  
concrete  historical  outcomes.    
For  instance,  this  is  how  James  describes  Toussaint’s  relationship  with  the  former  
slaves  during  the  period  of  his  ascension  to  a  position  of  power  in  what  was  still  San  
Domingue:    
Leader  of  a  backward  and  ignorant  mass,  he  was  yet  in  the  forefront  of  the  great    
historical  movement  of  his  time.  The  blacks  were  taking  their  part  in  the  
destruction  of  European  feudalism  begun  by  the  French  Revolution,  and  liberty  
and  equality,  the  slogans  of  the  revolution  meant  far  more  to  them  than  to  any  
Frenchman.    (198)  
  
In  James’s  description,  the  black  slaves  of  San  Domingue  have  come  to  participate  in  a  
great  historical  movement.  They  are  vital  agents  of  a  major  historical  shift.  But  because  
they  have  been  held  outside  of  the  political  forms  of  modern  time  (“a  backward  and  
ignorant  mass”)  they  are  only  able  to  take  up  this  role  through  the  exemplary  leadership  
of  Toussaint,  himself  an  ex-­‐‑slave  who  has  made  a  great  leap  forward  into  a  mastery  of  
modern  political  forms.  The  entrance  of  the  slaves  into  political  history  depends  on  their  
elite  representative,  but  at  the  same  time,  the  slogans  of  political  modernity  (“liberty  and  
equality”)  belong  far  more  to  their  ways  of  knowing  and  living  than  to  the  Frenchmen  
who  are  more  widely  acknowledged  as  modern  political  actors.  The  black  masses  are  
both  incapable  of  becoming  modern  without  Toussaint  and  more  fundamentally  a  force  
in  history  than  those  who  we  take  for  granted  as  political  agents.    
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Despite  the  discourse  of  modern  political  progress  that  understands  the  black  
masses  as  degraded  or  backward  as  a  product  of  their  exclusion  from  progressive  time,  
James  writes  the  black  masses  as  having  an  excessive  capacity  for  freedom.  The  black  
masses  bring  about  the  future  more  decisively  than  any  other  group  or  agent  in  the  text.  
Thus,  for  much  of  the  text  James  emphasizes  Toussaint’s  efforts  to  constrain  and  educate  
the  black  masses  so  the  colony  of  San  Domingue  can  more  fully  enter  into  modern  forms  
of  political  sovereignty.  It  might  be  surprising  that  James  endorses  Toussaint’s  political  
suppression  of  the  black  masses,  but,  as  David  Scott  has  suggested  this  is  in  part  
attributable  to  his  sense  of  the  impossibility  of  the  options  Toussaint  faced,  beset  at  all  
sides  by  avaricious  imperialist  nations.    
Here  is  how  James  describes  Toussaint’s  use  of  the  ex-­‐‑slaves  in  the  development  
of  San  Domingue’s  economic  independence:    
The  ultimate  guarantee  of  freedom  was  the  prosperity  of  agriculture.  This  was  
Toussaint’s  slogan.  The  danger  was  that  the  blacks  might  slip  into  the  practice  of  
cultivating  a  small  patch  of  land,  producing  just  sufficient  for  their  needs.  He  
would  not  allow  the  old  estates  to  be  broken  up,  but  bound  by  the  interests  of  the  
labourers  to  their  work  by  giving  them  their  keep  and  forth  of  the  produce  […]  
he  confined  the  blacks  to  the  plantations  under  rigid  penalties.  He  was  battling  
the  colossal  task  of  transforming  a  slave  population,  after  years  of  license,  into  a  
community  of  free  labourers,  and  he  was  doing  it  in  the  only  way  he  could  see.  
[emphasis  added]  (242)  
     
In  order  to  ensure  the  entrance  of  the  black  masses  into  a  modern  form  of  political  
organization  they  have  to  be  bound  and  constrained  by  a  leader  who  can  fully  represent  
and  direct  their  interests.  The  rhetoric  here  of  binding  and  constraint  is  haunted  with  the  
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slave  past  from  which  these  workers  have  just  escaped,  and  in  the  next  sentence  James  
remarks  on  the  relation  between  the  new  despotism  and  the  old.  Yet,  where  James’s  
narrative  overtly  figures  this  despotism  as  necessary  part  of  Toussaint’s  attempts  to  raise  
up  the  black  masses  from  a  “degraded  and  ignorant”  past,  the  sense  that  this  process  is  a  
forward  and  progressive  action  is  put  to  question  by  James’s  inclusion  of  the  potentially  
contrary  desires  of  the  ex-­‐‑slaves:  “[t]he  danger  was  that  the  blacks  might  slip  into  the  
practice  of  cultivating  their  own  plot  of  land.”  As  recent  historians  of  Haiti  have  argued,  
this  indeed  did  happen  and  helped  established  a  long  running  division  in  Haitian  
society  between  the  semi-­‐‑autonomous  rural  masses  and  the  urban  elite  who  (often  
unsuccessfully)  attempted  to  extract  capital  from  the  remote  regions.9  The  language  of  
slippage  ties  together  the  temporal  coordinates  of  progress  (as  in  slipping  backwards  or  
down  a  slope)  with  an  entirely  different  future  of  freedom  beyond  the  constraints  of  
progress  (as  in  slipping  out  of  one’s  chains).  This  other  future  of  independent  
agricultural  labor  was  excessive  to  Toussaint’s  vision  of  progress  so  it  had  to  be  
constrained,  but  it  remained  an  immanent  potential  of  the  actions  of  the  black  masses,  
who  sought  to  slip  beyond  the  oppressive  conditions  of  modern  labor  (slave  and  free)  
entirely.  Again,  it  is  this  excessive  futurity,  beyond  and  at  odds  with  progress,  that  
                                                                                                              
9  See  Michel-­‐‑Rolph  Trouillot’s  Haiti:  State  Against  Nation  and  Laurent  Dubois’s  Haiti:  The  Aftershocks  of  
History  for  further  explications  of  this  phenomenon.  
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haunts  James’s  concept  of  the  black  masses  as  an  aesthetic  excess.  It  is  a  feeling  for  the  
future  that  cannot  be  accommodated  to  modern  time.  
Though  constrained  by  the  framework  of  a  romantic  narrative  that  would  see  the  
black  masses  as  a  folk  that  had  to  be  educated  into  modern  political  forms  by  elite  
political  leaders  to  unleash  their  potential  for  historical  change,  the  black  masses  sets  the  
temporal  order  of  James’s  narrative  into  tension.  It  introduces  into  the  text  another  order  
of  time  that  has  been  excluded  from  modernity  and  is  set  against  the  progressive  future  
pursued  by  the  elite  Toussaint.  By  the  end  of  the  text,  the  distance  between  Toussaint  
and  the  black  masses  results  in  the  tragic  undoing  of  a  number  of  revolutionary  gains.  
David  Scott  sees  this  tragedy  as  a  result  of  the  constraints  placed  on  Toussaint  by  the  
impossible  choices  of  colonial  modernity  that  demanded  he  maintain  economic  coercion  
of  labor  to  maintain  abolition,  thus  setting  him  at  odds  with  the  desires  of  his  people.  I  
agree  with  this  reading  and  its  saliency  for  our  current  political  moment  but  also  want  to  
suggest  that  the  black  masses  present  an  alternative  to  both  the  romantic  and  tragic  
narrative  modes  of  the  text.  The  black  masses,  as  drawn  by  Du  Bois  and  James,  throws  
into  crisis  modern  temporalities  of  progress.  It  introduces  an  excessive  desire  for  the  
future  that  cannot  be  accommodated  to  conventional  narrative  modes  of  historiography  
and  forces  both  authors  to  confront  other  futures  than  what  has  been.  This  feeling  for  a  
different  order  in  history  upsets  progressive  time,  overturning  the  discursive  limits  of  
historical  narration  with  potentials  that  lie  beyond  history  as  such,  offering  us  texts  
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whose  registration  of  temporality  is  always  doubled,  modern  and  progressive  whilst  
being  radically  otherwise  in  the  same  instant.  
   The  histories  that  I  have  analyzed  in  this  dissertation  do  more  than  just  narrate  
stories  about  the  past  or  deploy  ideological  myths  about  race  and  the  nation;  they  
encode  feelings  for  the  limits  and  potentials  of  time  itself.  Critical  scholarship  would  do  
well  to  grasp  the  lesson  of  the  aesthetics  of  history.  Texts  committed  to  tracing  linear  
connections  in  the  cause  and  effects  of  things  that  happened  in  the  past,  whether  
committed  to  a  philosophy  of  progress  or  not,  are  inevitably  aesthetic  in  the  way  they  
produce  a  feeling  for  history  as  a  space  of  limitation  and  constraint.  Linearity  is  a  feeling  
for  limitation,  for  what  must  have  been  and  could  not  have  been  otherwise.  That  logic  is  
aesthetic  insomuch  as  it  is  not  grounded  by  anything  but  the  narrative  production  of  
coherency.  The  threat  of  historical  scholarship,  despite  valuable  critical  aims,  is  to  
overwhelm  us  with  the  thought  of  what  must  be  through  the  limiting  and  limited  
narratives  structured  by  a  linear  sense  of  temporality.  Dormant  in  the  aesthetics  of  
history  is  the  possibility  that  historical  scholarship  would  aim  at  the  production  of  
different  feelings  for  how  the  past  is  connected  to  the  future  that  would  refresh  our  
memory  that  history  can  always  have  been  different  from  what  it  has  been.  The  affects  
encoded  in  our  writing  are  fundamental  aspects  of  out  political  vision.  Writing  
aesthetically  should  be  a  process  of  producing  tensions,  not  erasing  them  in  the  closure  
of  a  single  time.  In  daring,  like  James  and  Du  Bois,  to  engage  with  an  aesthetic  form  like  
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romance  we  may  well  run  past  its  limits,  as  they  did,  in  the  revisionary  rewriting  of  its  
aesthetic  codes.  Rather  than  more  debunking  narratives  of  ideologically  suspect  
aesthetic  modes,  we  need  more  aesthetic  categories  that  can  expose  the  limits  of  our  
modernity  and  make  us  feel  the  possibility  that  the  future  contains  more  than  one  
possible  trajectory  and  more  than  a  single  ordering  of  the  past.     
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